两汉政府对少数民族的赋役政策

作为我国统一的多民族国家形成的初级阶段,两汉时期的中央政府在对少数民族赋役政策方面做了积极的探索,形成了以贡纳羁縻之、以兵役统率之、以赋税汉化之的特点。这为后世封建王朝处理此类问题提供了借鉴,为中华民族的形成做出了贡献。     

The Smothering Embrace: Competition in the Implementation of Social Policy

One element of recent welfare state reform has been the introduction of market coordination in the implementation of social policy. The authors of this article have conducted a comparative study of social security, health care and housing policy implementation in the Netherlands, focusing on the conditions necessary for an effective mechanism of competition. The most important condition is that clients should be able to switch between providers without difficulty. Evidence shows that the providers in these fields of social policy engage in activities that undermine the potential for future competition. While this is not uncommon in itself, the new markets in social policy appear to be particularly vulnerable to such activities. This can be explained on the basis of two variables: (1) the institutional characteristics of the policy fields as they existed before the introduction of market coordination, and (2) the characteristics of the products that providers distribute. The combination of path dependency and product characteristics strengthens efforts to reduce competition.     

Measuring power and satisfaction in societies with opinion leaders: an axiomatization

Opinion leaders are actors who have some power over their followers as they are able to influence their followers’ choice of action in certain instances. In van den Brink et al. (Homo Oeconomicus 28:161–185, 2011) we proposed a two-action model for societies with opinion leaders. We introduced a power and a satisfaction score and studied some common properties. In this paper we strengthen two of these properties and present two further properties, which allows us to axiomatize both scores for the case that followers require unanimous action inclinations of their opinion leaders to follow them independently from their own action inclinations.     

Index of Authors Volume 50, 2000

Authors Index

Index of Authors Volume 50, 2000     

Digraph Competitions and Cooperative Games

Digraph games are cooperative TU-games associated to domination structures which can be modeled by directed graphs. Examples come from sports competitions or from simple majority win digraphs corresponding to preference profiles in social choice theory. The Shapley value, core, marginal vectors and selectope vectors of digraph games are characterized in terms of so-called simple score vectors. A general characterization of the class of (almost positive) TU-games where each selectope vector is a marginal vector is provided in terms of game semi-circuits. Finally, applications to the ranking of teams in sports competitions and of alternatives in social choice theory are discussed.     

Axiomatization of a class of share functions for n-person games

The Shapley value is the unique value defined on the class of cooperative games in characteristic function form which satisfies certain intuitively reasonable axioms. Alternatively, the Banzhaf value is the unique value satisfying a different set of axioms. The main drawback of the latter value is that it does not satisfy the efficiency axiom, so that the sum of the values assigned to the players does not need to be equal to the worth of the grand coalition. By definition, the normalized Banzhaf value satisfies the efficiency axiom, but not the usual axiom of additivity.In this paper we generalize the axiom of additivity by introducing a positive real valued function on the class of cooperative games in characteristic function form. The so-called axiom of -additivity generalizes the classical axiom of additivity by putting the weight (v) on the value of the gamev . We show that any additive function determines a unique share function satisfying the axioms of efficient shares, null player property, symmetry and -additivity on the subclass of games on which is positive and which contains all positively scaled unanimity games. The axiom of efficient shares means that the sum of the values equals one. Hence the share function gives the shares of the players in the worth of the grand coalition. The corresponding value function is obtained by multiplying the shares with the worth of the grand coalition. By defining the function appropiately we get the share functions corresponding to the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value. So, for both values we have that the corresponding share functions belong to this class of share functions. Moreover, it shows that our approach provides an axiomatization of the normalized Banzhaf value. We also discuss some other choices of the function and the corresponding share functions. Furthermore we consider the axiomatization on the subclass of monotone simple games.     

Decentralized Implementation of Flood Resilience Measures – A Blessing or a Curse? Lessons from the Thames Estuary 2100 Plan and the Royal Docks Regeneration

This article presents a case study on the implementation of the Thames Estuary 2100 Plan in the Royal Docks, a regeneration project in the East of London. On paper, the Thames Estuary 2100 Plan advances the shift from traditional flood control to flood resilience, because of its long-term horizon, estuary-wide approach, and emphasis on floodplain management. In practice, however, we identify three frictions between vision and reality: a lack of local ownership of the plan, a lack of clear guidance for floodplain management, and limited capacities with local authority. These frictions suggest an ongoing ‘public-public divide’ in decentralized governance.     

Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values

One of the main issues in economic allocation problems is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide three different characterizations of egalitarian Shapley values being convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division solution. First, from the perspective of a variable player set, we show that all these solutions satisfy the same reduced game consistency. Second, on a fixed player set, we characterize this class of solutions using monotonicity properties. Finally, towards a strategic foundation, we provide a non-cooperative implementation for these solutions which only differ in the probability of breakdown at a certain stage of the game. These characterizations discover fundamental differences as well as intriguing connections between marginalism and egalitarianism.     

Crossover of distress due to work and family demands in dual-earner couples: A dyadic analysis

Abstract

Distress resulting from work and family overload is likely to be interdependent between partners, as both men and women increasingly participate in work and family tasks. We attempted to explain distress of both partners by looking at their work and family demands and the resulting time and energy deficits experienced by each partner. Furthermore, we investigated how time deficit, energy deficit and distress due to such demands crossover between partners. The study, which used a precise measurement of family demands, was based on a sample of both partners from 828 dual-earner couples in The Netherlands. The results showed that for both partners work and family demands increase time deficit and energy deficit. Energy deficit due to heavy demands resulted in more feelings of distress, whereas time deficit did not contribute significantly to distress. We found different patterns of crossover between male and female partners. Feelings of time deficit and energy deficit crossed over from the man to the woman, whereas feelings of distress crossed over from the woman to the man. These results indicate that the demands on each partner contribute to their own distress, as well as to their partner's distress, either through the crossover of energy deficit or through the crossover of distress