Upon infection with foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV) a considerable number of animals become carriers of the virus. These carriers are considered to be a risk for new outbreaks, but the rate at which these animals can transmit the infection has not been quantified. An analysis was carried out using data from previously published experiments in order to quantify the transmission rate parameter β of FMDV infection from carriers to susceptible animals. The parameter β was estimated at 0.0256 (likelihood-based confidence interval: 0.008–0.059) infections per carrier per month. Moreover, analysis of published experimental data indicates that the proportion of FMDV carriers decreases at a rate of 0.115 per month. Both parameters obtained from this study are useful for quantitative risk analyses of the trade of animals from FMDV-infected areas or the lifting of vaccination programs. 相似文献
Social Indicators Research - Recent interests in transit services have captured attention of experts on the monitoring of public transport quality. Previous research focused on relevant models and... 相似文献
We extend the deceptive advertising model of Piccolo et al. (RAND J Econ 46(3):611–624, 2015) to a framework in which consumers may be loss averse. There are two sellers, competing on prices and offering experience goods with some differences in quality. Prospective customers may be harmed by deceptive advertising: a marketing practice that can induce them to make bad purchases. We show that although deceptive advertising occurs depending on the degree of consumers’ loss aversion, this behavioral bias does not reflect on firms’ prices. Nevertheless, the presence of loss-averse consumers crucially changes the optimal deterrence rule that a Public Authority should adopt against false claims and misleading advertising. Unlike Piccolo et al. (2015), in this more general model, strong enforcements may improve the buyer welfare according to the degree of loss aversion.
This article examines the effects of uncertainty aversion in competitive call option markets using a partial equilibrium model
with the Choquet-expected utility setup. We find that the trading volume of a call option is negatively affected by uncertainty
aversion, whereas the price of the call is practically independent of it.
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We characterize, in the Anscombe–Aumann framework, the preferences for which there are a utility functionu on outcomes and an ambiguity indexc on the set of probabilities on the states of the world such that, for all acts f and g, . The function u represents the decision maker's risk attitudes, while the index c captures his ambiguity attitudes. These preferences include the multiple priors preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler and the multiplier preferences of Hansen and Sargent. This provides a rigorous decision‐theoretic foundation for the latter model, which has been widely used in macroeconomics and finance. 相似文献
The Choquet expected utility model deals with nonadditive probabilities (or capacities). Their dependence on the information
the decision-maker has about the possibility of the events is taken into account. Two kinds of information are examined: interval
information (for instance, the percentage of white balls in an urn is between 60% and 100%) and comparative information (for
instance, the information that there are more white balls than black ones). Some implications are shown with regard to the
core of the capacity and to two additive measures which can be derived from capacities: the Shapley value and the nucleolus.
Interval information bounds prove to be satisfied by all probabilities in the core, but they are not necessarily satisfied
by the nucleolus (when the core is empty) and the Shapley value. We must introduce the constrained nucleolus in order for
these bounds to be satisfied, while the Shapley value does not seem to be adjustable. On the contrary, comparative information
inequalities prove to be not necessarily satisfied by all probabilities in the core and we must introduce the constrained
core in order for these inequalities be satisfied. However, both the nucleolus and the Shapley value satisfy the comparative
information inequalities, and the Shapley value does it more strictly than the nucleolus.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
This is the first of two papers where we present a formal model of unawareness. We contrast unawareness with certainty and uncertainty. A subject is certain of something when he knows that thing; he is uncertain when he does not know it, but he knows he does not: he is consciously uncertain. On the other hand, he isunaware of something when he does not know it, and he does not know he does not know, and so on ad infinitum: he does not perceive, does not have in mind, the object of knowledge. The opposite of unawareness is awareness, which includes certainty and uncertainty.This paper has three main purposes. First, we formalize the concept of awareness, and introduce a symmetry axiom which states that a subject can be aware of something, say, if and only if he is aware of its negation not-; in other words, that and not- are perceived together, or neither is. We then derive the basic properties of awareness.The second purpose is to prove a different axiomatic characterization, based on the concept of awareness of the system which underlies the model of information with partitional structures (known asS5).The third purpose of this paper is to show that without a substantial weakening of the rules of inferences normally assumed in modal logic a satisfactory model of unawareness, which includes the symmetry axiom, is impossible. This alternative approach is developed in a second paper by the same authors. 相似文献