Participatory Organizational Research: Examining Voice in the Co‐production of Knowledge

This paper advances participatory methods in management research. We propose the term participatory organizational research to describe this adjunct to action research. We illustrate the potential of the method to allow sometimes unheard organizational members to generate alternative perspectives that can offer the potential for the co‐production of new forms of knowledge that are locally relevant. Participatory methods originate from work with marginalized groups and have been used more commonly in community and organizational development. The aim of such research is, generally, to change the social and organizational conditions within which participants operate by using their perspectives as active participants to develop alternative possibilities. As such, this research method has significant potential for management researchers in providing the means for unheard organizational members to voice their perspectives: a central component, we argue, in knowledge co‐production. Based on a participatory study of care quality in elder care institutions, we examine in detail how participatory organizational research can enable voice and explore some of the structural limitations particularly in respect of research ethics.     

非对称成本扰动信息非线性需求函数下的供应链契约设计

为了分析非对称的成本扰动信息对于供应链契约设计的影响,研究了当制造商的成本发生扰动并且扰动信息是非对称的情形下的零售商的最优契约设计问题。假定市场需求是关于价格的非线性函数,使用委托-代理理论,设计了非对称的成本扰动信息下的供应链最优契约菜单,并且分析了非对称的扰动信息对于供应链绩效的影响。研究结果表明,当需求为常数柔性函数或者指数函数形式时,可以设计有效的契约菜单来改善供应链的绩效;在非对称的成本扰动信息下,当生产成本扰动满足一定条件时,初始的生产计划仍然是最优的;非对称的成本扰动信息并不必然会给供应链带来利润损失。最后通过数值算例对模型的结果进行了验证。     

Incentives in a Stage‐Gate Process

Many large organizations use a stage‐gate process to manage new product development projects. In a typical stage‐gate process project managers learn about potential ideas from research and exert effort in development while senior executives make intervening go/no‐go decisions. This decentralized decision making results in an agency problem because the idea quality in early stages is unknown to the executive and the project manager must exert unobservable development effort in later stages. In light of these challenges, how should the firm structure incentives to ensure that project managers reveal relevant information and invest the appropriate effort to create value? In this study, we develop a model of adverse selection in research and moral hazard in development with a go/no‐go decision at the intervening gate. Our results show that the principal's uncertainty regarding early‐stage idea quality—a term we refer to as idea risk—alters the effect of late‐stage development risk. The presence of idea risk can alter the incentives offered to the agent and may lead the principal to reject projects that otherwise seem favorable in terms of positive net present value. A simulation of early‐stage ideas, found through search on a complex landscape, shows that the firm can mitigate the negative effects of idea risk by encouraging breadth of search and high tolerance for failure.     

Balancing Revenues and Repair Costs under Partial Information about Product Reliability

We consider the problem faced by a company selling a product with warranty and under partial information about the product reliability. The product can fail from multiple failure types, each of which is associated with an inherently different repair cost. If the product fails within the warranty duration, then the company is required to pay the repair cost. The company does not know the probabilities associated with different failure types, but it learns the failure probabilities as sales occur and failure information is accumulated. If the failure probabilities turn out to be too high and it becomes costly to fulfill the warranty coverage, then the company may decide to stop selling the product, possibly replacing it with a more reliable alternative. The objective is to decide if and when to stop. By formulating the problem as a dynamic program with Bayesian learning, we establish structural properties of the optimal policy. Since computing the optimal policy is intractable due to the high dimensional state space, we propose two approximation methods. The first method is based on decomposing the problem by failure types and it provides upper bounds on the value functions. The second method provides lower bounds on the value functions and it is based on a deterministic approximation. Computational experiments indicate that the policy from the first method provides noticeable benefits, especially when it is difficult to form good estimates of the failure probabilities quickly.     

融资代建制─公共工程项目建设管理新模式

本文明确了融资代建制的概念,将公共工程项目–项目融资–代建制联系起来,构建了公共工程项目融资代建制模式框架为:二个层次、三种管理和三项保证。进一步指出融资代建制是有中国特色的PFI,是公共工程项目建设管理的创新模式。     

集团军山地进攻作战减员预计模型

收集了我军以往作战军减员的经验数据,建立军减员率的时间序列模型,提出计算机模拟的方法。在此基础上,着重分析影响减员的多种因素,对交战双方武器装备数量及技术等级,作战地区的地形和气候条件等因素进行了定量描述。运用专家咨询方法筛选了社会经济行为等"软"指标,用群体层次分析法确定各指标的权重,建立了量化指标体系,并运用该指标体系对我军今后主要作战对象进行了量化。结合以上因素对计算机模拟生成的数据进行修正,建立相应的调整算法。     

利用CAPM计算中国房地产行业资本成本

行业资本成本特别是中国房地产行业资本成本的计算具有重要的意义,这不但是房地产行业的投资者进行投资的主要参考依据,也是房地产企业投融资活动的重要参考依据。本文首先对资本成本理论进行了综述,并且利用经典资本资产定价模型即CAPM理论对中国房地产行业资本成本进行了计算,得出中国房地产行业的资本成本为12.44%。在此基础之上可以初步认为:如果中国房地产投资的实际回报率低于12.44%,而仍然有大量资金涌入的话,那么该行业确实存在着一些“泡沫”。     

Business- oder Life-Coaching: Ist das die richtige Frage?

Three case studies are the basis for pointing out how a coaching may proceed to life–coaching. Some formal and methodical requirements for the consulting process are developed and possible central questions regarding the subsequent meta–level-dialogue are specified.     

运力受扰的多车场车辆调度干扰管理问题研究

为解决物流配送系统中因运输车辆毁坏而产生的干扰问题,基于干扰管理思想提出了解决问题的扰动恢复策略与实施方案。在扰动度量的基础上,设计了多车场车辆调度扰动恢复策略,建立相应的干扰管理模型。针对多车场车辆调度干扰管理问题的特有属性,设计了一系列求解简化策略,有效简化了问题的求解空间。结合干扰管理模型的特点,使用改进的遗传算法进行求解。最后给出了一个算例,其结果证明了干扰管理模型与算法的有效性。     

考虑零售商质量控制和风险规避的供应链网络均衡研究

研究零售商质量控制和供应链成员风险规避背景下供应链网络均衡问题。应用条件风险值度量风险规避程度,利用变分不等式理论描绘供应链参与者的最优经济行为,设计供应链网络均衡模型,考虑风险规避和质量控制策略对均衡的影响,证明均衡解存在且唯一,并运用Levenberg-Marquardt算法求解均衡模型。最后对重要参数进行数值分析,揭示质量控制和风险规避对供应链均衡解以及参与者条件风险值的影响。研究表明：供应链参与者越规避风险越有利于产品质量水平的提高,风险规避程度的加深会降低制造商或零售商自身的CVaR,同时增大对方的CVaR,对因产品合格率提高带来的利益而言,制造商所得优于零售商。