Clinical Social Work and Psychoanalysis: Introduction to the Special Issue

As clinical social work developed in America it was highly influenced by the concepts and techniques of psychoanalysis and many of its practitioners became interested in seeking psychoanalytic training. More and more psychoanalysts are now coming from a background in clinical social work due to the development of a network of interdisciplinary training institutes and the opening of the Institutes of the American Psychoanalytic Association to non-medical candidates. This special issue considers how psychoanalysis may be affected as more of its practitioners and contributors come from a background in clinical social work. This introduction reviews the history of the development of clinical social work and outlines the issues related to “lay analysis” in this country.

“Which One Is Yours?”: Children and Ethnography

This paper explores roles that children play in ethnographic research. Based on the limited literature on children in the field, and drawing on examples from ethnographies across disciplines, I identify four roles for children: 1) as “wedges,” or as instrumentally important in helping adult ethnographers gain access in various ways; 2) as collaborators; 3) as objects of study; and 4) as subjects of study. I also discuss the ways in which these roles illuminate key methodological issues in ethnography, like reflexivity, ethics, and agency. The paper synthesizes and integrates previously disconnected research on the presence of children in the field with ethnographies in which children and childhood are the topics of research. I draw on my own fieldwork experiences for further illustration.

$${\mathcal{Q}}$$-anonymous social welfare relations on infinite utility streams

This paper studies a class of social welfare relations (SWRs) on the set of infinite utility streams. In particular, we examine the SWRs satisfying -Anonymity, an impartiality axiom stronger than Finite Anonymity, as well as Strong Pareto and a certain equity axiom. First, we characterize the extension of the generalized Lorenz SWR by combining -Anonymity with Strong Pareto and Pigou–Dalton Equity. Second, we replace Pigou–Dalton Equity with Hammond Equity for characterizing the extended leximin SWR. Third, we give an alternative characterization of the extended utilitarian SWR by substituting Incremental Equity for Pigou–Dalton Equity.     

The NIP graph of a social welfare function

We consider the fraction of pairs of m distinct alternatives on which a social welfare function f may be nondictatorially independent and Pareto when the domain of f satisfies the free k-tuple property. When k = 4 we improve the existing upper bound to . When there are at least 26 alternatives and we obtain an original upper bound, . To obtain these results we define and analyze the graph formed from the nondictatorial independent and Pareto pairs and combine the results of this analysis with known results from extremal graph theory. The authors extend special thanks to the two reviewers and the editor for their comments.     

Minimal covering set solutions

We study necessary and sufficient conditions for a multi-valued solution S to be rationalized in the following sense: there exists a complete asymmetric relation T (a tournament) such that, for each feasible (finite) set, the solution set of S coincides with the minimal covering set of T restricted to that feasible set. Our characterization result relies only on properties relating S across feasible choice sets.     

Moral hazard and free riding in collective action

Most political and economic theorists point to moral hazard in teams as the main obstacle to lobbies’ collective action. In this paper, we address this important issue with a coalition-formation game. In the process of doing so, we characterize equilibrium lobby structures both in the absence and in the presence of moral hazard. Three notable results emerge from such an exercise: (1) an equilibrium lobby structure exists under both specifications of the model, (2) moral hazard in teams may raise large groups’ equilibrium lobby size, and (3) it may also raise the level of collective action of large groups with low organizational costs. I wish to express my appreciation to Helmuth Cremer, Philippe De Donder, Kai A. Konrad, Michel Le Breton, Daniel Seidmann, Shlomo Weber, an associate editor of this journal and a referee for valuable comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to Paul Belleflamme, Francis Bloch, Robert Dur, Joan Esteban, Debraj Ray, and the audience at the CESifo Area Conference on Public Sector Economics 2006 and at the 15th Aix-Marseille SSIEIO for helpful discussions.