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51.
52.
The logistic model has some limitations when applied to the sparse census data sets, typically available for developing countries. In such a situation, the relative growth rates (RGR) exhibit some unusual trends which are different from the common decreasing trend of logistic law. To explain such irregular trends we extend the logistic law by incorporating nonlinear positive and negative feedback terms. We performed RGR modelling as a function of time, as the size covariate model is not analytically solvable and the underlying model is better identifiable in the former case. It can also detect the demographic phase change point of developing country. 相似文献
53.
Aritra Banik Bhaswar B. Bhattacharya Sandip Das 《Journal of Combinatorial Optimization》2013,26(4):655-669
The one-round discrete Voronoi game, with respect to a n-point user set $\mathcal {U}$ , consists of two players Player 1 (P1) and Player 2 (P2). At first, P1 chooses a set $\mathcal{F}_{1}$ of m facilities following which P2 chooses another set $\mathcal{F}_{2}$ of m facilities, disjoint from $\mathcal{F}_{1}$ , where m(=O(1)) is a positive constant. The payoff of P2 is defined as the cardinality of the set of points in $\mathcal{U}$ which are closer to a facility in $\mathcal{F}_{2}$ than to every facility in $\mathcal{F}_{1}$ , and the payoff of P1 is the difference between the number of users in $\mathcal{U}$ and the payoff of P2. The objective of both the players in the game is to maximize their respective payoffs. In this paper, we address the case where the points in $\mathcal{U}$ are located along a line. We show that if the sorted order of the points in $\mathcal{U}$ along the line is known, then the optimal strategy of P2, given any placement of facilities by P1, can be computed in O(n) time. We then prove that for m≥2 the optimal strategy of P1 in the one-round discrete Voronoi game, with the users on a line, can be computed in $O(n^{m-\lambda_{m}})$ time, where 0<λ m <1, is a constant depending only on m. 相似文献
54.
The value of mortality risk reductions in Delhi,India 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Soma Bhattacharya Anna Alberini Maureen L. Cropper 《Journal of Risk and Uncertainty》2007,34(1):21-47
We interviewed commuters in Delhi, India, to estimate their willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce their risk of dying in road
traffic accidents in three scenarios that mirror the circumstances under which traffic fatalities occur in Delhi. The WTP
responses are internally valid: WTP increases with the size of the risk reduction, income, and exposure to road traffic risks,
as measured by length of commute and whether the respondent drives a motorcycle. As a result, the value of a statistical life
(VSL) varies across groups of beneficiaries. For the most highly-exposed individuals the VSL is about 150,000 Purchasing Power
Parity (PPP) dollars.
相似文献
Maureen L. CropperEmail: |
55.
Process plants deal with hazardous (highly flammable and toxic) chemicals at extreme conditions of temperature and pressure. Proper inspection and maintenance of these facilities is paramount for the maintenance of safe and continuous operation. This article proposes a risk-based methodology for integrity and inspection modeling (RBIIM) to ensure safe and fault-free operation of the facility. This methodology uses a gamma distribution to model the material degradation and a Bayesian updating method to improve the distribution based on actual inspection results. The method deals with the two cases of perfect and imperfect inspections. The measurement error resulting from imperfect inspections is modeled as a zero-mean, normally distributed random process. The risk is calculated using the probability of failure and the consequence is assessed in terms of cost as a function of time. The risk function is used to determine an optimal inspection and replacement interval. The calculated inspection and replacement interval is subsequently used in the design of an integrity inspection plan. Two case studies are presented: the maintenance of an autoclave and the maintenance of a pipeline segment. For the autoclave, the interval between two successive inspections is found to be 19 years. For the pipeline, the next inspection is due after 5 years from now. Measurements taken at inspections are used in estimating a new degradation rate that can then be used to update the failure distribution function. 相似文献
56.
57.
A randomized two-stage adaptive Bayesian design is proposed and studied for allocation and comparison in a phase III clinical
trial with survival time as treatment response. Several exact and limiting properties of the design and the follow-up inference
are studied, both numerically and theoretically, and are compared with a single-stage randomized procedure. The applicability
of the proposed methodology is illustrated by using some real data. 相似文献
58.
This article proposes consistent nonparametric methods for testing the null hypothesis of Lorenz dominance. The methods are based on a class of statistical functionals defined over the difference between the Lorenz curves for two samples of welfare-related variables. We present two specific test statistics belonging to the general class and derive their asymptotic properties. As the limiting distributions of the test statistics are nonstandard, we propose and justify bootstrap methods of inference. We provide methods appropriate for case where the two samples are independent as well as the case where the two samples represent different measures of welfare for one set of individuals. The small sample performance of the two tests is examined and compared in the context of a Monte Carlo study and an empirical analysis of income and consumption inequality. 相似文献
59.
This paper analyses strategy-proof mechanisms or decision schemes which map profiles of cardinal utility functions to lotteries
over a finite set of outcomes. We provide a new proof of Hylland’s theorem which shows that the only strategy-proof cardinal
decision scheme satisfying a weak unanimity property is the random dictatorship. Our proof technique assumes a framework where
individuals can discern utility differences only if the difference is at least some fixed number which we call the grid size. We also prove a limit random dictatorship result which shows that any sequence of strategy-proof and unanimous decision
schemes defined on a sequence of decreasing grid sizes approaching zero must converge to a random dictatorship.
We are most grateful to an Associate Editor and two referees for very helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.
An erratum to this article can be found at 相似文献
60.
Bhaskar?DuttaEmail author Matthew O.?Jackson Michel Le?Breton 《Social Choice and Welfare》2004,23(1):21-57
We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined, and in fact coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas. Under voting by successive elimination (or amendment), the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several specific settings and show that studying equilibrium agendas can lead to sharp predictions, in contrast with well-known chaos theorems.Financial support under NSF grant SES-9986190 and an RTDF grant from the University of Warwick are gratefully acknowledged. We thank John Duggan, Martin Osborne, and an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions, and participants at the Sixth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare for helpful comments. 相似文献