The Prevalence of Destructive Leadership Behaviour

This study investigates the prevalence of the four types of destructive leadership behaviour in the destructive and constructive leadership behaviour model, in a representative sample of the Norwegian workforce. The study employs two estimation methods: the operational classification method (OCM) and latent class cluster (LCC) analysis. The total prevalence of destructive leadership behaviour varied from 33.5% (OCM) to 61% (LCC), indicating that destructive leadership is not an anomaly. Destructive leadership comes in many shapes and forms, with passive forms prevailing over more active ones. The results showed that laissez‐faire leadership behaviour was the most prevalent destructive leadership behaviour, followed by supportive–disloyal leadership and derailed leadership, while tyrannical leadership behaviour was the least prevalent destructive leadership behaviour. Furthermore, many leaders display constructive as well as destructive behaviours, indicating that leadership is not either constructive or destructive. The study contributes to a broader theoretical perspective on what must be seen as typical behaviour among leaders.     

Departmental quality ratings and visibility: The advantages of size and age

In this article I argue that quality ratings can be conceptualized as reflecting the extent to which departments are visible to outside raters. Using cross-sectional as well as panel data on sociology departments from the two latest surveys of graduate education published by the National Research Council in 1982 and 1995, I explain departmental quality ratings in terms of measures that reflect a department’s visibility, such as its faculty productivity, size, age, and location at an elite-status university. While the results of the cross-sectional and the longitudinal models tell different stories, the two are not incompatible. Specifically, both models suggest strong effects of departmental size and age. By comparison, the estimated effects of faculty productivity and location at an elite-status university are weaker and significant only in the cross-sectional model. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York, NY, August 1996. This research was conducted under a FLAS fellowship from the U.S. Department of Education. I wish to thank Lowell Hargens for helpful comments and advice.     

2-Rainbow domination number of Cartesian products: C_{n}\square C_{3} and C_{n}\square C_{5}

A function \(f:V(G)\rightarrow \mathcal P (\{1,\ldots ,k\})\) is called a \(k\) -rainbow dominating function of \(G\) (for short \(kRDF\) of \(G)\) if \( \bigcup \nolimits _{u\in N(v)}f(u)=\{1,\ldots ,k\},\) for each vertex \( v\in V(G)\) with \(f(v)=\varnothing .\) By \(w(f)\) we mean \(\sum _{v\in V(G)}\left|f(v)\right|\) and we call it the weight of \(f\) in \(G.\) The minimum weight of a \( kRDF\) of \(G\) is called the \(k\) -rainbow domination number of \(G\) and it is denoted by \(\gamma _{rk}(G).\) We investigate the \(2\) -rainbow domination number of Cartesian products of cycles. We give the exact value of the \(2\) -rainbow domination number of \(C_{n}\square C_{3}\) and we give the estimation of this number with respect to \(C_{n}\square C_{5},\) \((n\ge 3).\) Additionally, for \(n=3,4,5,6,\) we show that \(\gamma _{r2}(C_{n}\square C_{5})=2n.\)      

“Economic Theory’s Stance On No-Fault Divorce”

This article explores key insights that economic theory can shed on the issue of no-fault divorce in the United States, addressing modifications in the incentive structure of individuals that resulted from the legislative reforms of the 1970s. After stressing the importance of correctly interpreting and classifying divorce laws, this work investigates the contributions of the theory of property rights, the contributions of game theory and intra-household bargaining, and the contributions of general equilibrium analysis in our understanding of how divorce laws work and what their impact is. By doing so, this exposé analyzes the theoretical consequences of no-fault divorce on the decision whether to get married or divorced, on the characteristics of spouses and divorcees, on divorce rates, and on marital-specific and non marital-specific investments.