Strategies and tactics in NGO–government relations

Relationships between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and government agencies have been variously described in the nonprofit literature as cooperative, complementary, adversarial, confrontational, or even co‐optive. But how do NGO–government relationships emerge in practice, and is it possible for NGOs to manage multiple strategies of interaction at once? This article examines the experience of three leading NGOs in Mumbai, India, involved in slum and squatter housing. We investigate how they began relating with government agencies during their formative years and the factors that shaped their interactions. We find that NGOs with similar goals end up using very different strategies and tactics to advance their housing agendas. More significant, we observe that NGOs are likely to employ multiple strategies and tactics in their interactions with government. Finally, we find that an analysis of strategies and tactics can be a helpful vehicle for clarifying an organization's theory of change.     

Generalization of multi-item,multi-retailer distribution system

The procedure developed by Muckstadt and Roundy is generalized. In a multi-echelon inventory system with a single warehouse and multi-retailers, some di erent items with constant demand rates are distributed. Considering set-up and holding costs as well as the cost of joint shipment of items from the warehouse to any retailer, the objective is to minimize the total costs of the system. In the proposed algorithm the assumption of nested policies is relaxed. The procedure introduced works for both nested and non-nested policies.     

Making sense of accountability: Conceptual perspectives for northern and southern nonprofits

This article examines the concept of accountability from various disciplinary lenses in order to develop an integrated understanding of the term. Special attention is devoted to principal—agent perspectives from political science and economics. An integrated framework is developed, based on four central observations. (1) Accountability is relational in nature and is constructed through inter‐ and intraorganizational relationships. (2) Accountability is complicated by the dual role of nonprofits as both principals and agents in their relationships with other actors. (3) Characteristics of accountability necessarily vary with the type of nonprofit organization being examined. (4) Accountability operates through external as well as internal processes, such that an emphasis on external oversight and control misses other dimensions of accountability essential to nonprofit organizations. The analysis draws from the experiences of both Northern and Southern nonprofits, that is, organizations based in wealthy industrialized regions of the world (the global North) and those in economically poorer areas (the South).     

A contingency view on the impact of supplier development on design and conformance quality performance

This study extends contingency theory’s account of organisational size and culture by exploring the relationship between supplier development and internal quality performance. Drawing on supplier development research, the study aims to examine the moderating impact of organisational size and culture on the relationship between supplier development and design and conformance quality dimensions. Using survey data of 518 UK manufacturing organisations, we found that larger organisations with greater access to resources and a strong supply chain orientation culture tend to place the most weight on supplier development programmes which in turn yield higher internal quality performance. These findings contribute to ‘Operations Management Practice Contingency Research (OM PCR)’ and will raise awareness among operations managers of their future sourcing decisions.     

Trust and Information Sharing in Supply Chains

Drawing on behavioral research, we construct a multi‐period model with which to examine the role of trust and other social characteristics in a supply chain. Specifically, we focus on trust building in the context of a salesperson who acts as a representative of a manufacturer and shares demand forecast information with a retailer. The actions of the salesperson affect both her immediate economic gain and her future credibility as determined by retailer's trust. Our analysis reveals that, in such environments, although salespersons of widely varying types (e.g., honest, self‐serving, benevolent, loyal) lie some extent about their forecast information, they tend to be trusted in long relationships, provided their forecasting accuracy is higher than that of the retailer. Furthermore, while the presence of a salesperson can improve the profits of both the retailer and manufacturer, there are cost structures under which the manufacturer is better off without a salesperson. Finally, we make the general observation that the appropriate salesperson compensation scheme depends on her social characteristics, and the specific observation that when the salesperson cares for the retailer, the linear compensation scheme commonly suggested in the literature as the optimal compensation scheme for the salesperson is no longer optimal.