An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories

Do polls simply measure intended voter behavior or can they affect it and, thus, change election outcomes? Do candidate ballot positions or the results of previous elections affect voter behavior? We conduct several series of experimental, three-candidate elections and use the data to provide answers to these questions. In these elections, we pay subjects conditionally on election outcomes to create electorates with publicly known preferences. A majority (but less than two-thirds) of the voters are split in their preferences between two similar candidates, while a minority (but plurality) favor a third, dissimilar candidate. If all voters voted sincerely, the third candidate — a Condorcet loser — would win the elections. We find that pre-election polls significantly reduce the frequency with which the Condorcet loser wins. Further, the winning candidate is usually the majority candidate who is listed first on the poll and election ballots. The evidence also shows that a shared history enables majority voters to coordinate on one of their favored candidates in sequences of identical elections. With polls, majority-preferred candidates often alternate as election winners.     

EARLY EVIDENCE ON RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION AND TRAFFIC FATALITIES

Over the last few years, marijuana has become legally available for recreational use to roughly a quarter of Americans. Policy makers have long expressed concerns about the substantial external costs of alcohol, and similar costs could come with the liberalization of marijuana policy. Indeed, the fraction of fatal accidents in which at least one driver tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol has increased nationwide by an average of 10% from 2013 to 2016. For Colorado and Washington, both of which legalized marijuana in 2014, these increases were 92% and 28%, respectively. However, identifying a causal effect is difficult due to the presence of significant confounding factors. We test for a causal effect of marijuana legalization on traffic fatalities in Colorado and Washington with a synthetic control approach using records on fatal traffic accidents from 2000 to 2016. We find the synthetic control groups saw similar changes in marijuana-related, alcohol-related, and overall traffic fatality rates despite not legalizing recreational marijuana. (JEL K42, I12, I18)     

CATASTROPHE AND RATIONAL POLICY: CASE OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Predicting catastrophes involves heavy‐tailed distributions with no mean, eluding proactive policy as expected cost‐benefit analysis fails. We study US government counterterrorism policy, given heightened risk of terrorism. But terrorism also involves human behavior. We synthesize the behavioral and statistical aspects in an adversary‐defender game. Calibration to extensive data shows that where a Weibull distribution is the best predictor, US counterterrorism policy is rational (and optimal). Here, we estimate the adversary's unobserved variables, e.g., difficulty of an attack. We also find cases where the best predictor is a Generalized‐Pareto with no finite mean and rational policy fails. Here, we offer “work‐arounds”. (JEL H56, D81, C46)     

Capitalizing the Crisis? Explanatory Factors for the Design of Short‐time Work across Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development Countries

This article looks at the financial and economic crisis 2008–10 in 18 Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development states and seeks to investigate explanatory paths for the subsidization of further education within short‐time work programmes. Several hypotheses are put to the test: first, a classical partisan difference argument; second, a varieties of capitalism approach proposing a successful joint rallying of employers and employees for subsidization in coordinated market economies; and, lastly, the merged hypothesis that right‐wing parties in a coordinated economic context might subsidize feeling the pressure to overcompensate an ‘issue ownership’ of left parties in the field of employee‐friendly policies. We identify four explanatory paths: coordinated economies in the sample subsidized when they were economically closed or highly indebted. The results also support our combined hypothesis, that New Zealand – a left‐governed liberal market economy – and right‐governed coordinated market economies of the non‐Scandinavian type subsidized.