The fertility contribution of Mexican immigration to the United States

Crucial to the long-term contribution of immigration to a receiving country's population is the extent to which the immigrants reproduce themselves in subsequent, native-born generations. Using conventional projection methodologies, this fertility contribution may be poorly estimated primarily because of problems in projecting the number of immigrants who are at risk of childbearing. We propose an alternative method that obviates the need to project the number of immigrants by using the full sending-country birth cohort as the risk group to project their receiving-country childbearing. This "sending-country birth cohort" method is found to perform dramatically better than conventional methods when projecting to 1999 from base years both before and after the large increase in inflows of Mexican immigrants to the United States in the late 1980s. Projecting forward from 1999, we estimate a cumulative contribution of Mexican immigrant fertility from the 1980s to 2040 of 36 million births, including 25% to 50% more births after 1995 than are projected using conventional methods.     

Subjective Distributions

A decision maker has to choose one of several random variables whose distributions are not known. As a Bayesian, she behaves as if she knew the distributions. In this paper we suggest an axiomatic derivation of these (subjective) distributions, which is more economical than the derivations by de Finetti or Savage. Whereas the latter derive the whole joint distribution of all the available random variables, our approach derives only the marginal distributions. Correspondingly, the preference questionnaire needed in our case is less smaller.     

Uncertainty and the Second Space: Modern Birth Timing and the Dilemma of Education

This paper focuses on the relationship between experiential and statistical uncertainties in the timing of births in Cameroon (Central Africa). Most theories of fertility level and change emphasize the emergence of parity-specific control, treating desired family size as both central, and stable across the life course. By contrast, this paper argues for a theory of reproduction that emphasizes process, social context, and contingency. The paper concentrates on the second birth interval, showing that it is longer and more variable among educated than among uneducated women. The paper argues that this difference is due to the specific forms of uncertainty associated with education in contemporary Cameroon.     

On ranking linear budget sets in terms of freedom of choice

This paper examines how freedom of choice as reflected in an agents opportunity sets can be measured in economic environments where opportunity sets are linear budget sets in the non-negative orthant of the n-dimensional real space. Three axioms, Symmetry, Monotonicity and Invariance of Scaling Effects, are proposed for this purpose and the measure based on volumes of budget sets is characterized. I am grateful to Prasanta K. Pattanaik for his encouragement and fruitful discussions over many years on this and related subjects. The first draft of this paper was written while I was visiting the Institute of Economic Research at Hitotsubashi University in Japan. I would like to thank its hospitality. Helpful comments of a referee are gratefully acknowledged.     

Maximum likelihood approach to vote aggregation with variable probabilities

The Condorcet-Kemeny-Young statistical approach to vote aggregation is based on the assumption that voters have the same probability of comparing correctly two alternatives and that this probability is the same for any pair of alternatives. We relax the second part of this assumption by letting the probability of comparing correctly two alternatives be increasing with the distance between two alternatives in the allegedly true ranking. This leads to a rule in which the majority in favor of one alternative against another one is given a larger weight the larger the distance between the two alternatives in the true ranking, i.e., the larger the probability that the voters compare them correctly. This rule is not Condorcet consistent and does not satisfy local independence of irrelevant alternatives. Yet, it is anonymous, neutral, and paretian. It also appears that its performance in selecting the alternative most likely to be the best improves with the rate at which the probability increases.We would like to thank Michel Le Breton for his encouragement to examine this question and for his comments, as well as Philippe De Donder, Jean-Yves Duclos, Stephen Gordon, Cyril Téjédo and an anonymous referee for their comments.     

Living with unfairness: The limits of equal opportunity in a market economy

Equality of opportunity is often presented as a criterion which reconciles egalitarianism with principles of freedom and responsibility. This paper distinguishes between the principle of starting-line equality, which requires that everyones initial opportunities, assessed in relation to what is publicly known ex ante, are equal, and the principle that equal efforts should yield equal ex post rewards. It argues that the first principle is compatible with allocation of resources through markets but, because of the division of knowledge, the second is not. If we want the opportunities which markets give us, we have to accept ex post unfairness. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a workshop on the measurement of freedom at the London School of Economics, and at a conference on non-welfarist issues in normative economics at the University of Caen. I thank participants at those meetings, and particularly Tania Burchardt, Marco Mariotti and Franz Prettenthaler, for comments. My work on this paper was supported by the Leverhulme Trust.     

Measuring freedom of choice: An alternative view of a recent literature

A recent literature has emerged in social choice theory which attributes intrinsic importance to freedom in the evaluation of states of affairs. The literatures philosophical basis lies in Berlins notion of positive liberty. Accordingly, axiomatic measures of availability of choices are developed and the information they convey used for ranking states on the basis of the extent of liberty they offer to individuals. I am grateful to Nancy Cartwright, Dan Hausman and Marco Del Seta for their suggestions to previous drafts of this paper. The usual caveat applies. The support of the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science at the London School of Economics is also acknowledged.