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121.
Social entrepreneurship has emerged as an important means of addressing grand challenges. Although research on the topic has accelerated, scholars have yet to articulate an overarching framework that links the different pathways taken by social entrepreneurs with the positive effects of these efforts. To address this shortcoming, we conducted a systematic literature review which enabled us to conceptually differentiate between social value and social change as distinct outcomes of social entrepreneurship and identify seven pathways for achieving these outcomes. Building on our analysis, we outline a research agenda for questions pertaining to: the dynamics between social value and social change; how contextual factors and social entrepreneurs influence various pathways; design principles of business models and innovations that facilitate social value and social change; and defining, measuring, and ensuring accountability for social value and social change.  相似文献   
122.
We study markets in which agents first make investments and are then matched into potentially productive partnerships. Equilibrium investments and the equilibrium matching will be efficient if agents can simultaneously negotiate investments and matches, but we focus on markets in which agents must first sink their investments before matching. Additional equilibria may arise in this sunk‐investment setting, even though our matching market is competitive. These equilibria exhibit inefficiencies that we can interpret as coordination failures. All allocations satisfying a constrained efficiency property are equilibria, and the converse holds if preferences satisfy a separability condition. We identify sufficient conditions (most notably, quasiconcave utilities) for the investments of matched agents to satisfy an exchange efficiency property as well as sufficient conditions (most notably, a single crossing property) for agents to be matched positive assortatively, with these conditions then forming the core of sufficient conditions for the efficiency of equilibrium allocations.  相似文献   
123.
International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) operate in competitive funding markets and face political pressures, which can incentivize their leaders to compromise their mission-oriented strategy for more resource security. This article empirically investigates whether INGO leaders perceive peer regulation as an effective governance mechanism that allows them to strengthen their mission-oriented strategy to withstand these economic and political constraints. In particular, we assess whether peer regulation is perceived to promote organizational learning processes. We test a partial least squares structural equation model (PLS-SEM) based on a unique data set from an international survey among 201 INGO leaders from 21 countries. Our findings suggest that INGO leaders indeed perceive that peer regulation strengthens their mission orientation, despite the economic competition and political opportunity constraints their organization faces. This effect is partially mediated by organizational learning processes. Our findings are based on a constructivist perspective that emphasizes the learneffect of peer regulation on INGOs' strategic orientation, and allows the derivation of several managerial recommendations to foster INGOs' strategic autonomy.  相似文献   
124.
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