A solution of the externality problem using strategic matching

This paper develops a Coase-like solution of the problem of inducing Pareto optimal behavior in the presence of reciprocal externalities. In place of Coasean direct compensation between the parties to an externality problem, actors strategically match each other's externality-producing activity, and thus induce counterparts to internalize the external benefits or costs of their actions. The analysis suggests a general framework for analyzing social interactions in the presence of reciprocal externalities. As an application of the theory, a solution of the duopoly problem is noted.We are indebted to L. Danziger, D. Samet, participants in faculty seminars at Bar-Ilan and New York Universities and at the University of Maryland, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussions. All remaining errors are our own.     

ACCOUNTING PRACTICES AND ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING

In this paper we argue for the importance of a sociologically informed study of organizational accounting practices. By making the nexus between accounting and decision making problematic, instead of given, we move issues of interpretation and hierarchical control to the center stage of understanding the social construction of accounting practices. We suggest that inductive case studies of the organizational setting is a promising methodological strategy for identifying how accounting operates as an organizational control system. We focus on debates and proceedings of the board of directors as an overlooked source of data on decision making and organizational practices. We show how accounting practices are part of the strategic control system that functions to interpret the environment and direct the adaptation of the organization in a manner particular to the substantive rationality of corporate decision makers. We illustrate these contentions with a case study of accounting practice changes over a six year period.     

Modified cross-validation in density estimation

We propose a new modified (biased) cross-validation method for adaptively determining the bandwidth in a nonparametric density estimation setup. It is shown that the method provides consistent minimizers. Some simulation results are reported on which compare the small sample behavior of the new and the classical cross-validation selectors.     

Construction and selection of tightened-normal-tightened sampling inspection scheme of type TNT-(n1, n2; c)

A table is presented for the construction and selection of tightened-normal-tightened sampling scheme of type TNT-(n1, n2;c). Efficiency of TNT-(n1, n2;c) scheme over conventional single and double sampling plans is discussed.     

THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMICS ON ANTITRUST LAW

Economists today play prominent roles in formulating antitrust policy and litigating antitrust cases. This paper explains why economics influences antitrust law and describes how economic theories enter and shape the antitrust system. Antitrust policy and doctrine change over time in response to developments in economic theory, and the decentralization of the antitrust adjudication system and the wide latitude accorded judges in interpreting antitrust statutes ensure that legal rules will reflect advances in the economic literature concerning the appropriate content of standards governing business conduct.     

Implications of temporal aggregation on the relation between two time series

Using a simple theoretical model and giving an empirical example it is investigated if it matters whether we use (monthly) averages or end-of-period (month) data in performing Granger-causality tests. It is shown that no major problems are to be expected if the two series are temporally aggregated in the same way, but non-trivial problems can occur if the two series have different kinds of temporal aggregation.     

Testing for state and local government job queues

Bivariate probit estimates with partial observability identify the factors influencing the worker’s decision to seek a state or local government job and the factors influencing the government’s decision to hire particular workers. The estimates routinely confirm the presence of a local job queue but confirm the presence of a state job queue only when the role of unionization is explicitly recognized. Our results suggest that the net benefits from local and state government employment are greater than those from private sector employment. The estimates also indicate that local governments disproportionately hire racial minorities relative to the local governments’ pool of applicants but indicate no such relationship for state governments. The authors thank Dale Belman, Jugal Ghorai, and Matt Higgins for help on this and related work. We also thank the referee and the editor for useful suggestions.     

The effect of 1980s tort reform legislation on general liability and medical malpractice insurance

A large number of states adopted tort reforms in the mid-1980s to limit the dramatic surge in insurance losses and premiums. Evidence based on liability insurance data by state indicates that these reforms substantially influenced general liability insurance. The levels of losses, premiums, and loss ratios (a measure of insurance profitability) all reflected the impact of the reforms. The large-scale reform efforts in 1986 were particularly influential. Medical malpractice insurance was much less sensitive to the reform efforts.