首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   21篇
  免费   1篇
管理学   2篇
理论方法论   2篇
社会学   3篇
统计学   15篇
  2019年   1篇
  2017年   1篇
  2016年   2篇
  2015年   2篇
  2013年   2篇
  2010年   2篇
  2009年   2篇
  2007年   1篇
  2006年   1篇
  2005年   1篇
  2004年   4篇
  2003年   3篇
排序方式: 共有22条查询结果,搜索用时 62 毫秒
21.
We consider the problem of the estimation of the invariant distribution function of an ergodic diffusion process when the drift coefficient is unknown. The empirical distribution function is a natural estimator which is unbiased, uniformly consistent and efficient in different metrics. Here we study the properties of optimality for another kind of estimator recently proposed. We consider a class of unbiased estimators and we show that they are also efficient in the sense that their asymptotic risk, defined as the integrated mean square error, attains the same asymptotic minimax lower bound of the empirical distribution function.  相似文献   
22.
Approval voting is the voting method recently adopted by the Society for Social Choice and Welfare. Positional voting methods include the famous plurality, antiplurality, and Borda methods. We extend the inference framework of Tsetlin and Regenwetter (2003) from majority rule to approval voting and all positional voting methods. We also establish a link between approval voting and positional voting methods whenever Falmagne et al.s (1996) size-independent model of approval voting holds: In all such cases, approval voting mimics some positional voting method. We illustrate our inference framework by analyzing approval voting and ranking data, with and without the assumption of the size-independent model. For many of the existing data, including the Society for Social Choice and Welfare election analyzed by Brams and Fishburn (2001) and Saari (2001), low turnout implies that inferences drawn from such elections carry low (statistical) confidence. Whenever solid inferences are possible, we find that, under certain statistical assumptions, approval voting tends to agree with positional voting methods, and with Borda, in particular.Michel Regenwetter thanks the National Science Foundation for funding this research through NSF grant SBR 97-30076. Both authors thank the Fuqua School of Business for financially supporting their collaboration. Most of this research was done while Regenwetter was a faculty member at Fuqua. We thank Prof. Steven Brams for his valuable comments as a discussant of a previous version of this paper, given at the 2002 Public Choice meeting, and Prof. Donald Saari for his helpful comments in conversations and on another draft. We also thank the editor in charge and a referee for their valuable comments. Tsetlin acknowledges the support of the Centre for Decision Making and Risk Analysis at INSEAD.  相似文献   
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号