Prosumer der Gefühle

In recent years, “online dating” has become one of the few profitable sectors of the digital economy. The business model is quite distinct: The main “product” of dating platforms are emotional relationships. In practice however, those relationships are produced by the actual users and their emotion work on the platform. As a result, the roles of producers and consumers merge. Users of dating platforms are becoming “prosumers of emotions”. With their emotion work they produce surplus value for the platform while they pay considerable monthly fees as consumers. Based on our own empirical research, we analyze the tensions between love and emotion work in general as well as the specific emotional production regime of dating platforms, which not only tend to spur emotions but also tend to transform them into productive emotional labor. Regarded this way, online dating appears as a current and outstanding example for a general trend in today’s capitalism to intensify the use of emotions as a source of economic value creation.     

Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms

Consider the problem of exact Nash Implementation of social choice correspondences. Define a lottery mechanism as a mechanism in which the planner can randomize on alternatives out of equilibrium while pure alternatives are always chosen in equilibrium. When preferences over alternatives are strict, we show that Maskin monotonicity (Maskin in Rev Econ stud 66: 23–38, 1999) is both necessary and sufficient for a social choice correspondence to be Nash implementable. We discuss how to relax the assumption of strict preferences. Next, we examine social choice correspondences with private components. Finally, we apply our method to the issue of voluntary implementation (Jackon and Palfrey in J Econ Theory 98: 1–25, 2001).I thank Toyo Sakai for his comments on a previous draft. I also thank two anonymous referees and an editor of this journal for helpful comments that improved this paper. A previous version circulated as “A note on Maskin monotonicity”. After the results presented here were obtained, I became aware of a new unpublished paper by Benoit and Ok (2004). The result of Theorem 2 and the discussion that follows is partially similar to their Theorem 1.     

Estimation of sex‐specific survival with uncertainty in sex assessment

In monomorphic species, determination of sex from behavior is prone to errors. The authors develop capture‐recapture survival models that account for uncertainty in the assessment of sex. They examine parameter redundancy for four basic models with constant or time‐dependent survival and encounter probabilities. They further develop a more refined and more appropriate model for an Audouin's gull data set where four distinct behavioral clues have been used. They examine how useful it is to incorporate the least reliable of the clues and the genetic determination of sex available for only a handful of individuals. They finally discuss the implications of their findings for the design of field studies.     

Social Willingness to Pay,Mortality Risks and Contingent Valuation

The Willingness-to-Pay approach is the basic justification for the use of the Contingent Valuation method to evaluate public mortality risk reduction programs. However, aggregating unweighted willingness-to-pay is a valid method only when individuals have the same marginal value of money, an unrealistic assumption in the presence of heterogeneity. We show that heterogeneity on wealth and baseline risk (respectively on risk reduction) leads to systematically overestimate (respectively underestimate) the social value of a risk reduction program. Using a recently published Contingent Valuation analysis, we find this overestimation to be quite modest though, approximately 15% in an upper bound case.     

Calculating Bivariate Orthonormal Polynomials By Recurrence

Emerson gave recurrence formulae for the calculation of orthonormal polynomials for univariate discrete random variables. He claimed that as these were based on the Christoffel–Darboux recurrence relation they were more efficient than those based on the Gram–Schmidt method. This approach was generalised by Rayner and colleagues to arbitrary univariate random variables. The only constraint was that the expectations needed are well‐defined. Here the approach is extended to arbitrary bivariate random variables for which the expectations needed are well‐defined. The extension to multivariate random variables is clear.     

A Note on Unit Root Tests and GARCH Errors: A Simulation Experiment

This article re-examines the Monte Carlo experiments in Seo (1999 Seo , B. ( 1999 ). Distribution theory for unit root tests with conditional heteroskedasticity . J. Econometrics 91 : 113 – 144 .[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) for unit root tests with GARCH errors. We report a Monte Carlo study with data generated from various GARCH(1, 1) processes where 0.8 ≤ α + β < 1 and β > α. In this case, the Dickey–Fuller test works better than the Seo test.     

Nonparametric Estimation of the Multivariate Distribution Function in a Censored Regression Model with Applications

In a regression model with univariate censored responses, a new estimator of the joint distribution function of the covariates and response is proposed, under the assumption that the response and the censoring variable are independent conditionally to the covariates. This estimator is based on the conditional Kaplan–Meier estimator of Beran (1981 Beran , R. ( 1981 ). Nonparametric regression with randomly censored survival data. Technical Report, University of California, Berkeley, California . [Google Scholar]), and happens to be an extension of the multivariate empirical distribution function used in the uncensored case. We derive asymptotic i.i.d. representations for the integrals with respect to the measure defined by this estimated distribution function. These representations hold even in the case where the covariates are multidimensional under some additional assumption on the censoring. Applications to censored regression and to density estimation are considered.     

The Impact of Tax-Benefit Reforms on Labor Supply in a Simulated Nash-bargaining Framework

Several theoretical contributions have suggested to model household behavior as a Nash-bargaining game. Yet very few attempts have been made to operationalize cooperative models of labor supply for policy analysis. In this paper, we implement a Nash-bargaining model with external threat points (divorce) into the microsimulation of tax-benefit policy reforms in France. The observation of divorced individuals is used to predict outside options and (some) of the preferences for individuals living in couples. Benchmark simulations are conducted in a way that guarantees consistency with the Nash bargaining setting, regularity conditions and observed behavior. We examine how the labor supply of couples adjusts to shocks on threat points, either hypothetical or generated by a radical tax-benefit reform.