Demographic change, macroeconomic conditions, and the murder rate: The case of the United States, 1934–2006

Fluctuations in aggregate crime rates contrary to recent shifts in the age distribution of the U.S. population have cast doubt on the predictive power of the age–crime hypothesis. By examining a longer time horizon, back to the early 1930s, we show that the percentage of the young population is a robust predictor of the observed large swings in the U.S. murder rate over time. However, changes in the misery index—the sum of the inflation and unemployment rates—significantly contribute to explaining changes in the murder rate. This applies, in particular, to those changes that are at odds with the long-run trend of the U.S. age distribution, such as the decline in the murder rate in the latter part of the 1970s or its increase starting around the middle of the 1980s.     

Bargaining with Incomplete information an axiomatic approach

Within this paper we consider a model of Nash bargaining with incomplete information. In particular, we focus on fee games, which are a natural generalization of side payment games in the context of incomplete information. For a specific class of fee games we provide two axiomatic approaches in order to establish the Expected Contract Value, which is a version of the Nash bargaining solution.     

The quincunx: history and mathematics

Received: December 30, 1999; revised version: July 19, 2000     

Morbidity measures in the presence of recurrent composite endpoints

The analysis of recurrent event data in clinical trials presents a number of difficulties. The statistician is faced with issues of event dependency, composite endpoints, unbalanced follow‐up times and informative dropout. It is not unusual, therefore, for statisticians charged with responsibility for providing reliable and valid analyses to need to derive new methods specific to the clinical indication under investigation. One method is proposed that appears to have possible advantages over those that are often used in the analysis of recurrent event data in clinical trials. Based on an approach that counts periods of time with events instead of single event counts, the proposed method makes an adjustment for patient time on study and incorporates heterogeneity by estimating an individual per‐patient risk of experiencing a morbid event. Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate that, with use of a real clinical study data, the proposed method consistently outperforms other measures of morbidity. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Labour Market

Social Indicators Research -     

Towards a Typology of European Welfare Production: Summary and Discussion

Social Indicators Research -     

Authors’ response: on the role of data,statistics and decisions in a pandemic

AStA Advances in Statistical Analysis -     

Positive Effekte sozialen Faulenzens beim Lösen komplexer Probleme

The term “social loafing” refers to a decrease in motivation and achievement in group work due to sinking responsibility of the individual for the groups’ outcome. Recent studies assume a paradoxical relation between motivation and outcome, which should produce better outcome with decreased motivation. The current study addresses this question. Two experiments with N=60 subjects working in groups of 3 are reported. Subjects had to deal with a computer simulated scenario of a fire fighting situation. There was a simple and a more complex version; also, individual responsibility for the groups’ outcome was either given (coactive condition) or not (collective condition). During experiment 1, subjects could only deal with their own section of the scenario; in experiment 2, they were allowed to work on the whole field. Dependent variables were effort (in terms of commands given) and achievement (in terms of space saved). It turned out that under collective responsibility effort was reduced but this did not lead to decreased achievement. Under the complex condition, with decreased effort even an increase in achievement could be demonstrated. Implications for the collective effort model presented by Karau and Williams are discussed.