Parteineigung als Fakt oder Parteineigung durch Fakten

Textbooks in empirical research of voting behavior usually distinguish between the sociological approach, the social psychological approach and the rational choice approach. The distinction is based on the component of explanation on which each approach is focused. In doing so, it is neglected that the logic of explanation changes in accordance to the main determinant of voting behavior. This paper points out this difference between the three approaches, while concentrating on party affiliation and issues as components of explanation. With reference to the “Retrospective Voting” approach of Fiorina and attitude theories of Fishbein, Ajzen and Fazio an integrative model is presented in which the specific relevance of one of the two components of explanation depends on the mode of decision making. The mode of decision making again also determines the logic of explanation.     

Small sample properties of tests on homogeneity in one—way Anova and Meta—analysis

Received: January 12, 2000; revised version: July 26, 2000     

On a conjecture concerning the least favorable configuration of a two-stage selection procedure

A two-stage procedure 𝓅with screening in the first stage to find the population with the largest mean out of k ≧ 2 normal populations with unknown means and a common variance is under concern. It was proposed and previousiy studied by Cohen (1959), Alam (1970) and Tamhane and Bechhofer (1977, 1979) using the indifference-zone approach. The conjecture that the least favourable parameter configuration for the probability of a correct selection is of the slippage type remained unproved for k ≧ 3. Miescke and Sehr (1980) proved the conjecture for k=3. The problem was further discussed by Gupta and Miescke (1982). A general proof for rhe conjecture will be given in this paper.     

?konomie des Abschlusspr��ferwechsels

In this state-of-the-art article we survey the analytical and empirical work on the economic determinants and consequences of auditor changes. First, we define the term ??auditor change?? and touch on the legal constraints affecting auditor changes in Germany and in the USA. Additionally. we discuss the corresponding disclosure requirements associated with auditor changes in these countries. Auditor changes can be triggered by the client or by the auditor. We identify four categories under which auditor change incentives can be classified: (1) changes in contractual relationships of the client which in turn can cause a change in demand for audit quality; (2) changes of information possessed by the client or auditor concerning certain attributes of the audit; (3) changes in certain characteristics of the audit and (4) changes in regulation. We use this classification to structure our discussion of analytical models and empirical evidence. Turning to the consequences of auditor changes, we summarize the findings of the prior literature to show that capital market participants react on auditor changes and that they differentiate between both the initiator of auditor changes and the incentives to change auditor. We conclude with a discussion of some of the limitations of the current literature on auditor changes and identify some possible avenues for future research.     

Erik Händeler: Die Geschichte der Zukunft. Sozialverhalten heute und der Wohlstand von morgen — Kondratieffs Globalsicht

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