The impact of social networks on the occupational status of migrants

This paper postulates that there is a continuous exchange of information and knowledge between those who share the common bond of having migrated to the US. The individual components of this information exchange constitute social networks. The 2 hypotheses tested are 1) immediate social networks and people known in the US facilitate the flow of information both to new migrants and between established migrants, thus promoting upward social mobility; and 2) access to broader network ties, organization membership, extra-ethnic friendships, and familiarity with established institutions smooths the transition process, resulting in increased social position. The data used comes from a study conducted in 1982-1983 in 4 Mexican sending communities (2 rural, 2 urban), for a total of 440 migrants. Results show that migrants in every socioeconomic bracket reported access to some or all social network characteristics. There was contact with either a family member or acquaintances from the migrants' town of origin. Over 50% of migrants reported knowing many fellow townspeople. Twice as many migrants belong to a sports club as to a social or religious organization. Very few rural migrants report knowing no townspeople, while 32% of urban migrants claim no knowledge of fellow migrants from their town of origin. Urban origin migrants report more contacts with those of other ethnicity than rural migrants. Those employed in agriculture are least acquainted with social information and contacts, while those in skilled and service sectors are well acquainted with them. The results of fact and analysis show that 1) access to personal US networks results in an average 4.4 point advantage in occupational prestige scores over no access, and 2) utilizing institutional US networks combined with any cumulative US experience gives a migrant a 5 point advantage over a fellow migrant with identical experience level but no institutional network contacts. This is also true for institutional Mexican networks. Thus success or failure in migrating is partly due to migrants' societal infrastructure and the fact that available information and social networks are accessed and utilized differently by different migrants.     

Policies over time and pareto optimality

This paper is concerned with sequences of policies that occur over time in voting models and planning procedures. The framework for our analysis includes assumptions that are satisfied by models in the corresponding literatures, together with other standard assumptions for microeconomic analysis that involve time. The starting point for our analyses is the prespective that results from combining the following (widely held) views: 1) certain voting models and planning procedures can be interpreted as being non-tatonnement or sequential processes (where each policy in the sequence that is generated is actually experienced by voters or consumers) and 2) an alternative being Pareto optimal in any given period (temporal Pareto optimality) is the appropriate efficiency criterion only if the alternative is the final outcome from a tatonnement process-and that, otherwise, one should examine the efficiency of the entire path (using intertemporal Pareto optimality). Our first observation about the planning literature is that is has (by and large) neglected the efficiency criterion that is appropriate for the discrete-time procedures that can be interpreted as non-tatonnement or sequential processes-and that, what's more, such trajectories will (in general) fail to meet this criterion. Our second observation identifies some results that can be used to establish that some of these trajectories will at least be ultimately intertemporally Pareto optimal. In our discussion of voting theory, we review Buchanan's opposition to requiring (social) choice consistency for voting procedures-and his argument for this position on (Pareto) efficiency grounds. We then consider voting procedures that can be interpreted as non-tatonnement or sequential processes and arrive at the conclusion that, in these cases, (i) majority rule cycles are intertemporally Pareto inefficient and (ii) achieving intertemporal Pareto optimality requires choice consistency. We then go on to show that related observations apply to Kramer's normative conclusions about his dynamical model of political equilibrium — and identify some further references where similar observations apply. In the final part of our discussion of voting models, we arrive at the further conclusion that, in the most relevant cases, a trajectory that stays in the temporal Pareto set is not necessarily more desirable (on efficiency grounds) than one that doesn't.This paper has been improved by helpful comments and suggestions that have been provided by Kenneth Arrow, an anonymous referee, and the editor who handled the paper.Peter Coughlin gratefully acknowledges financial support provided by (i) National Science Foundation Grant No. SES-8409352, and (ii) the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford (with support from National Science Foundation Grant No. BNS-8700864 and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation).     

Social choice theory in the case of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities

Part I of this paper offers a novel result in social choice theory by extending Harsanyi's well-known utilitarian theorem into a multi-profile context. Harsanyi was contented with showing that if the individuals' utilities u _i are von Neumann-Morgenstern, and if the given utility u of the social planner is VNM as well, then the Pareto indifference rule implies that u is affine in terms of the u _i. We provide a related conclusion by considering u as functionally dependent on the u _i, through a suitably restricted social welfare functional (u ₁,...,u _n)u=f(u ₁,...,u _n). We claim that this result is more in accordance with contemporary social choice theory than Harsanyi's single-profile theorem is. Besides, harsanyi's initial proof of the latter was faulty. Part II of this paper offers an alternative argument which is intended to be both general and simple enough, contrary to the recent proofs published by Fishburn and others. It finally investigates the affine independence problem on the u _i discussed by Fishburn as a corollary to harsanyi's theorem.The authors are indebted to L. Haddad, A. Sen and two anonymous referees for useful written comments. They also benefited from stimulating remarks in seminars and helpful conversations with their colleagues. The usual caveat of course applies. One of the authors acknowledges partial financial support from the ARI Communication of the C.N.R.S., Paris.     

Student desires for a university drug education program

A questionnaire was designed to determine the type of drug education program most desired by undergraduate students attending a major university. The survey was to provide the basis for a comprehensive drug education program. The 101 item questionnaire elicited responses from 656 undergraduates in categories ranging from knowledge base to credible information sources. The analysis of student desires as they relate to program design is included in this article. The students strongly believed the university should provide a drug education program. In particular they desired a credit course dealing with both drugs and alcohol. They also wanted regularly published articles on drugs in school publications. The most credible knowledge sources were PhDs and MDs. Students also wanted contact with former drug users. More than half the students believed that values clarification and "coping skills" training would decrease their drug use. In general more women than men were likely to utilize such resources.     

The prevalence rates of pathological gambling: A look at methods

Planning the gambling environment requires protection of the public's health, safety and welfare. Whereas most public gaming provisions and statutes address the public's fears of organized crime as well as some welfare needs, rarely do they safeguard the public's health regarding the spread of the mental disease known as pathological gambling. Measurement of the prevalence and incidence of this disease would enable policy planners to evaluate both the state's responsibility for an epidemic and the adequacy of publicly funded treatment programs. The purpose of this paper is to examine the methods which underlie three different estimates of the prevalence rate of pathological gambling and to critique them in the light of sound epidemiological procedure. In 1975, the Institute for Social Research (ISR) of the University of Michigan conducted a national survey and a survey of the state of Nevada on behalf of the U.S. Commission on a National Policy Toward Gambling. Using discriminant function analysis coupled with subjective inspection of cases in the at-risk pool, the researchers estimated rates of probable and potential pathological gamblers. In 1984 and 1985, this author surveyed residents in the Delaware Valley and the state of Ohio using the cumulative clinical signs method which also posited rates of probable and potential pathological gamblers. In 1986, researchers at the Office of Mental Health for the State of New York employed a formal screening device to survey residents and proposed a rate of probable pathological gamblers and a rate of problem — although not pathological — gamblers. All three approaches produced different estimates. The utility of prevalence and incidence rate research in this field is threatened by a lack of consensus about the proper epidemiological procedure to be employed in arriving at these estimates. There is also confusion about the distinction between a probable and a potential pathological gambler. The planning purpose, method, validity and reliability of prevalence rate research about pathological gambling are addressed in this paper.     

Evolution of family policy in the light of demographic development in West European countries

The author examines some of the issues facing those responsible for developing family policies in European countries, many of which are experiencing rapid demographic aging. Population dynamics in Council of Europe member countries are first described. Implications of this trend for social policies as a whole are also reviewed.     

On "being a prostitute"

The book "On Being a Prostitute" (Perkins & Bennett, 1985) is a valuable contribution to the sociology of deviance and sexual ideologies. However, comprehensive as it is, the book presents certain omissions and flaws, with implications for both is empirical data and theoretical underpinnings. In focusing on male (homoerotic) prostitution, and drawing upon Bennett's (1983) "Twenty-Ten" survey (which forms the main empirical base of that aspect of the book), I argue that certain categories of male prostitutes have been excluded. These omissions, I suggest, were necessary to allow Bennett's hypothesis that most male prostitution derives from economic necessity--a recurrent economic determinism reminiscent of Havelock Ellis (1906/1936), and somewhat contrary to a broader structural approach (see Mathews, 1983).     

Consequentialist demographic norms and parenting rights

This paper extends the author's recent work on dynamically consistent consequentialist social norms for an unrestricted domain of decision trees with risk to trees in which the population is a variable consequence — i.e., endogenous. Given a form of ethical liberalism and ethical irrelevance of distant ancestors, classical utilitarianism is implied (provided also that a weak continuity condition is met). The repugnant conclusion that having many poor people may be desirable can be avoided by denying that individuals' interests extend to the circumstances of their birth. But it is better avoided by recognizing that potential parents have legitimate interests concerning the sizes of their families.That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers. Francis Hutchison (1725).An abiding interest in concepts of optimality for the choice of population has been stimulated by frequent discussions with Partha Dasgupta. This paper was presented at the seminar on Distributive Justice and Inequality at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, May 1986. I am grateful to the audience for their helpful comments, especially Maurice Salles and Patrick Suppes, and especially to John Weymark for carefully reading and suggesting distinct improvements to the earlier version.