Time, Self, and the Curiously Abstract Concept of Agency*

The term "agency" is quite slippery and is used differently depending on the epistemological roots and goals of scholars who employ it. Distressingly, the sociological literature on the concept rarely addresses relevant social psychological research. We take a social behaviorist approach to agency by suggesting that individual temporal orientations are underutilized in conceptualizing this core sociological concept. Different temporal foci—the actor's engaged response to situational circumstances—implicate different forms of agency. This article offers a theoretical model involving four analytical types of agency ("existential,""identity,""pragmatic," and "life course") that are often conflated across treatments of the topic. Each mode of agency overlaps with established social psychological literatures, most notably about the self, enabling scholars to anchor overly abstract treatments of agency within established research literatures.     

THE MYSTERIOUS DISAPPEARANCE OF BATTERED WOMEN IN FAMILY THERAPISTS' OFFICES: MALE PRIVILEGE COLLUDING WITH MALE VIOLENCE

Family therapy has not served battered women well. Men use battering to silence women; a woman, once abused, is unlikely to speak honestly in a situation where doing so invites re-abuse. Therefore we rarely perceive, label or deal effectively with male violence toward women, a major source of marital disruption. To stand with the oppressed, we must learn to detect the possibility of abuse, separate the couple, and refuse to collude with criminal acts.     

Uncertainty Analysis for Computer Model Projections of Hurricane Losses

Projecting losses associated with hurricanes is a complex and difficult undertaking that is wrought with uncertainties. Hurricane Charley, which struck southwest Florida on August 13, 2004, illustrates the uncertainty of forecasting damages from these storms. Due to shifts in the track and the rapid intensification of the storm, real-time estimates grew from 2 to 3 billion dollars in losses late on August 12 to a peak of 50 billion dollars for a brief time as the storm appeared to be headed for the Tampa Bay area. The storm hit the resort areas of Charlotte Harbor near Punta Gorda and then went on to Orlando in the central part of the state, with early poststorm estimates converging on a damage estimate in the 28 to 31 billion dollars range. Comparable damage to central Florida had not been seen since Hurricane Donna in 1960. The Florida Commission on Hurricane Loss Projection Methodology (FCHLPM) has recognized the role of computer models in projecting losses from hurricanes. The FCHLPM established a professional team to perform onsite (confidential) audits of computer models developed by several different companies in the United States that seek to have their models approved for use in insurance rate filings in Florida. The team's members represent the fields of actuarial science, computer science, meteorology, statistics, and wind and structural engineering. An important part of the auditing process requires uncertainty and sensitivity analyses to be performed with the applicant's proprietary model. To influence future such analyses, an uncertainty and sensitivity analysis has been completed for loss projections arising from use of a Holland B parameter hurricane wind field model. Uncertainty analysis quantifies the expected percentage reduction in the uncertainty of wind speed and loss that is attributable to each of the input variables.     

Modeling for Risk Assessment of Neurotoxic Effects

The regulation of noncancer toxicants, including neurotoxicants, has usually been based upon a reference dose (allowable daily intake). A reference dose is obtained by dividing a no-observed-effect level by uncertainty (safety) factors to account for intraspecies and interspecies sensitivities to a chemical. It is assumed that the risk at the reference dose is negligible, but no attempt generally is made to estimate the risk at the reference dose. A procedure is outlined that provides estimates of risk as a function of dose. The first step is to establish a mathematical relationship between a biological effect and the dose of a chemical. Knowledge of biological mechanisms and/or pharmacokinetics can assist in the choice of plausible mathematical models. The mathematical model provides estimates of average responses as a function of dose. Secondly, estimates of risk require selection of a distribution of individual responses about the average response given by the mathematical model. In the case of a normal or lognormal distribution, only an estimate of the standard deviation is needed. The third step is to define an adverse level for a response so that the probability (risk) of exceeding that level can be estimated as a function of dose. Because a firm response level often cannot be established at which adverse biological effects occur, it may be necessary to at least establish an abnormal response level that only a small proportion of individuals would exceed in an unexposed group. That is, if a normal range of responses can be established, then the probability (risk) of abnormal responses can be estimated. In order to illustrate this process, measures of the neurotransmitter serotonin and its metabolite 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid in specific areas of the brain of rats and monkeys are analyzed after exposure to the neurotoxicant methylene-dioxymethamphetamine. These risk estimates are compared with risk estimates from the quantal approach in which animals are classified as either abnormal or not depending upon abnormal serotonin levels.     

Lifestyle Options and Economic Strategies: Subsistence Activities in the Mississippi Delta1

Abstract "Subsistence" and "informal economy" are contrasted in their utility as sociological concepts and their ability to explain a variety of activities in two rural Mississippi Delta communities. Literature on subsistence stresses that the desired outcome of participation is not an increase in income but the social rewards of participation itself. Two underlying dimensions of participation in these activities are documented through the literature and through a confirmatory factor analysis of empirical data: life-style choice and economic strategy. These were constructed into indexes and examined individually and in combination as dependent variables using regressors at the community, household, and individual levels. Community ties were weakly associated with participation in such activities. Whites and those with higher incomes participated more in lifestyle choice oriented activities. Participation in general was statistically related to households needing less weekly income and being of larger size. Potential connections with persistent rural poverty are discussed.     

Religiosity and the political economy of the Salem witch trials

Salem Village, both before and through the witchcraft trials, was a religion-based community, allowing its minister to exert a level of political–economic control over its citizens. During the height of the witchcraft episode, there was an increased demand for ministerial services (salvation) in the Salem area. Recent research has argued that the minister used the witchcraft episode to maintain and build upon personal and corporate wealth. In the years after the witchcraft trials changes were made in the business and legal environment of the surrounding New England region. By transitioning to a more neutral rules system with a larger area of consensus for the system, Salem and the rest of the New England transitioned from the 17th Century traditional, religion-based community to a more rules-based, pro-business one in the 18th Century.     

Improving Risk Management: From Lame Excuses to Principled Practice

The three classic pillars of risk analysis are risk assessment (how big is the risk and how sure can we be?), risk management (what shall we do about it?), and risk communication (what shall we say about it, to whom, when, and how?). We propose two complements as important parts of these three bases: risk attribution (who or what addressable conditions actually caused an accident or loss?) and learning from experience about risk reduction (what works, and how well?). Failures in complex systems usually evoke blame, often with insufficient attention to root causes of failure, including some aspects of the situation, design decisions, or social norms and culture. Focusing on blame, however, can inhibit effective learning, instead eliciting excuses to deflect attention and perceived culpability. Productive understanding of what went wrong, and how to do better, thus requires moving past recrimination and excuses. This article identifies common blame‐shifting “lame excuses” for poor risk management. These generally contribute little to effective improvements and may leave real risks and preventable causes unaddressed. We propose principles from risk and decision sciences and organizational design to improve results. These start with organizational leadership. More specifically, they include: deliberate testing and learning—especially from near‐misses and accident precursors; careful causal analysis of accidents; risk quantification; candid expression of uncertainties about costs and benefits of risk‐reduction options; optimization of tradeoffs between gathering additional information and immediate action; promotion of safety culture; and mindful allocation of people, responsibilities, and resources to reduce risks. We propose that these principles provide sound foundations for improving successful risk management.