A WHITER SHADE OF PALE: ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS

We consider an intertemporal policy game between changing governments that differ in their attitudes towards a particular feature of market outcomes, exemplified with environmental pollution. When in power, a government will choose policy instruments and set strictness of regulation with a view to influencing the policy of future, possibly different, governments. We demonstrate that a “brown” government favours emission quotas over effluent taxes, as quotas establish property rights that are costly to reverse. Conversely, a “green” government prefers to regulate by taxes, in order to limit the incentives of future brown governments to ease regulations. Strategic behaviour tends to exaggerate policy differences (making green governments greener and brown governments browner) compared to when such strategic considerations were not an issue. (JEL: D81, D9, H23, L51, Q28, Q38)     

The Distributive Impact of Reforms in Credit Enforcement: Evidence From Indian Debt Recovery Tribunals

It is generally presumed that stronger legal enforcement of lender rights increases credit access for all borrowers because it expands the set of incentive compatible loan contracts. This result relies on an assumption that the supply of credit is infinitely elastic. In contrast, with inelastic supply, stronger enforcement generates general equilibrium effects that may reduce credit access for small borrowers and expand it for wealthy borrowers. In a firm‐level panel, we find evidence that an Indian judicial reform that increased banks' ability to recover nonperforming loans had such an adverse distributive impact.     

Job Insecurity and the Timing of Parenthood: A Comparison between Eastern and Western Germany

This article contributes to the ongoing debate on the economic determinants of fertility behavior by addressing the role of job insecurity in couples’ intentions concerning parenthood and its timing. It starts from the hypothesis that cultural values moderate individuals’ reactions to job insecurity and the way it is related to family formation. With a systematic thematic content analysis of a set of semi-structured interviews with childless men and women around the age of 30 in eastern and western Germany, we are able to show that there are substantial differences in the consequences of job insecurity on intentions to have a first child. In western Germany, a relatively secure job career is expected to precede family formation, and this sequence of transitions is rather rigid, whereas in eastern Germany job security and family formation are thought of and practiced as parallel investments. We suggest that the lack of convergence in family formation patterns between eastern and western Germany after the unification of the country in 1990 is partially related to different attitudes toward job insecurity in the two contexts.     

Patterns of Conflict About Risky Technologies

This paper examines taxonomies for classifying risks and conflicts about risky technologies. First, we describe six levels of conflict that represent various " shades of gray" between purely factual and purely value laden conflicts in technology disputes. Subsequently, we survey several recent taxonomies of risks and hazards that were at least partly intended to clarify the nature of the public conflicts about technologies and their risks. After pointing out that non-risk features frequently shape technology debates, we develop a taxonomy of the disputes themselves, based on a collection of 162 cases. Our taxonomy of technological controversies is related to the recent risk taxonomies and to the different levels of conflict. It turns out that the different technological disputes create quite different levels of conflict ranging from mainly factual (consumer products, drugs) to extremely value laden (nuclear power, genetic engineering). Depending on the type of controversy and level of conflict we suggest alternative conflict management strategies.     

Norwegian lottery winners: Cautious realists

The study investigated 261 lottery winners of prizes of NKR 1 million (US $150,000) or more in the years 1987–91 in a postal survey. The modal Norwegian winners were middle-aged married men of modest education, living in small communities. Emotional reactions to winning were few, aside from moderate happiness and relief. Winners emphasized caution, emotional control and unconspicuous spending, e.g. paying debts and sharing with children. There was only a slight increase in economic spending. A wish for anonymity was frequent, together with fear of envy from others. Betting was modest both before and after winning. Experiences with winning were predominantly positive. Life quality was stable or had improved. An age trend was observed, accounting for more variance than any other variable. The older winners seemed to represent a puritan subculture of caution, modesty and emotional restraint. A slightly more impatient pattern of spending was characteristic of younger winners. The results support Kaplan's 1987 and others' findings that lottery winners are not gamblers, but self-controlled realists and that tenacious, negative cultural expectations to the contrary are myths, but perhaps also deterrents of uncontrolled behavior.     

Rules of behavior and expected utility theory. Compatibility versus dependence

Conclusions We have seen that many decision rules which are intuitively and/or empirically supported and compatible with MEU, are compatible with it but not dependent on it.There are of course rules of behavior which are implied in MEU and also depend on it like this:If the hope of winning any of the prizes in a lottery motivates you to buy a ticket, and if you win half the amount of the highest prize, you should play double or nothing with your prize.Suppose you would prefer a one in a million chance of winning $2 million to a two in a million chance of winning $1 million, but your first choice is not available so you buy a ticket for $1 million. If you win, you should play 50–50 double or nothing with your prize. Generalize: put x in the place of $1 million and p in the place of 1/1 000000, and test yourself against this principle (Pf = preferred to): (p, 2x)Pf(2p, x) (0.5, 2x)Pf(1, x).See Friedmann and Savage (1968).In the real world lotteries are multiprize, i.e., composite games of elements like these. The same applies: If you would not have preferred the highest prize exchanged for a higher probability of some lower prize, then winning a lower prize would put you in the market for some simple bet like above. If you stand up to this test, you are a unique person because, as we know, such bets are not made.While in the process of finishing the final draft, I got hold of (Samuelson, 1983). He expresses grave doubts as to what he calls the dogma of Expected Utility maximizing. In a somewhat apologetic way, he preserves some formulations deriving behavior from EUM because, as he states in a general way, they do not depend on that particular dogma. More specifically: many models incompatible with EUM imply risk aversion, which would result also from maximizing the expectation of a concave utility function,In view of the authoritarian disposition of some of the strongest defenders of EUM and of Samuelson's (well deserved) authority and his leading role in the school of EUM theory, his open expression of doubt may well mark the beginning of the last chapter in the history of the rise and fall of the most powerful school that has so far been active in 20th century decision theory.     

Helge Pross-Preis 2007 der Universität Siegen an Cornelia Helfferich

Ohne Zusammenfassung