India: ‘Brain Drain’ or the Migration of Talent?

2 views on "brain drain" exist: 1) LDCs lose their enormous investments on higher education when skilled people migrate to other countries and 2) LDCs are exaggerating the problem and only a few skilled people migrate at 1 time. India does not completely lose its investment in education when professionals migrate, since the migrants still contribute to knowledge and also send remittances to relatives in India. Unemployed educated people would cause a greater drain on India's resources than educated migrants. The author prefers the phrase migration of talent to brain drain, since the former indicates a 2-way movement. Most migrants from LDCs are students. About 11,000 university graduates leave India every year for advanced study and/or work. A conservative estimate is that 2500 will remain abroad permanently. Most professionals who migrate go to the US and Canada. Factors promoting migration include 1) unemployment, 2) immigration rules, 3) colonial links, 4) financial incentives and material benefits, 5) pursuit of higher education, 6) improvement of working conditions and facilities, 7) avoidance of excessive bureaucratic procedures, and 8) compensation for the mismatch between Indian education and employment. Reasons for returning to India include 1) deference to wives who were unable to adjust to a foreign way of life, 2) contributing to Indian development, and 3) racial discrimination. It will probably not be possible to lure back migrants who left for material reasons. Attractive job offers could entice back those who left for advanced training. To encourage the return of those who left to pursue high quality research, India must 1) increase expenditure on research and development, possibly through the private industrial sector, 2) promote travel to other countries for professional enrichment, and 3) improve conditions of research work. The article concludes with an analysis of migration of talent from 3 perspectives: 1) the individual, 2) the nation-state, and 3) the world as a whole.     

The U.S. legalization program: a preliminary final report

The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 made 4 types of aliens eligible to receive legalization benefits: 1) those who resided "continuously" in the US since January 1, 1982; 2) those who had worked in the US perishable-crop agriculture for 90 "man-days" in specified time periods (Special Agricultural Workers [SAWS]); 3) those who were in the US since before January 1, 1972; and 4) those classified as Cuban/Haitian entrants and who had been in the US since January 1, 1982. Estimates of the number of aliens eligible for legalization, not including SAWS, ranges from 1.834 million to 2.56 million. Estimates of undercounts of undocumented aliens are 10% for those who entered before 1975 and 37.5% for those who arrived after 1975. Other refinements in the estimates of undocumented aliens include adjustments for 1) ethnic group and location, 2) the growth of the undocumented population between the census date and the legalization eligibility date under IRCA, and 3) emigration and deportation rates. Out of the 1,581,800 applicants entered into the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) computers (from a total of 2.15 million applicants) as of May 20, 1988, 73.7% were Mexican nationals. Only 5 other countries contributed more than 1%: El Salvador (6.5%), Haiti (2.3%), Guatemala (2.2%), the Philippines (1%), and Colombia (1%). The Mexican percentage was unexpectedly high, perhaps because the legalization had been much more successful in the Southwest than anywhere else in the country. Reasons that Mexicans have a higher legalization participation rate than other nationalities include 1) the distant eligibility date; 2) ethnic differences among non-Mexican nationalities; 3) particularly in the northeast, fears of exposing one's illegal status to INS; 4) the difficulty of information reaching ethnic communities, 5) the reluctance of those already undergoing the naturalization process to risk the legalization process; and 6) the reluctance of employees to admit employment of undocumented aliens. In the end, more than 90% of applicants are expected to be granted temporary resident alien status (and about 70% of agricultural workers), for a total of more than 2 million people. Researchers estimate that 2.5 - 3 million more persons remain in an undocumented status in the US.     

The impact of international migration on fertility: an econometric population model

The authors develop an econometric model to examine the impact of migration on fertility in Greece in the period 1968-1986. In the model, the fertility equation is considered within a simultaneous equation system, and international migration is included as an explanatory factor of both fertility and per capita income. (SUMMARY IN FRE AND SPA)     

Individual irrationality and social welfare

Individual preferences inconsistent with personal welfare caused neither by ignorance nor by a positive consideration for the welfare of others are defined as (welfare) irrational. Sources of irrationality (rigid adherence to moral principles, excessive fear of danger, excessive tempetation of pleasure, revenge, inertia, faulty telescopic faculty, the fallacy of diminishing marginal utility of utility, etc.) are discussed. An evolutionary explanation of irrationality is suggested and some implications for individual decision and social policy indicated.I am grateful to two anonymous referees for comments.     

Policies over time and pareto optimality

This paper is concerned with sequences of policies that occur over time in voting models and planning procedures. The framework for our analysis includes assumptions that are satisfied by models in the corresponding literatures, together with other standard assumptions for microeconomic analysis that involve time. The starting point for our analyses is the prespective that results from combining the following (widely held) views: 1) certain voting models and planning procedures can be interpreted as being non-tatonnement or sequential processes (where each policy in the sequence that is generated is actually experienced by voters or consumers) and 2) an alternative being Pareto optimal in any given period (temporal Pareto optimality) is the appropriate efficiency criterion only if the alternative is the final outcome from a tatonnement process-and that, otherwise, one should examine the efficiency of the entire path (using intertemporal Pareto optimality). Our first observation about the planning literature is that is has (by and large) neglected the efficiency criterion that is appropriate for the discrete-time procedures that can be interpreted as non-tatonnement or sequential processes-and that, what's more, such trajectories will (in general) fail to meet this criterion. Our second observation identifies some results that can be used to establish that some of these trajectories will at least be ultimately intertemporally Pareto optimal. In our discussion of voting theory, we review Buchanan's opposition to requiring (social) choice consistency for voting procedures-and his argument for this position on (Pareto) efficiency grounds. We then consider voting procedures that can be interpreted as non-tatonnement or sequential processes and arrive at the conclusion that, in these cases, (i) majority rule cycles are intertemporally Pareto inefficient and (ii) achieving intertemporal Pareto optimality requires choice consistency. We then go on to show that related observations apply to Kramer's normative conclusions about his dynamical model of political equilibrium — and identify some further references where similar observations apply. In the final part of our discussion of voting models, we arrive at the further conclusion that, in the most relevant cases, a trajectory that stays in the temporal Pareto set is not necessarily more desirable (on efficiency grounds) than one that doesn't.This paper has been improved by helpful comments and suggestions that have been provided by Kenneth Arrow, an anonymous referee, and the editor who handled the paper.Peter Coughlin gratefully acknowledges financial support provided by (i) National Science Foundation Grant No. SES-8409352, and (ii) the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford (with support from National Science Foundation Grant No. BNS-8700864 and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation).     

Social choice theory in the case of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities

Part I of this paper offers a novel result in social choice theory by extending Harsanyi's well-known utilitarian theorem into a multi-profile context. Harsanyi was contented with showing that if the individuals' utilities u _i are von Neumann-Morgenstern, and if the given utility u of the social planner is VNM as well, then the Pareto indifference rule implies that u is affine in terms of the u _i. We provide a related conclusion by considering u as functionally dependent on the u _i, through a suitably restricted social welfare functional (u ₁,...,u _n)u=f(u ₁,...,u _n). We claim that this result is more in accordance with contemporary social choice theory than Harsanyi's single-profile theorem is. Besides, harsanyi's initial proof of the latter was faulty. Part II of this paper offers an alternative argument which is intended to be both general and simple enough, contrary to the recent proofs published by Fishburn and others. It finally investigates the affine independence problem on the u _i discussed by Fishburn as a corollary to harsanyi's theorem.The authors are indebted to L. Haddad, A. Sen and two anonymous referees for useful written comments. They also benefited from stimulating remarks in seminars and helpful conversations with their colleagues. The usual caveat of course applies. One of the authors acknowledges partial financial support from the ARI Communication of the C.N.R.S., Paris.     

The American commune and the American mythology

While the symbolic value of community has long been recognized, most of the attention to date has focussed on the symbolic content of the American small town, taken as representing the most fundamental and lasting values and characteristics of the American Way of Life (Vidich and Bensman, 1968, Caplowet al., 1982).Here it is argued that communities existing not in the cultural center but rather on the periphery also contain symbolic potency and are so interpreted by the dominant society. As is demonstrated by the case of the Amana Colonies, such communities represent the Other within. They present both the possibility of cultural alternatives and the ultimate victory of mainstream values and structures. The tension between history and myth, community and society, is then related to interpretation of other communal societies and their relationship to the dominant American society.For helpful comments on an earlier version, I would like to thank David Bouchier and Maren Lockwood Carden.     

A quantitative theory of preferences: Some results on transition functions

We investigate a general theory of combining individual preferences into collective choice. The preferences are treated quantitatively, by means of preference functions (a,b), where 0(a,b) expresses the degree of preference of a to b. A transition function is a function (x,y) which computes (a,c) from (a,b) and (b,c), namely (a,c)=((a,b),(b,c)). We prove that given certain (reasonable) conditions on how individual preferences are aggregated, there is only one transition function that satisfies these conditions, namely the function (x,y)=x·y (multiplication of odds). We also formulate a property of transition functions called invariance, and prove that there is no invariant transition function; this impossibility theorem shows limitations of the quantitative method.Research supported in part by the National Science Foundation.     

Selecting a family therapy model: the role of personality attributes in eclectic practice*

The expanding knowledge and skill bases within the interdisciplinary family therapy profession pose a significant challenge for evolving practitioners, at whatever stage along the professional development process they find themselves. This challenge raises a basic question regarding whether there are any constraining forces to the level of eclecticism in practice towards which one can aspire. This paper empirically explores the role played by the personality attributes of the family therapist in facilitating and/or inhibiting one's adherence to a variety of approaches to family practice.