Mental Models of Flash Floods and Landslides

Perceptions of flash floods and landslides were analyzed in four communities of the Bavarian Alps using the mental model approach. Thirty-eight qualitative interviews, two telephone surveys with 600 respondents, and two onsite interviews (74/95 respondents) were conducted. Mental models concerning flash floods are much better developed than those for landslides because the key physical processes for flash floods are easier for the general public to recognize and understand. Mental models are influenced by the local conditions. People who have a better knowledge about the hazards are those who use many different sources to inform themselves, express fear about natural hazards, or have previous experience with hazards. Conclusions for how to improve information for the general public are discussed.     

Analysis of short-term systematic measurement error variance for the difference of paired data without repetition of measurement

The variance of short-term systematic measurement errors for the difference of paired data is estimated. The difference of paired data is determined by subtracting the measurement results of two methods, which measure the same item only once without measurement repetition. The unbiased estimators for short-term systematic measurement error variances based on the one-way random effects model are not fit for practical purpose because they can be negative. The estimators, which are derived for balanced data as well as for unbalanced data, are always positive but biased. The basis of these positive estimators is the one-way random effects model. The biases, variances, and the mean squared errors of the positive estimators are derived as well as their estimators. The positive estimators are fit for practical purpose.     

Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods

We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which together imply individual rationality) exists. For two agents with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for some profiles of separable preferences, no rule is efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. If there are more than two agents, for some profiles of separable preferences, no rule is efficient, individually rational, and transfer-proof.     

On (n-l)-wise and joint independence and normality of n Random variables: an example

An example is given of a vector of n random variables such that any (n-1)-dimensional subvector consists of n-1 independent standard normal variables. The whole vector however is neither independent nor normal.     

Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems

We consider the problem of allocating indivisible objects when agents may desire to consume more than one object and monetary transfers are not possible. Each agent receives a set of objects and free disposal is allowed. We are interested in allocation rules that satisfy appealing properties from an economic and social point of view. Our main result shows that sequential dictatorships are the only efficient and coalitional strategy-proof solutions to the multiple assignment problem. Adding resource-monotonicity narrows this class down to serial dictatorships.We thank Francois Maniquet, two anonymous referees, and the participants of the GREBE-FRANCQUI Summer School on Axiomatic Resource Allocation Theory, held in Namur, Belgium, for their comments.     

Prek?rer Wohlstand und nachhaltiger Konsum

The article addresses a question that so far has been neglected in environmental sociology: How do social vulnerabilities and precarious situations affect opportunities for sustainable consumption? Firstly, I will show that both the sociology of inequality and environmental sociology have hardly made any systematic attempt to clarify the relation between the physical environment and social inequality. Subsequently, I will distinguish different dimensions in the physical use of the environment and ask whether and to what extent they are relevant to social inequality. I will then demonstrate that private households are the appropriate focus of research for a promising sociology of inequality approach to the distributive issues involved in using the environment. Finally, I propose that environmental research on sustainable consumption pay greater attention to the findings from recent research on precarization.     

Demographic dynamics and long-run development: insights for the secular stagnation debate

This paper takes a global, long-run perspective on the recent debate about secular stagnation, which has so far mainly focused on the short term. The analysis is motivated by observing the interplay between the economic and demographic transition that has occurred in the developed world over the past 150 years. To the extent that high growth rates in the past have partly been the consequence of singular changes during the economic and demographic transition, growth is likely to become more moderate once the transition is completed. At the same time, a similar transition is on its way in most developing countries, with profound consequences for the development prospects in these countries, but also for global comparative development. The evidence presented here suggests that long-run demographic dynamics have potentially important implications for the prospects of human and physical capital accumulation, the evolution of productivity, and the question of secular stagnation.