Matched survival data in a co-twin control design

When using the co-twin control design for analysis of event times, one needs a model to address the possible within-pair association. One such model is the shared frailty model in which the random frailty variable creates the desired within-pair association. Standard inference for this model requires independence between the random effect and the covariates. We study how violations of this assumption affect inference for the regression coefficients and conclude that substantial bias may occur. We propose an alternative way of making inference for the regression parameters by using a fixed-effects models for survival in matched pairs. Fitting this model to data generated from the frailty model provides consistent and asymptotically normal estimates of regression coefficients, no matter whether the independence assumption is met.     

Support for democracy in cross-national perspective: The detrimental effect of economic inequality

Using survey data and national statistics on 35 modern democracies, this research explores the relationship between economic and political conditions and support for democracy. As expected from modernization theory, support for democracy tends to be highest in countries with a high level of economic development. More importantly, however, I contribute a new finding that income inequality matters much more. Specifically, citizens from countries with relatively low levels of income inequality tend to be more likely than others to support democracy. I also find that household income is positively related to support for democracy in most countries, though it tends to have its strongest effect if economic development is high and income inequality is low. Finally, even after taking into account the level of economic development in one's country, people from former Communist countries tend to have far less support for democracy than those from more established democracies.     

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INNOVATION INDUSTRY: ENTREPRENEURS,VENTURE CAPITALISTS,AND OLIGOPOLISTS

We construct a model where incumbents can either acquire basic innovations from entrepreneurs, or wait and acquire developed innovations from entrepreneurial firms supported by venture capitalists. We show that venture‐backed entrepreneurial firms have an incentive to overinvest in development vis à vis incumbents due to strategic product market effects on the sales price of a developed innovation. This will trigger preemptive acquisitions by incumbents, thus increasing the reward for entrepreneurial innovations. We also show that venture capital can emerge in equilibrium if venture capitalists have cost advantages, or if development is associated with double moral hazard problems. (JEL: G24, L1, L2, M13, O3)     

Eliciting Risk and Time Preferences

We design experiments to jointly elicit risk and time preferences for the adult Danish population. Since subjects are generally risk averse, we find that joint elicitation provides estimates of discount rates that are significantly lower than those found in previous studies and more in line with what would be considered as a priori reasonable rates. The statistical specification relies on a theoretical framework that involves a latent trade‐off between long‐run optimization and short‐run temptation. Estimation of this specification is undertaken using structural, maximum likelihood methods. Our main results based on exponential discounting are robust to alternative specifications such as hyperbolic discounting. These results have direct implications for attempts to elicit time preferences, as well as debates over the appropriate domain of the utility function when characterizing risk aversion and time consistency.     

“Do They Think I Am a Pack Rat?”

This case study presents details of the life of one older man who lived in seclusion and squalor, surrounded by hoarded possessions. This man was one participant of a focused ethnography of eight older adults who received home care. All participants in the original ethnography were identified by their community care coordinators as exhibiting hoarding behaviors. The case study presented here provides rich narrative and photographic detail in order to add strength to what has already been presented in previous research articles about compulsive acquisition. The narratives reveal examples of debilitating dysfunction, distress associated with decision making, broad acquisition of free things, compulsive buying, and ritualistic discarding. Quotes included in the case study stem from the original ethnography.     

Global QUALITY OF LIFE (QOL), health and ability are primarily determined by our consciousness. Research findings from Denmark 1991–2004

Social Indicators Research - Objective: To explain the global quality of life (QOL) from 2000 indicators representing all aspects of life. Design and setting: Two cross sectional population...     

Quality of life,intelligence and mood

We investigated the relationship between quality of life (QOL), general ability and current mood in a sample of young men (N=269, mean age 24.9 years). Intelligence (verbal, spatial and mathematical) and technical ability were uncorrelated with QOL. Current mood such as pleasure, anger, sadness, boredom correlated firmly with QOL. The paper concludes that intelligence seems to be a variable of minor interest for QOL-studies.     

Non‐Manipulable House Allocation With Rent Control

In many real‐life house allocation problems, rents are bounded from above by price ceilings imposed by a government or a local administration. This is known as rent control. Because some price equilibria may be disqualified given such restrictions, this paper proposes an alternative equilibrium concept, called rationing price equilibrium, tailored to capture the specific features of housing markets with rent control. An allocation rule that always selects a rationing price equilibrium is defined, and it is demonstrated to be constrained efficient and (group) non‐manipulable for “almost all” preference profiles. In its bounding cases, the rule reduces to a number of well‐known mechanisms from the matching literature. In this sense, the housing market with rent control investigated in this paper integrates several of the predominant matching models into a more general framework.