Social Class,Economic Inequality,and the Convergence of Policy Preferences: Evidence from 24 Modern Democracies

Using data from the World Values Survey and national‐level indicators for 24 modern democracies, we assess the influence of social class and economic inequality on preferences for government responsibility. We improve on previous research by using multilevel models that account for differences in attitudes both within (i.e., over time) and across countries. Our findings are consistent with the economic self‐interest hypothesis. Specifically, working class individuals, who tend to gain the most from government intervention because of their low and often more precarious economic position, are more likely than others to support government intervention. We also find a positive relationship between national‐level income inequality and support for government intervention. As income inequality rises, its social ills tend to be more pervasive, resulting in public opinion becoming more supportive of governments taking responsibility for their citizens. We further demonstrate that inequality moderates the relationship between social class and attitudes. Although the effect of income inequality is positive for all social classes, attitudes across social classes become more similar as inequality rises. Utilisant les données de World Values Survey et indicateurs de niveau national, nous évaluons l'influence de la classe sociale et l'inégalité économique sur les préférences en matière de responsabilité du gouvernement dans 24 démocraties modernes. Notre analyse se améliore sur la recherche précédente en utilisant des modèles à plusieurs niveaux qui tiennent compte des différences dans les attitudes au sein (ce est à dire, au fil du temps) et entre les pays. Nos résultats sont cohérents avec l'hypothèse d'auto‐ intérêt économique. Par exemple, les travailleurs ‐ qui ont tendance à bénéficier plus quand le gouvernement intervient dans l’économie en raison de leurs faibles revenus et souvent position plus précaire ‐ sont plus susceptibles que d'autres à un soutien responsabilité du gouvernement. Nous constatons également une relation positive entre l'inégalité des revenus au niveau national et le soutien à l'intervention du gouvernement. Comme l'inégalité des revenus se élève—et ses maux sociaux ont tendance à être plus répandue—l'opinion publique devient plus favorable des gouvernements assument la responsabilité de citoyens. Tout aussi important, cependant, nous démontrons également que la relation entre la social classe et les préférences pour la responsabilisation du gouvernement diffèrent par la quantité de l'inégalité des revenus dans un pays. Bien que l'effet de l'inégalité des revenus est positif pour toutes les classes sociales, les différences dans les attitudes de la classes sociale convergent que l'inégalité augmente.     

A multidimensional view on poverty in the European Union by partial order theory

Poverty can be seen as a multidimensional phenomenon described by a set of indicators, the poverty components. A one-dimensional measure of poverty serving as a ranking index can be obtained by combining the component indicators via aggregation techniques. Ranking indices are thought of as supporting political decisions. This paper proposes an alternative to aggregation based on simple concepts of partial order theory and illustrates the pros and cons of this approach taking as case study a multidimensional measure of poverty comprising three components – absolute poverty, relative poverty and income – computed for the European Union regions. The analysis enables one to highlight conflicts across the components with some regions detected as controversial, with, for example, low levels of relative poverty and high levels of monetary poverty. The partial order approach enables one to point to the regions with the most severe data conflicts and to the component indicators that cause these conflicts.     

Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Nonadditive Hedonic Models

This paper studies the identification and estimation of preferences and technologies in equilibrium hedonic models. In it, we identify nonparametric structural relationships with nonadditive heterogeneity. We determine what features of hedonic models can be identified from equilibrium observations in a single market under weak assumptions about the available information. We then consider use of additional information about structural functions and heterogeneity distributions. Separability conditions facilitate identification of consumer marginal utility and firm marginal product functions. We also consider how identification is facilitated using multimarket data.     

Leadership Styles as Predictors of Self‐reported and Observed Workplace Bullying

The connection between leadership or management style, on the one hand, and perceptions of bullying, on the other, has received little attention within bullying research. Hence, the aim of this study is to examine the relationship between subordinates' ratings of their immediate superiors' behaviours, and both perceived exposure and claims of observations of bullying at work. Based on a sampling process which emphasized randomness and representativeness, the responses from 5288 respondents in Great Britain taking part in a nationwide study on psychosocial issues at work were included in the analysis. Bullying correlated with all four leadership styles measured. Yet, ‘non‐contingent punishment’ emerged as the strongest predictor of self‐perceived exposure to bullying, while autocratic leadership was the strongest predictor of observed bullying. Hence, while observers particularly associate bullying with autocratic or tyrannical leader behaviour, targets relate bullying more to non‐contingent punishment, i.e. an unpredictable style of leadership, where punishment is meted out or delivered on leaders' own terms, independent of the behaviour of subordinates. In addition, laissez‐faire leadership emerged as a predictor of self‐reported as well as observed bullying. Thus, leadership styles seem to play an important but complex role in the bullying process.     

Financial issues in strategic planning

In this article the author considers a variety of financial issues which have an important bearing on strategic planning. Mr. Zettergren develops a financial model in the article with the objectives of making it easy to comprehend yet detailed enough to account for most pertinent factors.     

Nonsuicidal Self‐Injury in a Community Sample of Adolescents: Subgroups,Stability, and Associations With Psychological Difficulties

Patterns of nonsuicidal self‐injury (NSSI) and their association with other psychological difficulties were studied in a community sample of young Swedish adolescents, by a two‐wave longitudinal design with a 1‐year interval. Hierarchical cluster analysis at T1 identified eight NSSI subgroups in each gender, of which five were clearly replicated at T2. Among these were a subgroup with generalized high‐frequency NSSI, which was associated with both internalizing and externalizing problems, and a subgroup of girls who engaged primarily in cutting and showed mainly internalizing problems. In general, NSSI clusters among girls were more stable over time and associated with more psychological problems. The results indicate that different patterns of NSSI have different developmental and clinical implications.     

Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems

We consider the problem of allocating indivisible objects when agents may desire to consume more than one object and monetary transfers are not possible. Each agent receives a set of objects and free disposal is allowed. We are interested in allocation rules that satisfy appealing properties from an economic and social point of view. Our main result shows that sequential dictatorships are the only efficient and coalitional strategy-proof solutions to the multiple assignment problem. Adding resource-monotonicity narrows this class down to serial dictatorships.We thank Francois Maniquet, two anonymous referees, and the participants of the GREBE-FRANCQUI Summer School on Axiomatic Resource Allocation Theory, held in Namur, Belgium, for their comments.