THE BEHAVIOR OF REGULATORY ACTIVITY OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE: AN EMPIRICAL TEST

This paper tests a prediction of the interest-group theory of regulation which suggests that regulators generally will not force any one group to bear the full adjustment costs associated with variations in the business cycle. That is, the interest-group model predicts that regulatory agencies will redistribute cyclical gains and losses by supplying more "producer protection" regulation during contractions and more "consumer protection" regulation during expansions; i.e., regulatory activity which reduces consumer welfare will tend to be countercyclical, intensifying when aggregate demand falls and abating as demand increases.
The empirical results show a countercyclical and statistically significant ceteris paribus relationship between Federal Trade Commission enforcement efforts under the Robinson-Patman Act and several alternative measures of general business conditions. Since the Robinson-Patman Act is viewed widely as anti-consumer, the findings suggest that in cyclical downturns the Commission moves to protect producers against losses by bringing more cases which limit the tendency for prices to fall. This result may be rationalized under the view that during recessions, the Federal Trade Commission is in the business of transferring wealth from consumers either to protect small business or to bolster cartels. On the other hand, during business expansions the Commission reduces its Robinson-Patman case load, and such a change in enforcement may serve to mitigate producer gains, transferring wealth to consumers at the margin. In any case the paper offers empirical support for the interest-group model by providing evidence that the business cycle plays an important part in explaining the level and pattern of regulatory activity.     

POSITIONAL POWER, CLASS, AND INDIVIDUAL EARNINGS INEQUALITY: Advancing New Structuralist Explanations

This article seeks to advance "new structuralist" theory by considering the effects of positional power and class on individual earnings. We contend that positional power, that is the power wielded by workers employed in industries in an interdependent economy, confers upon workers the potential to disrupt system-wide production and creates leverage to demand higher earnings from employers. We demonstrate that positional power, in particular the per worker volume of goods and services received from other industries (or upstream production), increases workers' earnings net of sociodemographic variables and other plausible structural sources of earnings determination. We suggest that the threat of disrupting upstream production holds greater earnings potential than disrupting downstream production because of the profit realization problems associated with the former. We also show that the positive effects of positional power are not evenly distributed across the class structure, but rather are concentrated among non-owning classes who display a social control function in the labor process. We discuss the implications of our research for future new structuralist research.     

An interest-group theory of population growth

This paper applies the interest-group theory of government to explain population growth. The main argument is that countries whose populations are more ethnically heterogeneous will tend to have higher fertility rates because there are more interest groups which compete for control of the political process of wealth redistribution. The theoretical model is supported by empirical evidence using data on 130 countries for 1980.Wangui Kimenyi helped code the data set. Remaining errors are our responsibility.     

Beyond contradiction and consistency: A design for a dialectical policy system

It is only within the last ten years that the necessary technical machinery has been developed that enables us to construct models that even begin to approach the complexity of dialectical reasoning. This paper shows both the diversity and the complexity of the concepts that must be woven together in order to construct a dialectic ‘process logic’, i.e., a logic that unfolds over time. It utilizes such concepts as Rescher's and Manor's plausibility calculus, Toulmin's framework for argumentation, and Markov chains. The result is the essence of a design for a computer based dialectical policy system.     

A comparison of two randomized response survey methods with consideration for the level of respondent protection

In recent years randomized response methods have been introduced in an attempt to improve the accuracy and honesty in personalized response surveys of very sensitive questions. Two randomized response methods are compared, taking into account the protection afforded the respondent. In addition, we point out that the estimators, which previous authors have claimed to be the maximum likelihood estimators of the population proportion with the sensitive characteristic, are in fact not the maximum likelihood estimators.     

An exploration of the robustness of alternative laboratory methodologies: Matching funds and the provision of public goods

The voluntary provision of a pure public good is studied in the presence of an anonymous external donor. New data generated using experimental procedures employing both extra-credit and cash incentives, as well as asynchronous access to real-time decision rounds lasting several days, are compared to previous data generated using traditional cash-only, synchronous-access laboratory procedures. The effect on resource allocations to the public good of introducing external matching funds is examined in two different settings, lump-sum matching and one-to-one matching. The new data confirm the robustness of results previously reported in Baker et al. (2009) to the change in laboratory procedures and incentives. The new data are then used to extend the parameter space in which the two matching mechanisms are studied, including: varying within-round information regarding the current level of public-good allocations and varying group size from four to twenty group members. Allocations in lump-sum matching are no worse, and sometimes better, than one-to-one matching in these new treatments.     

Occupational Channels for Mexican Migration: New Destination Formation in a Binational Context

In the 1990s, Mexican immigration dispersed spatially, leading to the emergence of many “new destinations,” in nonmetropolitan areas of the United States. Previous studies constrain the scope of the analysis to the United States, limiting our understanding of how new destinations are formed. We place new destination formation into a binational context and emphasize the role of supply‐side immigration dynamics. We argue that occupations in Mexico provide ready‐made paths, or “channels,” for economic incorporation into the United States and that these channels underlie the formation of many new destinations. Using a unique data set on Mexican migration, we estimate a multivariate model that tests for the presence of occupational channels linking analogous sectors of the U.S. and Mexican economies, focusing especially on the food‐processing sector. The results demonstrate that Mexican migration is strongly channeled along occupational lines. There are occupational channels linking each of the major economic sectors in Mexico and the United States, but the effect of channeling is particularly strong in the food‐processing sector. By empirically identifying the existence of occupational channels, this study uncovers a key explanation of new destination formation in many nonmetropolitan areas.     

Towards a behavioral theory of systemic hypothesis-testing and the error of the third kind

Scientific ideas neither arise nor develop in a vacuum. They are always nutured against a background of prior, partially conflicting ideas. Systemic hypothesistesting is the problem of testing scientific hypotheses relative to various systems of background knowledge. This paper shows how the problem of systemic hypothesis-testing (Sys HT) can be systematically expressed as a constrained maximimization problem. It is also shown how the error of the third kind (E _III) is fundamental to the theory of Sys HT.The error of the third kind is defined as the probability of having solved the ‘wrong’ problem when one should have solved the ‘right’ problem. This paper shows howE _III can be given both a systematic as well as a systemic treatment. Sys HT gives rise to a whole host of new decision problems, puzzles, and paradoxes.     

FILE MANAGEMENT IN MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS*

The file management requirements of a particular management information system, that used for intelligence operations, are examined and a data storage and retrieval system developed that can be either manual or computer based. Scoring models are used to quantify the value of information. Values are adjusted dynamically so that decisions can be made on which items to add and which existing items to delete. Results of experiments with a police intelligence system are presented.