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961.
This paper explores roles that children play in ethnographic research. Based on the limited literature on children in the field, and drawing on examples from ethnographies across disciplines, I identify four roles for children: 1) as “wedges,” or as instrumentally important in helping adult ethnographers gain access in various ways; 2) as collaborators; 3) as objects of study; and 4) as subjects of study. I also discuss the ways in which these roles illuminate key methodological issues in ethnography, like reflexivity, ethics, and agency. The paper synthesizes and integrates previously disconnected research on the presence of children in the field with ethnographies in which children and childhood are the topics of research. I draw on my own fieldwork experiences for further illustration.
Hilary LeveyEmail:

Hilary Levey   is a PhD candidate in sociology at Princeton University. Her research interests include childhood, culture, gender, and qualitative methods, and her dissertation is an ethnography of competitive children’s activities, with a focus on elementary school-age children’s participation in chess, dance, and soccer. She has previously studied child beauty pageants and Kumon Math and Reading Centers.  相似文献   
962.
This paper studies a class of social welfare relations (SWRs) on the set of infinite utility streams. In particular, we examine the SWRs satisfying -Anonymity, an impartiality axiom stronger than Finite Anonymity, as well as Strong Pareto and a certain equity axiom. First, we characterize the extension of the generalized Lorenz SWR by combining -Anonymity with Strong Pareto and Pigou–Dalton Equity. Second, we replace Pigou–Dalton Equity with Hammond Equity for characterizing the extended leximin SWR. Third, we give an alternative characterization of the extended utilitarian SWR by substituting Incremental Equity for Pigou–Dalton Equity.  相似文献   
963.
We consider the fraction of pairs of m distinct alternatives on which a social welfare function f may be nondictatorially independent and Pareto when the domain of f satisfies the free k-tuple property. When k = 4 we improve the existing upper bound to . When there are at least 26 alternatives and we obtain an original upper bound, . To obtain these results we define and analyze the graph formed from the nondictatorial independent and Pareto pairs and combine the results of this analysis with known results from extremal graph theory. The authors extend special thanks to the two reviewers and the editor for their comments.  相似文献   
964.
We study necessary and sufficient conditions for a multi-valued solution S to be rationalized in the following sense: there exists a complete asymmetric relation T (a tournament) such that, for each feasible (finite) set, the solution set of S coincides with the minimal covering set of T restricted to that feasible set. Our characterization result relies only on properties relating S across feasible choice sets.  相似文献   
965.
Most political and economic theorists point to moral hazard in teams as the main obstacle to lobbies’ collective action. In this paper, we address this important issue with a coalition-formation game. In the process of doing so, we characterize equilibrium lobby structures both in the absence and in the presence of moral hazard. Three notable results emerge from such an exercise: (1) an equilibrium lobby structure exists under both specifications of the model, (2) moral hazard in teams may raise large groups’ equilibrium lobby size, and (3) it may also raise the level of collective action of large groups with low organizational costs. I wish to express my appreciation to Helmuth Cremer, Philippe De Donder, Kai A. Konrad, Michel Le Breton, Daniel Seidmann, Shlomo Weber, an associate editor of this journal and a referee for valuable comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to Paul Belleflamme, Francis Bloch, Robert Dur, Joan Esteban, Debraj Ray, and the audience at the CESifo Area Conference on Public Sector Economics 2006 and at the 15th Aix-Marseille SSIEIO for helpful discussions.  相似文献   
966.
According to standard theory founded on Harsanyi (J Polit Econ 61:434–435, 1953; 63:309–321, 1955) a social welfare function can be appropriately based on the individual’s approach to choice under uncertainty. We investigate how people really do rank distributions in terms of welfare. According to Harsanyi, the evaluation can be done from the standpoint of an uninvolved external judge, a public official, for example, or by a person who knows that she holds one of the positions in society, with an equal chance for any of the available positions. Are these two structures to be viewed differently? We use a questionnaire experiment to focus on the two different interpretations of the Harsanyi approach. There are important, systematic differences that transcend the cultural background of respondents.  相似文献   
967.
Transnational social networks powerfully shape Mexican migration and enable families to stretch internationally. In an atmosphere of such high dependence on social networks, it would be rare for families not to be affected by the opinions of others. This article analyzes this often-overlooked aspect of social networks, gossip. I analyze gossip stories prevalent for one type of migrant family, those in which parents and children live apart. Drawing on over 150 ethnographic interviews and observation with members of Mexican transnational families and their neighbors in multiple sites, I describe both parents’ and children’s experiences with transnational gossip. I show that in a transnational context, gossip is a highly gendered activity with different consequences for men and women. Although targeting both women and men, transnational gossip reinforces the expectations that mothers be family caregivers and fathers be family providers even when physical separation makes these activities difficult to accomplish.
Joanna DrebyEmail:

Joanna Dreby   is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Kent State University. Her research focuses on the consequences contemporary migration patterns have for family relationships and particularly for children. Current projects include a study of the impact different family migration patterns have on Mexican school children’s educational and migratory aspirations, and research into how U.S. migration affects the way young Mexican children imagine their families and the United States.  相似文献   
968.
This paper is based on 45 ethnographic interviews conducted with residents of mobile home communities in West Central Florida between 2005 and 2008. It investigates their strategies of managing the stigma that is commonly associated with living in a mobile home. Informants routinely encounter negative stereotypes regarding their “trailer” home, community, and lifestyle in public discourse and personal interactions, and consequently have developed ways of salvaging their decency. My analysis of these strategies particularly emphasizes two versions of distancing, here called “bordering” and “fencing,” as examples of symbolic boundary work. Other techniques discussed include ignoring, passing, humoring, resisting, normalizing, upstaging, and blaming. Throughout the paper, I argue that mobile home residents’ ways of salvaging decency are both similar and different compared to how other disparaged groups deal with stigmatization. The conclusion discusses broader sociological implications of the research in enhancing our understanding of the experience of stigmatization, folk conceptions of decency, symbolic and social differentiation, as well as race and class dynamics.  相似文献   
969.
This paper analyzes voting on a linear income tax whose proceeds are redistributed lump sum to the taxpayers. Individuals can evade taxes, which leads to penalties if evasion is detected. Since preferences satisfy neither single peakedness nor single crossing, a voting equilibrium may not exist. When an equilibrium does exist, there are several possible outcomes. There may be ‘conventional’ equilibria where the rich are expropriated by the poor and middle class. There may be equilibria without full expropriation where redistribution is limited by the threat of evasion. Finally, there may be equilibria where redistribution goes from the middle class to the rich and poor.  相似文献   
970.
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