For better,for worse? Public support for the capitalist model of the economy

A capitalist market economy is based on several institutional elements, such as private ownership and competition. Does public support for this economic model rise if the economy prospers, and fall during a downturn? Or is public support largely independent of the ups and downs of economic cycles? We hypothesize that positive economic performance increases support and that persons profiting personally are more supportive of the economic system's constitutive institutional elements. Using multilevel regression we study the determinants of individual-level support for the economic system. We also test for differences in the perception of economic performance due to political attitudes and personal properties. The findings partly support the hypotheses, indicating that macro-economic factors matter for individual-level attitudes towards the economy. Attitudes towards different institutional elements of the economic system also differ in the degree to which they are political or economic, and influenced by economic performance. Individual features – education and personal economic stakes – affect attitudes towards the economy, but a substantial share of the individual-level variation in economic attitudes remains unexplained.     

DESIGNED TO FAIL: THE MEDICARE AUCTION FOR DURABLE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

We examine the theoretical properties of the auction for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment. Two unique features of the Medicare auction are (1) winners are paid the median winning bid and (2) bids are nonbinding. We show that median pricing results in allocation inefficiencies as some high‐cost firms potentially displace low‐cost firms as winners. Further, the auction may leave demand unfulfilled as some winners refuse to supply because the price is set below their cost. We also introduce a model of nonbinding bids that establishes the rationality of a lowball bid strategy employed by many bidders in the actual Medicare auctions and recently replicated in Caltech experiments. We contrast the median‐price auction with the standard clearing‐price auction where each firm bids true costs as a dominant strategy, resulting in competitive equilibrium prices and full efficiency. (JEL D44, I11, H57)     

Intention to emigrate in transition countries: the case of Albania

We analyse the profile of potential emigrants from Albania using data from the Central and Eastern Europe Eurobarometer in 1992. Respondents were asked to rate on a four-point scale the likelihood that they would go to live in Western Europe. Our results show that intention to emigrate is correlated positively with males, education and certain occupations, and negatively with age. There is little relation between emigration and income. Those who support the introduction of a free market in Albania are also more likely to emigrate than those who do not. Received: 24 August 1998/Accepted: 17 April 2000     

Medical Students' Attitudes and Opinions About Human Sexual Behaviour

In their professional capacities doctors are often confronted with clients who present with psycho-sexual problems. At the present time Australian medical students are provided with very little instruction in the areas of human sexual behaviour. This paper examines the attitudes and amount of information possessed by a cohort of second year medical students compared with groups of first and fifth year students; these attitudes and levels of information are then related to students' sex, religious affiliation, strength of religious conviction, where this is seen to be relevant. It is shown that some areas of ignorance exist. The paper concludes by outlining some aspects relevant to courses in human sexual behaviour.     

Can we count on each other? Reciprocity and conflicts in financial support in Sweden

Espvall M, Dellgran P. Can we count on each other? Reciprocity and conflicts in financial support in Sweden
Int J Soc Welfare 2010: 19: 84–94 © 2008 The Author(s), Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the International Journal of Social Welfare. This article explores the experiences of reciprocity and conflicts in social relationships, and how these experiences are related to financial support (loans and gifts) in the wider social network. The balance of exchange within the social network as a whole is considered in relation to socio‐demographic features, financial conditions and the availability of social relationships. The data are drawn from a study of financial support exchange in Sweden based on a representative survey among Swedish citizens (n= 500). The results reveal that people living in economic hardship and who have more problematic life circumstances appear to be at risk of receiving more limited informal financial support and experience more feelings of conflict and nonreciprocal social relations.     

Population monotonic path schemes for simple games

A path scheme for a game is composed of a path, i.e., a sequence of coalitions that is formed during the coalition formation process and a scheme, i.e., a payoff vector for each coalition in the path. A path scheme is called population monotonic if a player’s payoff does not decrease as the path coalition grows. In this study, we focus on Shapley path schemes of simple games in which for every path coalition the Shapley value of the associated subgame provides the allocation at hand. Obviously, each Shapley path scheme of a game is population monotonic if and only if the Shapley allocation scheme of the game is population monotonic in the sense of Sprumont (Games Econ Behav 2:378–394, 1990). We prove that a simple game allows for population monotonic Shapley path schemes if and only if the game is balanced. Moreover, the Shapley path scheme of a specific path is population monotonic if and only if the first winning coalition that is formed along the path contains every minimal winning coalition. We also show that each Shapley path scheme of a simple game is population monotonic if and only if the set of veto players of the game is a winning coalition. Extensions of these results to other efficient probabilistic values are discussed.     

Two-sided intergenerational moral hazard,long-term care insurance,and nursing home use

Two-sided intergenerational moral hazard occurs (i) if the parent’s decision to purchase long-term care (LTC) coverage undermines the child’s incentive to exert effort because the insurance protects the bequest from the cost of nursing home care, and (ii) when the parent purchases less LTC coverage, relying on child’s effort to keep him out of the nursing home. However, a “net” moral hazard effect obtains only if the two players’ responses to exogenous shocks fail to neutralize each other, entailing a negative relationship between child’s effort and parental LTC coverage. We focus on outcomes out of equilibrium, interpreting them as a break in the relationship resulting in no informal care provided and hence high probability nursing home admission. Changes in the parent’s initial wealth, LTC subsidy received, and child’s expected inheritance are shown to induce “net” moral hazard, in contradistinction to changes in child’s opportunity cost and share in the bequest.