Unskilled labor and wage determination: an empirical investigation for Germany

This article contributes to the ongoing debate on native wage impacts of immigration. I propose a mobile-fixed factor distinction as a framework in which to think about the differential impact of immigration on various labor market groups. Skilled workers are treated as a fixed factor of production since the strong reliance on skill certification in Germany inhibits mobility and shelters from competition. Unskilled workers, in contrast, receive competitive wages. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for 1984–1989 I estimate panel wage regressions for groups of workers separated by skill certification. I find that university graduates‘ wages increase, and the wages of workers without postsecondary degree decrease, as the industry share of unskilled workers increases. The effect for apprentices is ambiguous. JEL classification: F22, J31 Received January 19, 1995 / Accepted August 14, 1995     

Managing autonomy in university–industry research: a case of collaborative Ph.D. projects in the Netherlands

Review of Managerial Science - Research partnerships between university researchers and industry partners are becoming increasingly prevalent. For university researchers, maintaining autonomy is...     

On the duty to give (and not to take): An experiment on moralistic punishment

Organizations aim to influence—via their internal guidelines and corporate culture—how unfair treatment of other stakeholders is perceived and condemned by employees. To understand how different frames and forms of publicity influence moralistic punishment, that is, the willingness of employees to take costs in order to foster norm compliance, we employ a modified version of a dictator game. In our dictator game, a bystander observes a dictator’s behavior towards a recipient and can punish the dictator. We vary how the dictator’s action is framed (either as giving money to the recipient or taking money from the recipient) and whether or not the recipient, as a victim of unfair behavior, is informed about the punishment. Our results suggest that bystanders are more likely to punish dictators when their action is framed as giving rather than taking, although both lead to the same consequences. When bystanders cannot inform recipients about their punishment, less punishment can be observed. On average, dictators partially anticipate this effect and behave more generously when recipients are informed about the bystanders’ punishment.     

Optimal design for the Bradley–Terry paired comparison model

Paired comparisons are a popular tool for questionnaires in psychological marketing research. The quality of the statistical analysis of the responses heavily depends on the design, i.e. the choice of the alternatives in the comparisons. In this paper we show that the structure of locally optimal designs changes substantially with the parameters in the underlying utility. This fact is illustrated by elementary examples, where the optimal designs can be completely characterized. As an alternative maximin efficient designs are proposed which perform well for all parameter settings. Research supported by grant Ho 1286 of the German Research Council (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft).     

The Effect of Income on General Life Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction

Increasing evidence from the empirical economic and psychological literature suggests that positive and negative well-being are more than opposite ends of the same phenomenon. Two separate measures of the dependent variable may therefore be needed when analyzing the determinants of subjective well-being. We investigate asymmetries in the effect of income on subjective well-being with a single-item measure of general life satisfaction. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 1984–2004, and a flexible multiple-index ordered probit panel data model with varying thresholds, we find that income has only a minor effect on high satisfaction but significantly reduces dissatisfaction.