DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN LINGUISTICALLY DIVERSE SOCIETIES: THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

We consider a linguistically diversified society and examine the notion of language disenfranchisement when some individuals are denied the full access to documents and political process in their native tongues. To calculate the disenfranchisement indices we use the Dyen percentage cognate matrix of linguistic distances between Indo‐European languages and apply survey and population data on language proficiency in the European Union. We then determine optimal sets of official languages that depend on society's sensitivity against disenfranchisement and comprehensiveness of the chosen language regime. We also discuss the language situation in the European Union after its last enlargement. (JEL: D70, O52, Z13)     

Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition

 In this paper we examine a model of electoral competition with entry costs, where several established parties compete against each other under the threat of potential entry. Assuming single-peakedness of the distribution of voters’ ideal points, we show that, if there are two established parties, an equilibrium always exists and is unique, and demonstrate that the Hotelling-Downs and the Smithies-Palfrey equilibria represent special cases of the equilibrium in our model. If there are more than two established parties, an equilibrium is always unique and there exists an upper bound on the values of entry cost which guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. Received: 3 July 1995/Accepted: 10 June 1996     

A note on the core and von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions of simple games

Following the results of Nakamura (1979) and Muto (1984), we derive, for a given proper voting game G, the upper bound on the size of the space of alternatives, which guarantees that the core constitutes a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution for any profile of voter's preferences. In particular, we show that if the space of alternatives consists of more than two elements, then, in general, the core is not a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution.We wish to thank Bezalel Peleg for pointing us out that one of the results in the previous version of this paper has already been proved by Muto (1984) and two anonymous referees for their useful remarks.     

From Generation to Generation: Intergenerational Relations in the Kibbutz

The first kibbutzim were established at the beginning of the twenetieth century. This short history allows us to trace the outline of generations. The second generation followed the practices of the founders, but without their ideological dedication. The third generation did not accept the kibbutz lifestyle, and many left. Those who stayed implemented changes, which ensured the continuity of the community, but at the cost of abandoning some original kibbutz values. Since the turn of the century, the youngest generation has been returning, but now to a different kibbutz, one based on principles that meet their needs while ensuring the sustainability of the community.