Attributing emotions to false beliefs: Development across discrete emotions

Emotion false belief (EFB) is the ability to correctly predict people's emotions given that they hold a false belief (FB). Accumulating evidence suggests that EFB understanding develops after FB understanding; however, the literature presents inconsistencies in this lag. The present study investigated the development of EFB in 85 four‐ and six‐year‐olds, and systematically compared this development to FB understanding across different emotions. Controlling for verbal ability and task demands, 6‐year‐olds scored significantly better on EFB tasks than 4‐year‐olds, and 6‐year‐olds' performance was better than chance. Performance did not vary by emotion. The data supported a developmental precedence of FB to EFB. Results suggest that children's acquisition of EFB is not due solely to verbal ability, FB understanding, or discrete emotion understanding; attributing emotions to beliefs represents a conceptual change in emotion understanding that occurs holistically. These conclusions are discussed in terms of socioemotional development.     

What finite-additivity can add to decision theory

Statistical Methods & Applications - We examine general decision problems with loss functions that are bounded below. We allow the loss function to assume the value $$infty $$ . No other...     

天塌了的感觉

父亲是很疼爱我们的,放暑假时带我到塘沽去住,他天天给我买五分钱的海棠果,我喜欢吃这玩意儿。     

On the equivalence of conglomerability and disintegrability for unbounded random variables

Statistical Methods & Applications - We extend a result of Dubins (Ann Probab 3:89–99, 1975) from bounded to unbounded random variables. Dubins showed that a finitely additive expectation...     

The Independence Postulate,Hypothetical and Called-off Acts: a further reply to Rabinowicz

The Independence postulate links current preferences between called-off acts with current preferences between constant acts. Under the assumption that the chance-events used in compound von Neumann-Morgenstern lotteries are value-neutral, current preferences between these constant acts are linked to current preferences between hypothetical acts, conditioned by those chance events. Under an assumption of stability of preferences over time, current preferences between these hypothetical acts are linked to future preferences between what are then and there constant acts. Here, I show that a failure of Independence with respect to current preferences leads to an inconsistency in sequential decisions. Two called-off acts are constructed such that each is admissible in the same sequential decision and yet one is strictly preferred to the other. This responds to a question regarding admissibility posed by Rabinowicz ([2000] Preference stability and substitution of indifferents: A rejoinder to Seidenfeld, Theory and Decision 48: 311–318 [this issue]).