Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections

If voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of expressing nuanced opinions, or would they always overstate the intensity of their preferences? For additive voting rules, say that a ballot is extremal if it is neither abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture of the available ballots. We give a sufficient condition for strategic equivalence: if two rules share the same set of extremal ballots (up to an homothetic transformation), they are strategically equivalent in large elections. This condition is also necessary for the strategic equivalence of positional rules. These results do not hold for small electorates.     

NPO,Internal Controls,and Supervision Mechanisms in a Developing Country

The premise of this paper is that effective supervision and proper internal control system (ICS) can promote accountability and transparency, and this will attract more donors. However, in a developing country like Malaysia, it is common that proper accounting standards are not available, the laws are not enforced, and charities often struggle for survival. Debates on regulating nonprofit organizations (NPOs) have been sensitive to many and are often left unresolved, and some quarters believe that NPOs should be left to handle their own affairs. This paper provides evidence from a survey of 60 charities on the status of their ICS. It briefly describes the current state of regulations in Malaysia and makes a case for better monitoring of the sector, as this might be the reason NPOs are lacking in their ICS. We propose what type of regulation and assistance can be provided by the authorities to this sector, not only in Malaysia but also in other developing countries facing similar challenges.     

The division problem with voluntary participation

The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of a homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. The literature has implicitly assumed that agents will find acceptable any share they are assigned to. In this article we consider the division problem when agents’ participation is voluntary. Each agent has an idiosyncratic interval of acceptable shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent either to not participate or an acceptable share because otherwise he would opt out and this would require to reassign some of the remaining agents’ shares. We study a subclass of efficient and consistent rules and characterize extensions of the uniform rule that deal explicitly with agents’ voluntary participation.     

Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency

We consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, by combining the result of Kayı and Ramaekers (Games Econ Behav 68:220–232, 2010) with ours, we also give a characterization of the class of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and budget-balance.     

Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems

We investigate the implications of balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction in the context of sequencing problems. Balanced consistency requires that the effect on the payoff from the departure of one agent to another agent should be equal between any two agents. On the other hand, balanced cost reduction requires that if one agent leaves a problem, then the total payoffs of the remaining agents should be affected by the amount previously assigned to the leaving agent. We show that the minimal transfer rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency and Pareto indifference together with either one of our two main axioms, balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction.     

From “dot.org” to “dot.gov”: Professional Crossings in the Brazilian National Policy on HIV/AIDS

This article reflects on the importance of the relations between state and society in policy-making in the area of public health. Several studies in various sectors such as health, education, and social services have made similar observations on organizational dynamics and the institutionalization of different models of partnerships or contracts, often based on the analytical model of three sectors. Individuals and their networks of relationships, however, remain an almost unexplored dimension in these types of research. Against this backdrop, this study seeks to analyze the movement of HIV/AIDS activists to governmental organizations working in this same field. The analysis raises questions concerning the forms of individual and institutional learning that help to maintain the distinct character of innovation of the Brazilian policy. Professionals who cross the borders hold a different profile once they have accumulated experience working with grassroots and local NGOs, and have also had the chance to be trained and enhance their technical and managerial capacities, since the government has supported NGOs for a long period. When combined, these experiences allow them to maintain relationships with social movements and give them the ability to navigate through the government bureaucracy and handle technical information about fighting AIDS epidemics, making it possible for them to negotiate strategic collaborations reflecting the interests of different groups. Hence, they constantly reflect on the differences between government and social spaces, and keep questioning and modifying their roles in the light of potential and existing complementarities.     

Ports modernization and its influence on trade unions

The restructuring of production resulting from the Port Modernization Law (Law 8.630/90) caused significant changes in work organization of Brazilian Ports. In the case of Mucuripe (Fortaleza, Ceará), in particular, the changes were very intense as Mucuripe is an old port that, before the Law, had labor regulation being governed by Trade Unions. This paper aims to present the perceptions of Union Representatives on the changes brought about by the Law on work organization in the port of Fortaleza, its influence in the organization and in the way the Unions deal with this new reality. Open and exploratory interviews were conducted with representatives of occasional labor workers registered in the Port of Fortaleza OGMO (Org?o Gestor de M?o de Obra, Labor Regulation Management). The analysis of the collected material in the interviews was based on the technique of content analysis proposed by Bardin (1979). Trade Unions have undergone a great loss of power and it has reflected in a relative inability to perform its function and to fight for the rights of the workers. The obvious Trade Unions weakness - a reduction of strikes and less unionized workers - reflects the dominating ideology of capital.