Minority and majority private equity investments: firm performance and governance

This paper adds to the literature on the determinants of the effects of private equity (PE) investments. Using an original dataset of 191 target firms in Italy, we study the effects on performance and governance of the stakes acquired by the PE investor. We employ a difference-in-differences approach and compare target and control firms sharing similar characteristics and performance in the years preceding the deal. We find that PE investment has a positive effect on profitability, sales, and employment; these effects are larger for minority investments. We argue that this signals effective governance that follows from complementing rather than substituting incumbent managers in minority investments.     

Dual class shares,board of directors’ effectiveness and firm’s market value: an empirical study

This study aims to identify whether a relationship exists between the controlling shareholders’ voting power and outside directors’ effectiveness in maximizing firms’ financial performance. We analyze a panel data with 3057 observations for the 2000–2012 period using a random effects model, logit and probit regressions, and the two-stage model of Heckman in the Brazilian stock market. Our findings show that firms whose controlling shareholders use dual class shares to leverage their voting power have less independence from the board and worse financial performance and market value. Further, the percentage of outside directors tends to be ineffective in increasing the firm’s value, and in changing the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO) when (1) the controlling shareholder’s voting power is leveraged, or (2) when the CEO assumes a position on the board of directors simultaneously. We interpreted that these results are in line with the arguments in favor of the existence of a new agency cost, which is related to the undue obedience of board members to authority, such as the largest controlling shareholder or the CEO in Brazilian listed firms.     

Influence of Perceived Economic Strain on the Relationship Between Caregiver BMI and Child BMI

As maternal BMI is a risk factor for higher child BMI, this exploratory study investigated perceived economic strain as a protective factor modifying this well-established relationship. Primary low-income female caregivers (n = 432) of preschoolers ages 3–5 years were interviewed using the Family Economic Strain Scale. Caregiver and child heights and weights were measured. Significant differences were found in perceived economic strain between normal versus underweight, overweight, and obese caregivers. A moderating effect approaching significance was noted such that at low levels of reported economic strain, caregiver BMI classification had no effect on child BMI z-score for normal weight, overweight, or obese caregivers. This study is the first to demonstrate that reduced perception of economic strain may act to buffer the impact of maternal overweight/obesity on child weight status. Given this biologically strong relationship, the potential for any modifiable factor to be detected is encouraging. Further collaborative research between economists and family resiliency researchers is suggested.     

Emergency Saving and Household Hardship

Households with limited income and wealth often struggle to access the financial liquidity needed to address unexpected expenses or income drops. Emergency savings can act as form of insurance against such economic shocks and reduce the risk of hardships that influence family wellbeing. Prior research has established that threshold amounts of liquid assets can reduce the risk of economic hardship. This study used a measure of self-reported emergency saving behavior to examine whether households who reported saving for emergencies were less likely to experience subsequent economic hardships in a longitudinal sample of households in disadvantaged neighborhoods from the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Making Connections project. Results across a range of regression models suggest that households who saved for emergencies experienced slightly less overall hardship and were less likely to report several specific hardships, such as food insecurity and having a phone disconnected, three years later. This study supports the idea that small, unrestricted savings may play a protective role for low-income households.     

Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections

If voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of expressing nuanced opinions, or would they always overstate the intensity of their preferences? For additive voting rules, say that a ballot is extremal if it is neither abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture of the available ballots. We give a sufficient condition for strategic equivalence: if two rules share the same set of extremal ballots (up to an homothetic transformation), they are strategically equivalent in large elections. This condition is also necessary for the strategic equivalence of positional rules. These results do not hold for small electorates.     

NPO,Internal Controls,and Supervision Mechanisms in a Developing Country

The premise of this paper is that effective supervision and proper internal control system (ICS) can promote accountability and transparency, and this will attract more donors. However, in a developing country like Malaysia, it is common that proper accounting standards are not available, the laws are not enforced, and charities often struggle for survival. Debates on regulating nonprofit organizations (NPOs) have been sensitive to many and are often left unresolved, and some quarters believe that NPOs should be left to handle their own affairs. This paper provides evidence from a survey of 60 charities on the status of their ICS. It briefly describes the current state of regulations in Malaysia and makes a case for better monitoring of the sector, as this might be the reason NPOs are lacking in their ICS. We propose what type of regulation and assistance can be provided by the authorities to this sector, not only in Malaysia but also in other developing countries facing similar challenges.     

The division problem with voluntary participation

The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of a homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. The literature has implicitly assumed that agents will find acceptable any share they are assigned to. In this article we consider the division problem when agents’ participation is voluntary. Each agent has an idiosyncratic interval of acceptable shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent either to not participate or an acceptable share because otherwise he would opt out and this would require to reassign some of the remaining agents’ shares. We study a subclass of efficient and consistent rules and characterize extensions of the uniform rule that deal explicitly with agents’ voluntary participation.     

Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency

We consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, by combining the result of Kayı and Ramaekers (Games Econ Behav 68:220–232, 2010) with ours, we also give a characterization of the class of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and budget-balance.     

Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems

We investigate the implications of balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction in the context of sequencing problems. Balanced consistency requires that the effect on the payoff from the departure of one agent to another agent should be equal between any two agents. On the other hand, balanced cost reduction requires that if one agent leaves a problem, then the total payoffs of the remaining agents should be affected by the amount previously assigned to the leaving agent. We show that the minimal transfer rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency and Pareto indifference together with either one of our two main axioms, balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction.