Tolerance‐based error reduction in multi‐agent bioassays

Some degree of error is inevitable in multi‐agent bioassays regardless of design or measurement technology. Estimation error can be reduced post facto by exploiting the matrix partial ordering of the bioassay survival estimates. The standard method for this is order‐restricted regression (ORR). If the joint action of the bioassay agents admits a tolerance‐based interpretation, additional structure beyond matrix partial ordering is available, leading to a new method of error reduction. This tolerance‐based error reduction (TBER) procedure almost always outperforms ORR. Like ORR, TBER applies to complete factorial bioassay designs and, using weighting, to incomplete designs.     

Relation of Goal Setting and Goal Sharing to Performance and Conflict for Interdependent Tasks

Despite the prevalence of goal setting in organizations, researchers have not thoroughly examined the implications of goal setting to work outcomes in interdependent work settings. A field survey (n= 442) assessed the relation of goal setting and goal sharing, the extent to which others are aware of an individual's work goal, to performance and conflict across varying levels of task interdependence. The results of moderated regression analyses demonstrate that in highly interdependent tasks, the use of goal setting resulted in lower performance levels. Moreover, goal setting and goal sharing in highly interdependent tasks resulted in individuals' reporting more somatic symptoms. The results are discussed in terms of clarifying the role of goal setting for interdependent tasks.     

Network Evening News Coverage of Environmental Risk

ABC, CBS, and NBC's carefully crafted and expensively produced evening news broadcasts devoted 1.7% of their air time to 564 stories about man-made environmental risks during the period from January 1984 to February 1986. Little relationship was found between amount of coverage and public health risk. Instead, the networks appeared to be using traditional journalistic determinants of news (timeliness, proximity, prominence, consequence, and human interest) plus the broadcast criterion of visual impact to determine the degree of coverage of risk issues. Government, industry, and citizens accounted for two-thirds of the sources cited by the networks. Experts and spokespersons for environmental advocacy groups were sparsely used as sources. Given the media's need for news pegs, acute and chronic risk stories were covered differently. Acute risk stories were reported in a clearly defined cycle, peaking on the second day with on-the-scene reports and film-clips of devastation. In keeping with a decrease in visual drama, later reports were shorter and emphasized legal and political considerations. Chronic risk coverage followed the release of new scientific, legal, or political information.     

Programmed Strategic Decision Making: The View From Mintzberg's Window1

A class of decisions, asset mix decisions made by pension fund managers, which exhibit characteristics of both programmed and strategic choices is examined in this paper. The decisions are classified using the scheme developed by Mintzberg et al., (1976) to highlight the circumstances under which strategic decisions may be programmed. The types of strategic decisions which lend themselves to programming are considered. The advantages and disadvantages of programming strategic decisions are also discussed.     

The role of inferential accuracy in performance rating

The presence of shared implicit theories of performance is used in explaining the failure of behavioral anchors to improve performance ratings. It is proposed that efforts to improve rating accuracy also will be hampered by a preoccupation with observation. Instead, attention needs to be focused on the inferential accuracy of the rater and the cognitive processes and implicit theories upon which raters rely.     

Whatever happened to environmental analysis?

This article discusses a longitudinal study of firms selected for their expertise in environmental analysis. It is primarily designed to test two general propositions. The first, that environmental analysis is increasing in importance over time— both within and between firms; and the second, that environmental analysis is most viable as a separate, freestanding function within the organization.     

Risk Homeostasis Theory and Traffic Accident Data

The risk homeostasis theory posits, in essence, that a control mechanism analogous to the thermal homeostatic system in warm-blooded animals tends to keep risk per unit time constant, and, as a consequence, the number of traffic accidents per unit time of driving also tends to remain constant, essentially independent of changes in the traffic safety system. It is the purpose of the present research to examine the validity of this claim using a wide variety of traffic accident data. All the data examined are found to be incompatible with the risk homeostasis theory. The only specific field accident data offered in the literature to support the risk homeostasis theory are found to, in fact, refute the theory. The accident data provide evidence that a rich variety of user responses occur. While it is possible for users to collectively respond in such a way that safety benefits are completely cancelled, such a response is not particularly common; it is certainly not universally occurring, as suggested by the risk homeostasis theory. It is concluded that the risk homeostasis theory should be rejected because there is no convincing evidence supporting it and much evidence refuting it.     

Final report of the Color Additive Scientific Review Panel

The Color Additives Scientific Review Panel considered whether there was information sufficient to perform a carcinogenic risk assessment on the colors D&C Red No. 19 (R-19), D&C Red No. 37 (R-37), D&C Orange No. 17 (O-17), D&C Red No. 9 (R-9), D&C Red No. 8 (R-8) and FD&C Red No. 3 (R-3) and to evaluate the assessments sent to FDA as part of the petitions for use of the colors for drug and external uses by the Cosmetic, Toiletry and Fragrance Association (CTFA). There is a lack of human data concerning the colors for making a human health assessment, so the assessments are based upon the extrapolation of animal data. The risk assessments are determined for exposure to single chemicals. Excluded from consideration are possible effects from exposure to multiple chemicals, such as co-carcinogenesis, promotion, synergism, antagonism, etc. In the light of recent efforts in establishing a consensus in risk assessment, the Panel has determined that the CTFA assessments for R-10, O-17, and R-9 are consistent with present acceptable usages, although it questions some of the assumptions used in the assessments. The Panel identified a number of general assumptions made, and discusses their validity, their impact on total uncertainty, and the potential options to address the gaps in understanding that necessitate the assumption. The Panel also derived revised risk estimates using more "reasonable" assumptions than "worst-case" situations, for 90th percentile and average exposure. For those assumptions that are easily quantifiable, the Panel's estimates are less than an order of magnitude lower than the CTFA risk estimates, indicating that the underestimates and overestimates of the CTFA risk estimates tend to balance each other. The impact of most of the assumptions is not quantifiable. The assessment for R-3 is complicated by the fact that there is no good skin penetrance study for this color. It was assumed that the penetrance is similar to that of another water-soluble xanthene color, R-19. It is expected that the absorption of the color is not likely to exceed that of the smaller molecule, R-19. Therefore, the risk estimates are similar to the CTFA estimates, but with different reasoning. The estimates for R-8 and R-37 are different from the others in that there is a lack of any exposure or toxicological information on these colors.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Integrating strategic issues into strategic management

The notion of a ‘strategic issues’ is rather pervasive in the field of planning in both conceptual [5, 19] and practical contexts. For instance, sometime ago the Wall Street Journal [41] reported that at least 50 large firms have created positions of ‘issues management director’; a dramatic increase in the number of such positions. ‘True’ strategic issues have a readily apparent importance to any organization; yet the process of identifying such issues and of integrating them into strategic planning and management is not well developed. Most treatments of strategic issues deal only with specific segments of the overall process through which relevant issues may be initially identified and finally translated into appropriate strategy [e.g. 5, 17]. This paper demonstrates that it is practical to develop a comprehensive process of ‘strategic issue management’ (SIM) that will facilitate the systematic identification, assessment and analysis of such issues. Such a process can ensure that issue-related factors are fully integrated into the formulation and implementation of strategy and plans. As such, SIM is a process whereby strategic issues may become an integral element of strategic management.