自杀和生命的意义——来自脑科学研究的解读

生命本身是一个随机事件，并不具有高尚的意义。进化的结果使人类可通过工作、家庭和人际关系等给予自己的生命以意义感。当我们的生活方式使脑内奖赏系统获得刺激，就会带来生命具有意义的感受，这种感受给人带来更好的生存机会。生存的欲望是一切生物体最具特征的属性，一些精神疾病患者缺乏这种欲望。自杀主要发生于精神疾病患者，它并非是基于自由意志的行为。抗精神病治疗和适当的社会交往可以预防自杀。由于不同个体有着不同的大脑，人们的生活方式就应该去适应各自大脑的特征。只要人们的生活方式不对他人造成过多的伤害，政府就应该允许和保护人们自由地按照各自的方式生活。     

货币增速剪刀差与股票价格波动的相关性实证研究--基于结构突变视角

为深入认知我国货币政策与股票市场间的传导机制,在阐述结构突变理论,揭示数据生成过程运行轨迹的基础上,选用2004年1月至2012年8月的月度数据,以货币增速剪刀差和上证综合指数为考察指标,利用滤波图分析、外生性与BLS内生性结构突变单位根检验及Granger因果关系检验方法,实证检验两者关系。表明货币增速剪刀差序列服从平稳过程,上证指数序列为含有在2006年9月和2007年7月发生结构突变的平稳过程。上证指数与货币增速剪刀差之间存在单向因果关系。     

德行领导对员工创新行为的影响---工作繁荣与情感承诺的作用*

研究表明，德行领导作为家长式领导的核心维度，对员工行为有重要影响，但现有研究忽视了员工工作状态的重要作用。本文基于自我决定理论，以员工工作繁荣为中介，探讨德行领导对员工创新行为的影响，并从社会认同的情感视角出发，考察了情感承诺在上述关系间的调节作用。研究表明，德行领导对员工工作繁荣与创新行为均存在显著正向影响；员工工作繁荣对其创新行为存在显著正向影响；员工工作繁荣在德行领导与创新行为之间起部分中介作用；情感承诺调节了德行领导对员工创新行为的影响，情感承诺越高，德行领导对员工创新行为的影响越显著。     

Beyond Piketty: A new perspective on poverty and inequality in India

The socio-economic literature has focused much on how overall inequality in income distribution (frequently measured by the Gini coefficient) undermines the “trickle down” effect. In other words, the higher the inequality in the income distribution, the lower is the growth elasticity of poverty. However, with the publication of Piketty’s magnum opus (2014), and a subsequent study by Chancel and Piketty (2017) of evolution of income inequality in India since 1922, the focus has shifted to the income disparity between the richest 1% (or 0.01%) and the bottom 50%. Their central argument is that the rapid growth of income at the top end of millionaires and billionaires is a by-product of growth. The present study extends this argument by linking it to poverty indices in India. Based on the India Human Development Survey 2005–12 – a nationwide panel survey-we examine the links between poverty and income inequality, especially in the upper tail relative to the bottom 50%, state affluence (measured in per capita income) and their interaction or their joint effect. Another feature of our research is that we analyse their effects on the FGT class of poverty indices. The results are similar in as much as direction of association is concerned but the elasticities vary with the poverty index. The growth elasticities are negative and significant for all poverty indices. In all three cases, the disparity between the income share of the top 1% and share of the bottom 50% is associated with greater poverty. These elasticities are much higher than the (absolute) income elasticities except in the case of the poverty gap. The largest increase occurs in the poverty gap squared – a 1% greater income disparity is associated with a 1.24% higher value of this index. Thus the consequences of even a small increase in the income disparity are alarming for the poorest.     

离退休职工养老问题探讨

离退休职工的养老问题是目前我国所面临的亟待解决的重大问题.要解决这一问题,必须充分发挥国家、家庭、社区、单位和个人的作用,建立国家、家庭、社区、单位、个人五个层次相结合的养老体系.     

Anmerkungen zur Publikation „Möglichkeiten und Probleme des Einsatzes postalischer Befragungen“ von Karl-Heinz Reuband in der Kzfss 2001, 2, S. 307–333

Reuband’s article purports to report empirical results that seem to contradict the widely held view of mail surveys. This assertion is made possible only by an unclear statement of hypotheses and a selective perception of the literature. The data analysis is based on techniques from the 1960s and 1970s; modern methods are not even mentioned. Although all the results reported in the article are based on local surveys conducted by a university institute, these are generalized to national surveys in general. The main points of this critique are methodological: careless literature review, lack of concrete hypotheses, inefficient data analysis and generalizations without empirical foundation.     

CORRUPTION: TOP DOWN OR BOTTOM UP?

This article studies the impact of corruption on an economy with a hierarchical government. In particular, we study whether centralizing corruption within the higher level of government increases or decreases the total amount of corruption. We show that when the after-tax relative profitability of the formal sector as compared to that of the informal sector is high enough, adding a layer of government increases the total amount of corruption. By contrast, for high-enough public wages and/or an efficient monitoring technology of the bureaucratic system, centralization of corruption at the top of the government hierarchy redistributes bribe income from the lower level to the upper level. In the process, total corruption is reduced and the formal sector of the economy expands.