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We consider a problem in which a policy is chosen from a one-dimensional set over which voters have single-peaked preferences. While Moulin (Public Choice 35:437–455, 1980) and others subsequent works have focused on strategy-proof rules, Renault and Trannoy (Mimeo 2011) and Renault and Trannoy (J Pub Econ Theory 7:169–199, 2005) have shown that the average rule implements a generalized median rule in Nash equilibria and provide an interpretation of the parameters in Moulin’s rule. In this article, we first extend their result by showing that a wide range of voting rules which includes the average rule can implement Moulin’s rule in Nash equilibria. Moreover, we show additionally that within this class, generalized average rules are Cournot stable. That is, from any strategy profile, any best response path must converge to a Nash equilibrium. 相似文献
12.
We first consider the problem of estimating the common mean of two normal distributions with unknown ordered variances. We give a broad class of estimators which includes the estimators proposed by Nair (1982) and Elfessi et al. (1992) and show that the estimators stochastically dominate the estimators which do not take into account the order restriction on variances, including the one given by Graybill and Deal (1959). Then we propose a broad class of individual estimators of two ordered means when unknown variances are ordered. We show that in estimating the mean with larger variance, estimators which do not take into account the order restriction on variances are stochastically dominated by the proposed class of estimators which take into account both order restrictions. However, in estimating the mean with smaller variance, similar improvement is not possible even in terms of mean squared error. We also show a domination result in the simultaneous estimation problem of two ordered means. Further, improving upon the unbiased estimators of the two means is discussed. 相似文献
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