Methodological Issues in the Use of Peer Sociometric Nominations with Middle School Youth

Studies reporting sociometric assessments based on nominations have been characterized by important methodological inconsistencies when conducted in the middle school context. The purpose of this study was to examine (1) the possibility of a response bias when participants are provided with a long roster sorted alphabetically, (2) the impact of including or not other‐sex peers in the voting population, and (3) the impact of including or not all the grademates in the voting population. Participants were 664 sixth graders from three middle schools. Peer nominations for sociometric items (i.e., like most and like least), as well as teacher ratings of antisocial behavior and records of academic performance, were collected. A sequence effect in peer nominations was found, suggesting that students whose names were listed higher on the rosters received more nominations than did students whose names were listed lower on the list. Moreover, results indicated that the nominations received from the other‐sex grademates and from the grademates outside the classroom improved the predictive validity of the sociometric measure. The implications of these results for the use of sociometric assessment in middle schools are discussed.     

Equity, efficiency and inequality traps: A research agenda

This paper discusses a research agenda that arises from unanswered questions and unresolved issues considered in the World Bank’s World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development. After formalizing the key concepts of equity; equality of opportunity; and efficiency, and proposing a definition for an equitable development policy, the paper discusses the concept of inequality traps, around which the research agenda is structured. Four broad groups of research questions are highlighted: those revolving around the measurement of inequality of opportunity and the diagnostics for the existence of an inequality trap; those dealing with the causes of inequality traps; the quantification of their efficiency costs; and those related to how institutions (including governments) evolve to overcome inequality traps. Bourguignon and Ferreira are in the Development Economics Vice-Presidency, The World Bank. Michael Walton is at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Together, they led the team that produced the World Bank’s World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development.     

Alerts and catastrophes: The case of the 1999 storm in France,a treacherous risk

How is it that catastrophes always seem predictable ex post but never ex ante? The paradox is recurrent. Our study of the warnings issued prior to one of the last major natural disasters in France – the tempest of December 27, 1999 – focuses on the organizational factors accounting for the surprise effect of the catastrophe, to try and understand why, though the phenomenon had been predicted and announced by the French weather bureau, the protagonists of Civil Defense said the magnitude of the event took them by surprise. A multi-level, qualitative analysis of the inter-organizational meteorological alert system shows that a combination of factors pertaining to structure, context and individuals transformed the warnings into routine messages. The case of the 1999 storm allows us to introduce a particular, ideal-type of risk, the treacherous risk, which, though clearly announced, was disregarded because seemingly so familiar.     

Evaluating the Move to a Linear Tax System in Germany and Other European Countries

This paper proposes a comparison of the results of tax policy analysis obtained on the basis of unitary and collective representations of the household. We first generate labour supplies consistent with the collective rationality, by use of a model calibrated on microdata as described in Vermeulen et al. [Collective Models of Household Labor Supply with Nonconvex Budget Sets and Nonparticipation: A Calibration Approach (2006)]. A unitary model is then estimated on these collective data and unitary and collective responses to a tax reform are compared. We focus on the introduction of linear taxation in Germany. The exercise is replicated for other European countries and other topical reforms. Distortions due to the use of a unitary model turn out to be important in predicting labour supply adjustments, in the design of tax revenue neutral reforms, and in predicting a reform’s welfare implications.

Nonparametric adaptive likelihood weights

The weighted likelihood can be used to make inference about one population when data from similar populations are available. The author shows heuristically that the weighted likelihood can be seen as a special case of the entropy maximization principle. This leads him to propose the minimum averaged mean squared error (MAMSE) weights. He describes an algorithm for calculating these weights and shows its convergence using the Kuhn‐Tucker conditions. He explores the performance and properties of the weighted likelihood based on MAMSE weights through simulations.     

Contents to Volume 1, 2003

Volume Contents

Contents to Volume 1, 2003     

Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information

We study subgame perfect implementation through perfect information mechanisms in economic environments. We assume that worst bundles exist for each agent and can be assigned to them independently of the bundle assigned to at least one other agent. We restrict our attention to allocation rules that are anonymous, efficient on their own range, single-valued in welfare, and that induce agents' participation. We define a class of mechanisms, which satisfy properties of minimal path length and finiteness of message dimensions. We characterize the class of allocation rules which can be implemented through those mechanisms.I would like to thank Bhaskar Dutta, Louis Gevers, Matthew Jackson, Ozgur Kibris, Hervé Moulin and Arunava Sen for stimulating discussions, seminar participants at Université de Montréal (the Axiomatic Theory of Resource Allocation meeting, May 1996), Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Universitad Carlos III de Madrid and Université de Paris Dauphine for their comments, and Frédéric Gaspart, Tarik Kara, James Schummer, William Thomson and an anonymous referee for extremely useful comments and suggestions on earlier versions.     

Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good

We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity of the nonrival good have opposite signs, reducing that gap improves social welfare. This condition, combined with the more standard requirements of Unanimous Indifference and Responsiveness, delivers a form of welfare egalitarianism in which an agent's welfare is measured by the quantity of the nonrival good that, consumed at no cost, would leave her indifferent to the bundle she is assigned.