LSTAR框架下一类针对单位根原假设的F检验

在LSTAR框架下构建了检验单位根原假设的F类型统计量,并推导了其极限分布。相较于之前学者的研究,对LSTAR模型线性系数和位置参数的约束得以放松,因此更具有普适性;有限样本下的仿真模拟表明,相比较ADF统计量以及刘雪燕等(2008)提出的t统计量,F统计量在LSTAR框架下具有更大的检验势。对人民币实际汇率的PPP检验进一步印证了F检验在相关应用研究中的适用性和优越性。     

政府购买服务中社会组织自主性研究综述

自主性是社会组织的生命力。随着政府购买服务进程的推进,政府对社会组织自主性的影响备受理论界和实务界的关注。该文对社会组织自主性进行了界定,并厘清了社会组织自主性六大影响维度,总结梳理了社会组织的三种自主性获得策略;但大部分研究停留在直觉判断和一般性描述、缺乏实证数据和实证经验支持;国外经验多且系统,但与国内实际接轨少,对中国社会组织自主性研究的适用性必须进行进一步经验性的验证,并且与政府资助的实际关联性进行测试,以便正式开发和测试适用于社会组织的自主性维度。     

所有权局限与政府作用：英美土地资本化流转经验对我国“三权分置”的启示

有效的农村土地资本化流转依托广义的土地产权结构，而不仅仅是狭义的土地所有权。英美国家的崛起历史表明，就促进土地资本化流转而言，土地所有权的公有或私有属性不是关键，关键是地权的流动性。自由资本主义的英美两国政府在其土地资本化流转过程中发挥了重要的地权构建作用，政府对国内外开放性经济条件的合利利用则使其在很大程度上摆脱了既定的土地禀赋限制。社会主义国家更有理由充分发挥政府的地权构建作用。当前我国应着重促进公有产权与农村土地资本化流转市场有机融合，但同时也要认识产权作用的局限性，做好地权构建后的系列制度匹配。     

纵向流动:中国社会活力再激发

在十二届全国人大三次会议开幕会上,记者现场听李克强总理作《政府工作报告》时,特别注意到,"纵向流动"新概念先后两次在关键处被提及。在谈到促进教育公平发展时,报告承诺:"畅通农村和贫困地区学子纵向流动的渠道,让每个人都有机会通过教育改变自身命运。"在谈到培育和催生经济社会发展新动力时,报告提出:"推动大众创业、万众创新。这既可以扩大就业、增加居民收入,又有利于促进社会纵向流动和公平正义。"     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.