不完全信息下说话者的博弈

本文着重考察会话中说话者的言语行为和意图。以博弈论为基础,分析了在不完全信息下说话者的博弈过程。提出总效用的概念,并建立了说话者与听话者总效用的函数模型,进而对说话者和听话者的总效用进行了量化分析。     

试析文在寅政府的“三层博弈”外交

"三层博弈"是结盟外交领域的一个新型模式概念。此概念基于普特南的"双层博弈"理论,提出国家对外交往时存在的三种博弈,即执政党与国内反对党间的博弈、与盟友间的博弈以及同对手国家间的博弈。本文借鉴"三层博弈"理论,尝试分析当前文在寅政府在韩国外交领域所展示的"三层博弈"及其影响。     

基于模糊合作的联盟博弈模型构建

模糊合作是对策理论的一个新兴分支,该理论研究的核心是关于不确定条件下的对策求解问题.文章基于模糊合作理论,进而建构了联盟博弈模型,并以供应链为考察视角,对该博弈模型作出了两次模型拓展与应用,以期为信息时代下物联网的发展及其相应的物流管理提供理论指引与经验证据.     

浅析“经济人”和“道德人”的辩证关系

社会主义市场经济建设和道德建设都是我国在实现社会主义现代化和全面建成小康社会过程中的重要方面。然而由于我国仍处于社会主义市场经济建设的探索阶段,对于社会主义市场经济也没有太多的借鉴经验,难免导致我国在市场经济过程中出现道德失范现象,这些现象已经影响到我国经济的持续快速健康发展。因此需要我们重新审视道德建设的问题,需要正确把握"经济人"和"道德人"的辩证关系。对于社会主义市场经济条件下的道德建设,必须从我国的国情出发,坚持以马克思主义为指导,建立有中国特色的社会主义道德体系。只有实现"经济人"与"道德人"的统一,完成法治与德治的整合,才能有助于社会主义和谐社会的构建,有助于中国梦的实现,有助于中华民族的伟大复兴。     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

劣势耐用品厂商的产品质保期与质保服务投入策略研究

在实际中，消费者购买耐用品时均同时获得厂商提供的质保服务，由于产品质保服务影响着消费者的产品使用效用，因此耐用品定价、质保期和产品质保服务投入是影响厂商利润的主要因素。考虑双寡头市场环境下，建立微分博弈模型讨论单位产品质保服务投入和产品质保期对双寡头厂商均衡价格的影响。结论表明双寡头厂商的单位产品质保服务投入越高、质保期越长，均衡价格越高；但单位产品保服务投入与质保服务对消费者效用影响系数的关系影响着竞争对手在均衡价格的变化趋势；劣势的低质量厂商可以通过增加单位产品质保服务投入策略或延长质保期的策略实现在均衡下与高质量厂商以同等价格销售耐用品，但劣势厂商增加单位产品质保服务投入策略要优于延长质保期策略。最后，利用数值分析进一步验证了所得结论的有效性。