风险刑法理论研究中的错位与检讨

社会风险不能等同于刑法危险，但二者存在动态交叉关系，社会风险可以通过刑事政策转变为刑法中的危险。风险刑法首先是现代刑法应对风险过程中"自觉"的结果，是现代刑法体系的同质组成部分。从贝克划分社会形态的时间考虑，我国早已进入风险社会，且是全面而非局部风险社会。我国社会主要矛盾的转变使我国社会风险在质上表现为严重危害公共安全和公共利益，在量上表现为风险的相对增多，从刑法的应对上来看，似乎只能选择刑法提前介入。风险刑法理论的中国展开应该从实然和应然两个层面出发，前者旨在突出风险刑法的教义学研究，后者需要从社会风险自身的特点出发，有针对性地调整刑法体系，以期防控风险、创造安全。     

调查 间隔多久再怀孕更好

想生二胎或三胎的妈妈要等多久?世界卫生组织的建议是18-24个月,但加拿大专家最新研究认为,最理想的怀孕间隔期为12~18个月,而低于12个月间歇期的再次生育风险,对所有年龄段产妇都适用。35岁以上产妇怀孕间歇期为6个月时,死亡或患重症风险为1.2%;间歇期为18个月,这一风险降低为0.5%。     

区域旅游经济空间差异的实证分析

文章基于统计学因子分析法测算了河北省各市旅游经济规模综合排名,通过系统聚类分析对各市进行分类,两种分析结果具有较高的一致性。利用引力模型对河北省各市旅游经济空间联系强度进行测算,进而对比分析各城市对周边区域旅游经济的辐射能力,借助ArcGIS10.5可视化11个城市的旅游经济空间联系网络图。结果发现:河北省旅游经济具有"双核四驱"的特征,即以石家庄、保定为核心的中部旅游带以及以秦皇岛、承德的东北部旅游带;城市旅游经济规模与旅游经济联系量不存在必然联系,石家庄旅游经济对周边城市的辐射带动效应最大,沧州最小。整体来看,形成了石家庄、保定、邢台、邯郸的旅游经济辐射圈。     

试论重点领域效能监察对国企反腐倡廉建设的促进作用

重点领域效能监察工作是新形势下监察工作服务于国有企业发展的有效途径,是纪检监察部门履行和深化职能的重要体现,也是国有企业管理的再管理、监督的再监督。大量实践表明,国有企业效能监察在促进管理、提高效能效益的同时,其防腐反腐功效日渐凸显,对反腐倡廉建设起到了非常重要的作用。当前,在党和国家高压反腐的新形势下,企业持续加强效能监察,有利于促进反腐倡廉建设深入开展。本文对效能监察的反腐倡廉功效进行简要分析。     

非传统安全下企业刑事法律风险的表现及防控研究

非传统安全具有威胁不确定性、相互关联性等特点.在非传统安全的背景下,在威胁不确定性、相互关联性等因素的影响下,企业面临着可怕的刑事法律风险,这些风险表现形式千差万别.对于这些风险,如果处置不当可使企业损失惨重,直至破产倒闭.但是,依据一定的防控原则,依法采取一系列的防控措施,这些风险便可逐一化解,最终使企业安然无恙,保持良好的发展态势.     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

基于动态面板数据分位数回归模型的福州市房价影响因素分析

房地产业作为基础性和先导性产业,对经济和社会的影响有着举足轻重的作用。因此,房价影响因素的探讨一直都是国内外的热点话题。该文在研究城市人口密度、家庭人均可支配收入以及利率对房价的影响机制的基础上,选取了福州市2010—2017年的样本数据,利用动态面板数据的分位数回归模型进行了实证分析。结果表明,家庭可支配人均收入和人口密度的增加对房价的正影响随着分位数的增加呈逐步上升的趋势,即福州房价上涨的主要因素是家庭人均可支配收入和城市人口密度,利率的变化并不是福州市房价变动的主导因素。