拍卖采购合同及议价谈判机制设计

考虑采购商在多个潜在供应商中选择1名获胜者来提供单物品或服务,并且供应商存在不可见努力的情况,设计了两阶段采购机制.该机制先实施关于合同的拍卖阶段,再执行可能的议价谈判阶段.分析的基本结论是,在对称信息情况下,存在系统最优的质量标准和努力水平;不对称信息下,投标者将在拍卖阶段报价自己的真实成本.在不对称信息的谈判阶段,存在包含重新确定的价格、质量和努力水平的惟一议价均衡,此均衡将实现对称信息下的分配效率——系统最优.从采购商的利益出发,给出了采购商选择采取谈判策略或者采用拍卖阶段合同的条件.     

两阶段网上相继起拍拍卖中最优拍卖策略研究

基于序贯拍卖和同时向上叫价拍卖的特点,本文首先提出了网上相继起拍拍卖模式,建立了两阶段相继起拍拍卖模型;在允许缺货的条件下,分析了卖方最优拍卖策略的一些性质,给出了卖方总期望收益的上下限;最后,对影响卖方最优拍卖策略的因素进行了数值分析,得到在某些情况下卖方在第二场拍卖开始时根据当前库存量以及已参与第一场拍卖的顾客数采用缺货策略可以提高卖方期望收益等结论。     

考虑再谈判的网上服务采购多属性拍卖研究

针对在线服务外包,研究了供应商投标服务方案(体现服务质量)和价格的买方决定制多属性采购拍卖,分析了交易双方关于服务内容的再谈判对供应商投标均衡、买方初始服务内容决策和各方期望利润的影响。结果表明,无再谈判情形下,供应商的服务质量投标均衡和信息租金都随初始服务内容递增;而有再谈判情形下,尽管买方对服务质量的评标权重随初始服务内容递增,但供应商服务质量、信息租金及买方期望利润都不受初始服务内容影响。换言之,初始服务内容对采购项目的规制作用被再谈判完全替代。不仅如此,相较于无再谈判情形,再谈判的存在能够激励供应商提供更高的服务质量,并促成更多的服务内容成交,最终使买方、获胜供应商和交易平台都获得更高期望利润。     

Transparency in Buyer‐Determined Auctions: Should Quality be Private or Public?

We study buyer‐determined procurement auctions where both price and non‐price characteristics of bidders matter for being awarded a contract. Although, in scoring auctions bidders perfectly know how price and non‐price attributes determine the awarding of the contract, this remains uncertain in buyer‐determined auctions where the buyer is free to choose once all bids have been submitted. We analyze the impact of information bidders have with respect to the buyer's awarding decision. As we show theoretically whether it is in the buyer's interest to conceal the impact of non‐price characteristics depends on how important the quality aspects of the procured good are to the buyer: The more important quality aspects are, the more interesting concealment becomes. In a counterfactual analysis using data from a large European procurement platform, we analyze the reduction of non‐price information available to the bidders. Confirming our hypothesis, for auction categories where bidders’ non‐price characteristics strongly influence buyers’ decisions concealment of non‐price information leads to an increase in buyers’ surplus of up to 15% due to higher competitive pressure and lower bids. Conversely, for categories where bidders’ non‐price characteristics are of little importance concealment of non‐price information leads to a decrease in buyers’ surplus of up to 6%.     

Electronic Markets for Truckload Transportation

A wide variety of electronic marketplace formats are used in the Truckload (TL) transportation industry, including combinatorial auctions, private and public exchanges, and electronic catalogs. Combinatorial multi‐attribute auctions are commonly used strategically to populate electronic catalogs, commonly called “routing guides,” with pricing, assignments, and priority logic. Private and public exchanges are used to complement the electronic catalogs in cases where the catalog fails. This paper discusses the TL transportation market, places the procurement of services in the context of electronic marketplace formats, and illustrates how these are currently used.     

Common Value Auctions with Insider Information

Bidding is studied in first-price common value auctions where an insider is better informed than other bidders (outsiders) about the value of the item. With inexperienced bidders, having an insider does not materially reduce the severity of the winner's curse compared to auctions with a symmetric information structure (SIS). In contrast, super-experienced bidders, who have largely overcome the winner's curse, satisfy the comparative static predictions of equilibrium bidding theory: (i) average seller's revenue is larger with an insider than in SIS auctions, (ii) insiders make substantially greater profits, conditional on winning, than outsiders, and (iii) insiders increase their bids in response to more rivals. Further, changes in insiders' bids are consistent with directional learning theory (Selten and Buchta (1994)).     

Clocks and Trees: Isomorphic Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games

We report an experiment on effects of varying institutional format and dynamic structure of centipede games and Dutch auctions. Centipede games with a clock format unravel, as predicted by theory but not reported in previous literature on two‐player tree‐format centipede games. Dutch auctions with a tree format produce bids close to risk neutral Nash equilibrium bids, unlike previous literature on clock‐format Dutch auctions. Our data provide a new, expanded set of stylized facts which may provide a foundation for unified modeling of play in a class of games that includes centipede games and Dutch auctions.