移动Adhoc网络中改进的动态源路由算法研究

实时多媒体业务的普及使得提供QoS保证成为移动自组网研究的热点问题。然而移动节点的自由移动和拓扑动态变化,经常造成已经建立的路径断开而需重构路由,造成通信中断和较大的时延与抖动。该文提出了一种改进的动态源路由协议,采用链路状态探测的方法,找到一条最稳定的路径并在通信过程中实时监测路径状态变化,及时进行软切换,有效降低通信中断的概率,从而提供服务质量保证。     

广告标语中的音韵修辞格及翻译策略

针对英文广告标语中音韵修辞格的理解、欣赏与翻译策略，采用逐一分析四种最常见音韵修辞格及其对应翻译策略的方法进行研究，指出了各种音韵修辞格不同的音乐美感和对消费者的影响，提供了不同的翻译策略。实践证明，正确地理解、欣赏与翻译英文广告标语中的音韵修辞格，有利于最大限度地传递英文广告标语的意义和美感。     

Interregional Price Difference in the New Orleans Auctions Market for Slaves

Our article investigates the variation of winning bids in slave auctions held in New Orleans from 1804 to 1862. Specifically, we measure the variation in the price of slaves conditional on their geographical origin. Previous work using a regression framework ignored the auction mechanism used to sell slaves. This introduced a bias in the conditional mean of the winning bid because it depended on the number of bidders participating in the auction. Unfortunately, the number of bidders is unobserved by the econometrician.We adopt the standard framework of a symmetric independent private value auction and propose an estimation strategy to attempt to deal with this omitted variable bias. Our estimate of the mean number of bidders doubled from 1804 to 1862. We find the number of bidders had a significant positive effect on the average winning bid. An increase from 20 to 30 bidders in an auction raised the average winning bid by around 10%%. The price variation according to the geographical origin of slaves found in earlier work continues to persist after accounting for the omitted variable. We also find a new result that a considerable premium is paid for slaves originating from New Orleans. However, this price variation disappears once we account for regional productivity differences.     

Object-oriented design of a distributed agent-based framework for e-Procurement

Procurement is an important function in any manufacturing organization and it also has strategic business value attached to it. Hence, any improvements in the process would result in tremendous benefits. E-Procurement exploits the Internet and agent technologies to conduct procurement-related processes. In this paper, we design and develop a software agent-based framework for a typical e-Procurement process by decomposing it into three business processes: e-Negotiations, reverse auctions and e-Settlement. The artefacts of the system for each of the three business processes have been designed and developed using Unified Modeling Language (UML). A prototype of one of the processes, viz. reverse auction, has also been implemented.     

Bayesian and Dominant‐Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private‐Values Model

We prove—in the standard independent private‐values model—that the outcome, in terms of interim expected probabilities of trade and interim expected transfers, of any Bayesian mechanism can also be obtained with a dominant‐strategy mechanism.     

Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions

This paper provides a novel approach to ordering signals based on the property that more informative signals lead to greater variability of conditional expectations. We define two nested information criteria (supermodular precision and integral precision) by combining this approach with two variability orders (dispersive and convex orders). We relate precision criteria with orderings based on the value of information to a decision maker. We then use precision to study the incentives of an auctioneer to supply private information. Using integral precision, we obtain two results: (i) a more precise signal yields a more efficient allocation; (ii) the auctioneer provides less than the efficient level of information. Supermodular precision allows us to extend the previous analysis to the case in which supplying information is costly and to obtain an additional finding; (iii) there is a complementarity between information and competition, so that both the socially efficient and the auctioneer's optimal choice of precision increase with the number of bidders.     

Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First‐price Auctions

This paper proposes a general approach and a computationally convenient estimation procedure for the structural analysis of auction data. Considering first‐price sealed‐bid auction models within the independent private value paradigm, we show that the underlying distribution of bidders' private values is identified from observed bids and the number of actual bidders without any parametric assumptions. Using the theory of minimax, we establish the best rate of uniform convergence at which the latent density of private values can be estimated nonparametrically from available data. We then propose a two‐step kernel‐based estimator that converges at the optimal rate.     

“程度副词＋名词”组合的语义、语用分析

“程度副词＋名词”组合作为目前流行的一种言语现象，已经引起了学者的广泛关注，从不同角度探讨其存在的合理性一直是大家致力解决的问题。从语义、语用两个方面阐明了该组合之所以能够存在的原因，另外还指出，社会、语言使用者等因素也会对该组合的出现有一定的影响。     

Dynamic Matching,Two‐Sided Incomplete Information,and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition

Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good. Time is discrete, each period has length δ, and, each unit of time, continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry. Traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter. Within a period each buyer is matched anonymously with a seller and each seller is matched with zero, one, or more buyers. Every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and, if trade occurs, both the seller and the winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility. Traders who fail to trade continue in the market to be rematched. We characterize the steady‐state equilibria that are perfect Bayesian. We show that, as δ converges to zero, equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the Walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation. We also show the existence of equilibria for δ sufficiently small, provided the discount rate is small relative to the participation costs.     

Do Auction Parameters Affect Buyer Surplus in E‐Auctions for Procurement?

Although the initial euphoria about Internet‐enabled reverse auctions has given way to a cautious but widespread use of reverse auctions in business‐to‐business (B2B) procurement, there is a limited understanding of the effect of auction design parameters on buyer surplus. In this paper, we study the effect of bidding competition, information asymmetry, reserve price, bid decrement, auction duration, and bidder type on buyer surplus. We collected field data on more than 700 online procurement auctions conducted by a leading auctioneer and involving procurement items worth millions of dollars. Consistent with the predictions of auction theory, the results indicate that bidding competition, reserve price, and information sharing affect buyer surplus. Unlike previous findings in the consumer‐to‐consumer context, we find that bid decrement and auction duration have no effect in B2B procurement auctions. Our results suggest that use of the rank‐bidding format increases buyer surplus when incumbent suppliers participate in the auction. We discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of these findings for future research and for optimal design of online procurement auctions.