移动自组织网络的体系桔构及其在现代通信中的应用

Ad hoc的技术特点，移动自组织网络(MANET)的体系结构，相关技术和协议及其应用领域研究。     

Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions

Experiments on first-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values have shown that submitted bids typically exceed Nash-equilibrium predictions for risk-neutral bidders. Existing bidding models explain this phenomenon by assuming that the bidders are risk-averse and capable of drawing complete and correct inferences about their winning probabilities. In this article, we use the Choquet expected utility (CEU) theory to demonstrate that the observed bidding behavior can also be attributed to ambiguity aversion which causes the bidders to underestimate their chances of winning the auction. Empirical support for CEU bidding models is given through an analysis of recent bidding data.     

Increasing Revenue by Decreasing Information in Procurement Auctions

We report on results of several laboratory experiments that investigate on‐line procurement auctions in which suppliers bid on price, but exogenous bidder quality affects winner determination. In procurement auctions, bidder quality may or may not be publicly known to all bidders, and the effect of this quality transparency on the auction outcome is one aspect of auction design that we examine. The second aspect of auction design that we examine is the effect of price visibility on the auction outcome, and the interaction between price visibility and quality transparency. In terms of price visibility, we consider two extreme cases: the sealed bid request for proposals (RFPs), and the open‐bid dynamic auction event. In terms of bidder quality transparency, we also consider two extreme cases: a setting in which bidder qualities are publicly known and the case in which they are private. We find that in our laboratory experiments, the RFP format is consistent in generating higher buyer surplus levels than does the open‐bid dynamic format. This advantage is independent of the quality transparency. In contrast, the open‐bid format is highly sensitive to quality transparency, generating significantly lower buyer surplus levels when the information about bidder quality is public.     

A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions

I propose a new mechanism design approach to the problem of ranking standard auctions with two heterogeneous bidders. A key feature of the approach is that it may be possible to rank two auctions even if neither dominates the other for all combinations of types. The approach simplifies the analysis and unifies results in the existing literature. Roughly speaking, the first‐price auction is more profitable than the second‐price auction when the strong bidder's distribution is flatter and more disperse than the weak bidder's distribution. Applications include auctions with one‐sided externalities. Moreover, contrary to previous work, reserve prices are easily handled. Finally, the method can be extended to some environments with many bidders.     

利用指定群首设计自组网分层路由协议

基于具有组移动模型的移动Adhoc网络,分析了传统LANMAR分层路由协议的原理。以LANMAR协议为基础,设计了能够满足上述移动Adhoc网络要求的包含骨干网节点的物理分层网络体系结构,包括信道设置及接入方法,形成了一种指定群首的分层(DC-LANMAR)路由协议。该指定群首安装了更强大的通信设备,使用高性能的骨干网链路进行群间通信来减少路由的跳数。通过计算机仿真比较了LANMAR和DC-LANMAR协议的主要性能,证实了DC-LANMAR协议的可行性和有效性。     

Introduction to the Special Issue on Marketing and Operations Management Interfaces and Coordination

In this special issue, the contributing authors address several emerging marketing and operations interface problems and develop innovative approaches for solving them. Specifically, by explicitly modeling active consumer behavior under different pricing schemes, the papers in this special issue examine how firms can coordinate their marketing and operations to improve their competitiveness and profit. The papers also provide insights on how to develop and operate new and innovative market mechanisms.     

具有计算复杂性的VCG机制投标策略研究

在组合拍卖的获胜者确定问题(WDP)具有计算复杂性的情况下,研究了相应的VCG机制中投标者的投标策略问题。通过提出2类重要概率,描述了投标者对于VCG机制WDP算法和其真实估价对于组合拍卖分配效率的信念。通过建模分析,揭示了在具有计算复杂性的VCG机制中,上述2类重要概率、投标者获胜后事后效用、跳投标增量与投标策略之间的确定性关系。     

睡眠者效应与插播广告的传播效果

插播广告的传播优势是强迫性注意,其传播效果中有睡眠者效应的存在。睡眠者效应产生的原因有三种理论解释：线索分离假说、差别衰退假说和有用性—有效性假说。插播广告的睡眠者效应可以解释为：广告内容的劝说信息和广告媒体形式的折扣线索之分离;广告情绪反应和认知反应两类记忆系统的差别衰退,时间间隔导致信息有用性和有效性的改变等。     

Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant‐Strategy Implementation

We characterize dominant‐strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A deterministic social choice function is dominant‐strategy incentive compatible if and only if it is weakly monotone (W‐Mon). The W‐Mon requirement is the following: If changing one agent's type (while keeping the types of other agents fixed) changes the outcome under the social choice function, then the resulting difference in utilities of the new and original outcomes evaluated at the new type of this agent must be no less than this difference in utilities evaluated at the original type of this agent.