Ad hoc网络中一种新的退避算法

为了提高Ad hoc网络中高等级节点的接入能力,提出了一种新的二进制负指数退避算法,该算法中高等级节点在分组发送成功时将竞争窗口设为普通节点的最小竞争窗口,在发生碰撞时竞争窗口随着退避次数的增加而呈负指数规律减小。仿真结果表明,该算法能够显著提高高等级节点的接入能力,提高了其业务吞吐量,并降低了端到端传输时延。     

Push or Pull? Auctioning Supply Contracts

Consider a buyer, facing uncertain demand, who sources from multiple suppliers via online procurement auctions (open descending price‐only auctions). The suppliers have heterogeneous production costs, which are private information, and the winning supplier has to invest in production capacity before the demand uncertainty is resolved. The buyer chooses to offer a push or pull contract, for which the single price and winning supplier are determined via the auction. We show that, with a pull contract, the buyer does not necessarily benefit from a larger number of suppliers participating in the auction, due to the negative effect of supplier competition on the incentive of supplier capacity investment. We thus propose an enhanced pull mechanism that mitigates this effect with a floor price. We then analyze and compare the outcomes of auctions for push and (enhanced) pull contracts, establishing when one form is preferred over the other based on the buyer's profits. We also compare our simple, price‐only push and pull contract auctions to the optimal mechanisms, benchmarking the performance of the simple mechanisms as well as establishing the relative importance of auction design and contract design in procurement auctions.     

Keyword Auctions,Unit‐Price Contracts,and the Role of Commitment

Motivated by the enormous growth of keyword advertising, this paper explores the design of performance‐based unit‐price contract auctions, in which bidders bid their unit prices and the winner is chosen based on both their bids and performance levels. The previous literature on unit‐price contract auctions usually considers a static case where bidders' performance levels are fixed. This paper studies a dynamic setting in which bidders with a low performance level can improve their performance at a certain cost. We examine the effect of the performance‐based allocation on overall bidder performance, auction efficiency, and the auctioneer's revenue, and derive the revenue‐maximizing and efficient policies accordingly. Moreover, the possible upgrade in bidders' performance level gives the auctioneer an incentive to modify the auction rules over time, as is confirmed by the practice of Yahoo! and Google. We thus compare the auctioneer's revenue‐maximizing policies when she is fully committed to the auction rule and when she is not, and show that the auctioneer should give less preferential treatment to low‐performance bidders when she is fully committed.     

Ad hoc网络密钥预配置方案

为了减少Ad hoc网络密钥管理方案对网络资源、节点资源的依赖,同时提高网络的安全性能,该文深入研究了传感器网络中基于多项式的密钥对预配置方案,将门限机制引用到密钥的传输过程当中,设计出一个应用于Ad hoc网络的高效密钥预配置方案:基于门限机制的密钥预配置方案。通过分析可以看出该方案有一些优良的特性,包括两节点间能以很高的概率成功建立密钥对、对入侵有较强的鲁棒性、高连通性、低通讯量。     

Ad Hoc网络中IEEE 802.11 DCF的改进

分析了在AdHoc网络的IEEE802.11DCF中扩展帧间隔EIFS的作用,指出DCF存在不公平性问题。给出了一个简单的改进方案——MDCF。通过仿真验证MDCF可以显著改善不公平性问题。     

An Analysis of Scoring and Buyer‐Determined Procurement Auctions

In procurement auctions, the object for sale is a contract, bidders are suppliers, and the bid taker is a buyer. The suppliers bidding for the contract are usually the current supplier (the incumbent) and a group of potential new suppliers (the entrants). As the buyer has an ongoing relationship with the incumbent, he needs to adjust the bids of the entrants to include non‐price attributes, such as the switching costs. The buyer can run a scoring auction, in which suppliers compete on the adjusted bids or scores, or, he can run a buyer‐determined auction, in which suppliers compete on the price, and the buyer adjusts a certain number of the bids with the non‐price attributes after the auction to determine the winner. Unless the incumbent has a significant cost advantage over the entrants, I find that the scoring auction yields a lower average cost for the buyer, if the non‐price attributes are available. If the non‐price attributes are difficult or expensive to obtain, the buyer could run a buyer‐determined auction adjusting only the lowest price bid.     

目的论与广告语篇汉英翻译的策略

文章以功能翻译的核心理论--目的论为依据,通过对广告翻译的实质、目的和译文预期功能的分析后认为,为了实现译文的预期目的和功能,广告语篇汉英翻译可采用"自上至下"的工具翻译策略.文章还从广告语言、文化和管理法规等角度,以实例验证了使用工具翻译策略的必要性.     

Ad Hoc网络中的分布式证书撤消机制

通过分析AdHoc网络中证书撤销机制存在的问题,提出了一个适用于该网络的分布式证书撤销机制。该机制包含证书撤销算法和证书撤销实现过程。引入四个因素进一步完善了证书撤销算法,提高了节点自觉监控网络的能力和积极性;并通过要求网络中所有节点各自维护两张表,有效地降低节点证书撤销过程中的通信。     

Integrated-Quantile-Based Estimation for First-Price Auction Models

This article considers nonparametric estimation of first-price auction models under the monotonicity restriction on the bidding strategy. Based on an integrated-quantile representation of the first-order condition, we propose a tuning-parameter-free estimator for the valuation quantile function. We establish its cube-root-n consistency and asymptotic distribution under weaker smoothness assumptions than those typically assumed in the empirical literature. If the latter are true, we also provide a trimming-free smoothed estimator and show that it is asymptotically normal and achieves the optimal rate of Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000). We illustrate our method using Monte Carlo simulations and an empirical study of the California highway procurement auctions. Supplementary materials for this article are available online.     

Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks

We consider a dynamic Bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed cost shock in each period. Although cost shocks are independent across firms, within a firm costs follow a first‐order Markov process. We analyze the set of collusive equilibria available to firms, emphasizing the best collusive scheme for the firms at the start of the game. In general, there is a trade‐off between productive efficiency, whereby the low‐cost firm serves the market in a given period, and high prices. We show that when costs are perfectly correlated over time within a firm, if the distribution of costs is log‐concave and firms are sufficiently patient, then the optimal collusive scheme entails price rigidity: firms set the same price and share the market equally, regardless of their respective costs. When serial correlation of costs is imperfect, partial productive efficiency is optimal. For the case of two cost types, first‐best collusion is possible if the firms are patient relative to the persistence of cost shocks, but not otherwise. We present numerical examples of first‐best collusive schemes.