随机需求条件下的P2P网络借贷拍卖机制

在P2P网络借贷契约中，提供了一种关于随机借款需求的两阶段关闭式降价拍卖，并构成了借款人的一个最优机制。对此，首先设计借贷契约以确定初始借款需求；随后以事前对称贷款人为基准建立相应的拍卖模型，并进行一次标准的关闭式降价拍卖，再从中标贷款人中获得一个额外的借款需求；最后将这个机制拓展到事前非对称贷款人的情形，以分析非对称情形下的拍卖过程，并通过算例加以说明。这个机制对借款人是最优的，而且借款人和贷款人都比较熟悉这种简单拍卖，因此可以用于改进中国P2P网络借贷市场的交易机制。     

Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks

We consider a dynamic Bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed cost shock in each period. Although cost shocks are independent across firms, within a firm costs follow a first‐order Markov process. We analyze the set of collusive equilibria available to firms, emphasizing the best collusive scheme for the firms at the start of the game. In general, there is a trade‐off between productive efficiency, whereby the low‐cost firm serves the market in a given period, and high prices. We show that when costs are perfectly correlated over time within a firm, if the distribution of costs is log‐concave and firms are sufficiently patient, then the optimal collusive scheme entails price rigidity: firms set the same price and share the market equally, regardless of their respective costs. When serial correlation of costs is imperfect, partial productive efficiency is optimal. For the case of two cost types, first‐best collusion is possible if the firms are patient relative to the persistence of cost shocks, but not otherwise. We present numerical examples of first‐best collusive schemes.     

广告语言的伦理性分析

广告伦理要求广告语言既要表现伦理诉求,又要反映出道义上的责任感.也就是说,广告语言所表达的内容既要"求真"(即实事求是,不虚夸,不模糊),又"求善"(即文明健康,不庸俗,不误导,不贬毁).同时,广告语言还要考虑到受众的心理情感以及接受能力和鉴赏能力.     

Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner's Curse?: An Experimental Study

We use a second‐price common‐value auction, called the maximal game, to experimentally study whether the winner's curse (WC) can be explained by models which retain best‐response behavior but allow for inconsistent beliefs. We compare behavior in a regular version of the maximal game, where the WC can be explained by inconsistent beliefs, to behavior in versions where such explanations are less plausible. We find little evidence of differences in behavior. Overall, our study casts a serious doubt on theories that posit the WC is driven by beliefs.     

Precautionary Bidding in Auctions

We analyze bidding behavior in auctions when risk‐averse buyers bid for a good whose value is risky. We show that when the risk in the valuations increases, DARA bidders will reduce their bids by more than the appropriate increase in the risk premium. Ceteris paribus, buyers will be better off bidding for a more risky object in first price, second price, and English auctions with affiliated common (interdependent) values. This “precautionary bidding” effect arises because the expected marginal utility of income increases with risk, so buyers are reluctant to bid so highly. We also show that precautionary bidding behavior can make DARA bidders prefer bidding in a common values setting to bidding in a private values one when risk‐neutral or CARA bidders would be indifferent. Thus the potential for a “winner's curse” can be a blessing for rational DARA bidders.     

Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions

We consider discriminatory and uniform price auctions for multiple identical units of a good. Players have private values, possibly asymmetrically distributed and for multiple units. Our setting allows for aggregate uncertainty about demand and supply. In this setting, equlibria generally will be inefficient. Despite this, we show that such auctions become arbitrarily close to efficient if they are “large,” and use this to derive an asymptotic characterization of revenue and bidding behavior.     

中央电视台2010年上半年黄金广告研究

在重新划分中央电视台黄金资源广告的前提下,量化分析了黄金广告四个子时段,揭示出各子时段广告刊播特点,并在此基础上对竞标企业和经营媒体提出了相关建议。     

Level‐k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private‐Value Auctions?

This paper proposes a structural nonequilibrium model of initial responses to incomplete‐information games based on “level‐k” thinking, which describes behavior in many experiments with complete‐information games. We derive the model's implications in first‐ and second‐price auctions with general information structures, compare them to equilibrium and Eyster and Rabin's (2005) “cursed equilibrium,” and evaluate the model's potential to explain nonequilibrium bidding in auction experiments. The level‐k model generalizes many insights from equilibrium auction theory. It allows a unified explanation of the winner's curse in common‐value auctions and overbidding in those independent‐private‐value auctions without the uniform value distributions used in most experiments.     

Compliance Strategies under Permits for Emissions

We characterize the trade‐offs among firms' compliance strategies in a market‐based program where a regulator interested in controlling emissions from a given set of sources auctions off a fixed number of emissions permits. We model a three‐stage game in which firms invest in emissions abatement, participate in a share auction for permits, and produce output. We develop a methodology for a profit‐maximizing firm to derive its marginal value function for permits and translate this value function into an optimal bidding strategy in the auction. We analyze two end‐product market scenarios independent demands and Cournot competition. In both scenarios we find that changing the number of available permits influences abatement to a lesser extent in a dirty industry than in a cleaner one. In addition, abatement levels taper off with increasing industry dirtiness levels. In the presence of competition, firms in a relatively clean industry can, in fact, benefit from a reduction in the number of available permits. Our findings are robust to changes in certain modeling assumptions.     

Auctions within E‐Sourcing Events

The paper presents a survey of current industry practices in designing and running auctions as part of e‐sourcing events. We report our findings from numerous interviews with auction makers in leading e‐sourcing application vendors. The differences between auction theory and auction practice pose a number of interesting and important research questions for the Operations Management community; we conclude with a discussion of lessons learned and open research questions.