Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game

This paper proposes an estimation method for a repeated auction game under the presence of capacity constraints. The estimation strategy is computationally simple as it does not require solving for the equilibrium of the game. It uses a two stage approach. In the first stage the distribution of bids conditional on state variables is estimated using data on bids, bidder characteristics, and contract characteristics. In the second stage, an expression of the expected sum of future profits based on the distribution of bids is obtained, and costs are inferred based on the first order condition of optimal bids. We apply the estimation method to repeated highway construction procurement auctions in the state of California between May 1996 and May 1999. In this market, previously won uncompleted contracts reduce the probability of winning further contracts. We quantify the effect of intertemporal constraints on bidders' costs and on bids. Due to the intertemporal effect and also to bidder asymmetry, the auction can be inefficient. Based on the estimates of costs, we quantify efficiency losses.     

Efficient Multi‐Attribute Multi‐Unit Auctions for B2B E‐Commerce Logistics

This study is the first proposing allocatively efficient multi‐attribute auctions for the procurement of multiple items. In the B2B e‐commerce logistics problem (ELP), the e‐commerce platform is the shipper generating a large number of online orders between product sellers and buyers, and third‐party logistics (3PL) providers are carriers that can deliver these online orders. This study focuses on the ELP with multiple attributes (ELP‐MA), which is generally the problem of matching the shipper's online orders and 3PL providers given that price and other attributes are jointly evaluated. We develop a one‐sided Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (O‐VCG) auction for the ELP‐MA. The O‐VCG auction leads to incentive compatibility (on the sell side), allocative efficiency, budget balance, and individual rationality. We next introduce the concept of universally unsatisfied set to construct a primal‐dual algorithm, also called the primal‐dual Vickrey (PDV) auction. We prove that the O‐VCG auction can be viewed as a single‐attribute multi‐unit forward Vickrey (SA‐MFV) auction. Both PDV and SA‐MFV auctions realize VCG payments and truthful bidding for general valuations. This result reveals the underlying link not only between single‐attribute and multi‐attribute auctions, but between static and dynamic auctions in a multi‐attribute setting.     

随机需求条件下的P2P网络借贷拍卖机制

在P2P网络借贷契约中,提供了一种关于随机借款需求的两阶段关闭式降价拍卖,并构成了借款人的一个最优机制。对此,首先设计借贷契约以确定初始借款需求;随后以事前对称贷款人为基准建立相应的拍卖模型,并进行一次标准的关闭式降价拍卖,再从中标贷款人中获得一个额外的借款需求;最后将这个机制拓展到事前非对称贷款人的情形,以分析非对称情形下的拍卖过程,并通过算例加以说明。这个机制对借款人是最优的,而且借款人和贷款人都比较熟悉这种简单拍卖,因此可以用于改进中国P2P网络借贷市场的交易机制。     

Valuing Dealers' Informational Advantage: A Study of Canadian Treasury Auctions

In many financial markets, dealers have the advantage of observing the orders of their customers. To quantify the economic benefit that dealers derive from this advantage, we study detailed data from Canadian Treasury auctions, where dealers observe customer bids while preparing their own bids. In this setting, dealers can use information on customer bids to learn about (i) competition, that is, the distribution of competing bids in the auction, and (ii) fundamentals, that is, the ex post value of the security being auctioned. We devise formal hypothesis tests for both sources of informational advantage. In our data, we do not find evidence that dealers are learning about fundamentals. We find that the “information about competition” contained in customer bids accounts for 13–27% of dealers' expected profits.     

Planning a TV advertising campaign: A crisp multiobjective programming model from fuzzy basic data

This paper proposes a crisp two-objective logarithmic programming model to help companies decide their advertising campaigns on TV networks for mature products. Both objectives are: (a) to achieve the highest audience impact and (b) to reduce advertising costs as much as possible. Information input is fuzzily elaborated from statistical data, the fuzzy variables being defuzzified to introduce them into the crisp model. This fuzzy information is elicited by TV experts (often independent consultants). Although these experts know statistical information on audience in the past, they do not fully trust its predictive ability. The approach leads to the strategic advertisement (ad) placement among different broadcasts. Users (often managers of big companies) should inform the analyst about their advertising campaign budget. From Weber and Fechner-based psychological research, the ad impact during the advertising campaign is measured depending on the logarithm of ad repetitions. The crisp two-objective problem is solved by a tradeoff method subject to TV technical constraints. A case study with real world data is developed.     

Does Higher Transparency Lead to More Search in Online Auctions?

In a controlled field experiment, we examine pairs of auctions for identical items under different conditions. We find that auction design features that are under the control of the auctioneer—including information transparency, number of simultaneous auctions, and the degree of overlap between simultaneous auctions—affect bidder search and choice. Clickstream data show that a significant relationship between information transparency and price dispersion can be linked to search. Specifically, the effect of information transparency on price dispersion is fully mediated by lookup behavior. Combining these findings, we make auction design recommendations regarding the provision of product and value information.     

The Value of Category Captainship in the Presence of Manufacturer Competition

This research investigates the value of category captainship (a management practice in which a retailer relies on a manufacturer for recommendations regarding strategic category management decisions) in retail supply chains. We consider a setting where the scope of category management is limited to assortment decisions and demand enhancing activities. We assume that the retailer selects a category captain among multiple competing manufacturers with privately known capabilities for driving category traffic. First, we consider a benchmark scenario where the retailer is responsible for category management. Then, we consider the category captainship scenario where the retailer selects one of the manufacturers as a captain to manage the category. We find that captainship is more likely to emerge in categories where the cost of managing variety, the retail margins, and the competition for captainship are moderate and the captain is more capable of driving traffic compared to the retailer. In such categories the collaboration between the retailer and the captain ensures sufficient surplus for both parties. Finally, we show that captainship can also benefit the non‐captain manufacturers.     

An Auction Mechanism for Pricing and Capacity Allocation with Multiple Products

We consider a pricing and short‐term capacity allocation problem in the presence of buyers with orders for bundles of products. The supplier's objective is to maximize her net profit, computed as the difference between the revenue generated through sales of products and the production and inventory holding costs. The objective of each buyer is similarly profit maximization, where a buyer's profit is computed as the difference between the time‐dependent utility of the product bundle he plans to buy, expressed in monetary terms, and the price of the bundle. We assume that bundles' utilities are buyers' private information and address the problem of allocating the facility's output. We directly consider the products that constitute the supplier's output as market goods. We study the case where the supplier follows an anonymous and linear pricing strategy, with extensions that include quantity discounts and time‐dependent product and delivery prices. In this setting, the winner determination problem integrates the capacity allocation and scheduling decisions. We propose an iterative auction mechanism with non‐decreasing prices to solve this complex problem, and present a computational analysis to investigate the efficiency of the proposed method under supplier's different pricing strategies. Our analysis shows that the problem with private information can be effectively solved with the proposed auction mechanism. Furthermore, the results indicate that the auction mechanism achieves more than 80% of the system's profit, and the supplier receives a higher percentage of profit especially when the ratio of demand to available capacity is high.     

我国广告产业定位与复合型广告人才需求

我国广告行业的定位问题直到2006年才得以解决,即广告产业属于现代服务业,是文化产业的支撑。回顾我国广告产业的定位过程,分析广告产业定位模式对广告人才需求的影响,结论是广告产业需要复合型人才。     

谈英汉广告互译中情感因素的实现

本文提出了在英汉广告互译中情感因素的重要意义和作用,并试探讨出了实现情感因素的三条可行性途径:一是要尽可能使英汉文化差异的趋平,达到情感的一致;二是在文法修辞上的给予调整,获得情感的体验;三是情感美的氛围的营造。从而增强广告效果,实现广告的功能目的。