CEO Succession: Overcoming Forces of Inertia

Population ecologists suggest that inertialpressures make it difficult for organizations to adapttheir strategies and structures in response toenvironmental changes. One way in which organizations may attempt to overcome these inertial tendenciesis by selecting executive successors with differentcareer specializations than their predecessors, whichmay enable them to better cope with changingenvironmental contingencies. The present study examined therelationship between the previous CEO s careerspecialization, the corporate strategy in place at thetime of the succession event, and the careerspecialization of the new CEO from 1981-1990. The resultssuggest that organizations often chose successors withdifferent career specializations than theirpredecessors, and that previous corporate strategy wasa relatively poor predictor of successors specializations.These results differ from earlier research findingsconcerning executive succession between 1957-1981.Possible reasons for these differences are discussed, and the implications for future research are considered.     

试析美国CEO的法律地位

CEO是美国大公司时代公司内部权力新的分配安排机制的产物 ,它不仅是称谓上的变化 ,而且是经济、法律等诸多因素整合的结果。CEO掌握有公司的业务执行权、部分决策权、对外代表权。同时 ,美国判例法、制定法对其课以诸多义务 ,违反这些义务 ,就可能遭致公司、股东、其他利益相关者的重重诉讼 ,从而对其权力进行制约     

企业环境的几个世界——兼及美国杰出CEO的危机管理策略

企业经营环境是多侧面、多层次、多向度的集合体，是包含着人的、多维度的、动态的开放系统。在信息、能量的交换和流转中，环境不断运动、变化、发展和转型，展示其丰富性、多变性和复杂性，可以划分为相对独立、彼此交织、相互作用的若干个“世界”。选择理性、意志、无意识、荒谬、符号等多种角度，以美国杰出CEO卡内基、摩根、洛克菲勒、福特家族、斯隆、沃森父子、艾柯卡、韦尔奇等为例，兼及其危机管理策略，对企业环境进行多层次、多角度、全方位的剖析与透视，是对企业环境进行多角度透视时应持的基本态度，也是接近真理的方法。     

Do large firms overly use stock-based incentive compensation?

This study employs the panel threshold model to reexamine the non-monotonic relationship between CEO stock-based compensation and firm earnings across various firm-size conditions. The feasibility of the model is tested using data for US non-financial firms from 1993 to 2005. Our empirical results indicate that while a positive relationship between the CEO stock-based pay and earnings is presented for small-size firms, a negative impact of CEO stock-based compensation on earnings is shown when large-size firms are concerned. Further, the longstanding puzzle of whether the CEO stock-based pay could enhance earnings among earlier studies could be satisfactorily explained by our empirical results.     

The emerging CEO agenda

This article identifies and articulates the major challenges facing CEOs of large multinational firms. Analysis of recent surveys and interviews highlights eight challenges: 1. Developing growth avenues, 2. Raising productivity, 3. Competing for talent, 4. Managing diverse risks, 5. Tightening corporate governance, 6. Incorporating sustainability, 7. Creating new innovation models, and 8. Building out new infrastructures. This large and broad set of issues involves new twists on known challenges and the emergence of new challenges. These challenges are demanding because they require new types of non-business expertise, their rules are not yet clear, and they are interdependent. CEOs need to craft an agenda for dealing individually and collectively with these issues.     

CEO特征与企业研发投入关系的实证研究

CEO作为企业投资决策的核心制定者,其自身特征无疑会对企业的研发活动产生重要影响。利用世界银行2005年对中国120个城市12 065家企业的调研数据,分析了CEO受教育水平、CEO任期、CEO自主权等三个因素对企业研发投入水平的影响,在控制了企业特征、行业等因素后,实证结果发现:(1)CEO受教育水平与企业研发投入水平显著正相关,即教育程度高的CEO更加重视研发活动;(2)CEO任期同企业研发投入水平显著正相关,即较长的任期有助于CEO着眼于长远目标,进而加大研发投入;(3)CEO自主权也同企业研发投入水平显著正相关,说明较高的CEO自主权有利于CEO通过努力实现自身人力资本价值,从而激励其加大研发的投入。     

多元化、公司业绩与总经理变更

总经理变更是公司内部治理的重要手段,其业绩敏感性受到多种因素的影响,以2002年～2007年沪深两市702家A股上市公司的数据为样本,探讨多元化经营对总经理变更绩效敏感性及其业绩改进效应的影响,为公司经营模式对公司治理效率的影响提供经验证据,利用传统的Logistic回归、边际效应分析以及面板数据随机效应回归对多元化和总经理变更的关系进行研究。实证结果表明,多元化降低了总经理变更的业绩敏感性,多元化公司总经理变更的概率与资产收益率代表的多元化公司业绩变化没有显著的关系,即使在公司业绩下降的条件下,股东替换总经理的动机也弱于集中化公司;多元化公司总经理变更后的资产重组行为规模显著弱于集中化公司,带来的业绩改进也小于集中化公司。     

我国公司设置CEO的法律问题和对策分析

CEO源于美国,崛起于全球,它给现代公司治理注入了新的活力。我国有一些著名公司先后设置了CEO,但要真正达到创设CEO的初衷,必须对CEO有个清晰的界定,在我国,还要相应修改《公司法》,赋予CEO以明确的法律地位,完善公司的治理结构,给CEO营造适存的土壤,另外,还要加强CEO约束机制的创设和经理人才市场的培育。     

Executive Discretion and Corporate Performance as Determinants of CEO Compensation,Contingent on External Monitoring Activities

In this paper we discuss the potential impactof managerial discretion and firm performanceon CEO compensation, contingent on the extentof monitoring activities. We argue that CEOcompensation may be positively related toexecutive discretion and corporate performancefor firms that have vigilant external monitors. We alternatively contend that CEO compensationmay neither be associated with discretion norperformance for firms with passive externalmonitors. The empirical results are supportiveof our contentions.     

经理任期风险和公司治理的实证分析

对公司经理任期的约束应该是公司治理的一个重要方面.本文通过多元线性回归和生存分析的方法检验了内外部治理因素对经理职位变动的影响.这两种方法得出的结果大同小异,相互补充.从结果可以看出,董事长和总经理因为同样处于代理人的位置,所以他们的任期风险影响因素中有几个是共同的:市场业绩、年龄、学历、股权变更.市场业绩的影响作用和理论相反.由于董事长和总经理存在权力的分别,所以领导独立性、内部监事比例和企业规模三个变量对两个职位任期风险的影响作用不同.另外,在检验的变量中,企业的利润率和国有股权比例都没有对经理任期风险产生显著影响,说明经理任期风险并不受企业会计业绩和企业股权性质的影响.