试论我国宪法的完善

宪法是国家的根本法。我国现行宪法在宪法的解释制度、修宪程序以及全国人大及其常委会的表决制度等方面存在一些问题。我们应借鉴西方国家宪法的经验并结合本国的实际情况 ,将宪法的解释权赋予人民法院 ,确立宪法的司法解释制度 ;修正宪法的第六十四条 ,改进修改宪法的方式 ;在表决原则、表决的法定人数和意愿表示项方面进一步完善全国人大及其常委会的表决制度。     

Opinion leaders,independence, and Condorcet's Jury Theorem

Condorcet's Jury Theorem shows that on a dichotomous choice, individuals who all have the same competence above 0.5, can make collective decisions under majority rule with a competence that approaches 1 as either the size of the group or the individual competence goes up. The theorem assumes that the probability of each voter's being correct is independent of the probability of any other voter being correct. Contrary to several authors, the presence of mutual or common influences such as opinion leaders does not easily rule independence either in or out. Indeed, and this ought to be surprising,under certain conditions deference to opinion leaders can improve individual competence without violating independence, and so can raise group competence as well.     

Majority voting on orders

We characterize two lexicographic-type preference extension rules from a set X to the set of all orders on this set. Elements of X are interpreted as basic economic policy decisions, whereas elements of are conceived as political programs among which a collectivity has to choose through majority voting. The main axiom is called tournament-consistency, and states that whenever majority pairwise comparisons based on initial preferences on X define an order on X, then this order is also chosen by a majority among all other orders in . Tournament-consistency thus allows to predict the outcome of majority voting upon orders from the knowledge of majority preferences on their components.     

Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power — A critical re-appraisal

This paper re-evaluates the problem of measuring thea priori relative voting power of a voter in an assembly. We propose several new intuitively compelling postualtes that any reasonable index of voting power ought to satisfy. At the same time we argue that most of the paradoxes of voting power discussed in the literature are paradoxical only in a weak sense, if at all. This leaves three crippling paradoxes — the well-known paradox ofweighted voting, and two new ones presented here: thebloc anddonation paradoxes. We evaluate the four main relative power indices discussed in the literature with respect to these three severe paradoxes. The Shapley-Shubik index is seen to be immune to all three paradoxes, while the Deegan-Packel index is vulnerable to all three. The Banzhaf and the Johnston indices are demonstrably immune to the paradox of weighted voting. However, they are shown to suffer from both the bloc and the donation paradoxes. We argue that this seriously undermines these indices in a hitherto unsuspected way. Several other theoretical issues relating to voting power are discussed.     

Exact and heuristic methods for a class of selective newsvendor problems with normally distributed demands

In this paper we study a class of selective newsvendor problems, where a decision maker has a set of raw materials each of which can be customized shortly before satisfying demand. The goal is then to select which subset of customizations maximizes expected profit. We show that certain multi-period and multi-product selective newsvendor problems fall within our problem class. Under the assumption that the demands are independent and normally, but not necessarily identically, distributed we show that some problem instances from our class can be solved efficiently using an attractive sorting property that was also established in the literature for some related problems. For our general model we use the KKT conditions to develop an exact algorithm that is efficient in the number of raw materials. In addition, we develop a class of heuristic algorithms. In a numerical study, we compare the performance of the algorithms, and the heuristics are shown to have excellent performance and running times as compared to available commercial solvers.     

家族企业股东异质性与CEO选聘决策

家族企业积极引入并利用非家族资本时,CEO人选对其职业化经营和现代化转型具有重要促进作用。基于2004—2017年中国2 065家上市家族企业数据,从家族企业股东异质性的视角考察了其对家族企业CEO人选的影响。研究发现：家族大股东和非家族大股东投票权不对称性与职业经理人担任CEO显著负相关。非家族大股东类型越多,投票权不对称性与职业经理人担任CEO的负相关关系越强,但家族股东数量增加会抵消这种作用。横截面差异检验表明,不同类型非家族大股东对CEO人选具有不同的影响,未发生代际传承、由家族直接创办、审计质量较低的家族企业,投票权不对称性与职业经理人担任CEO之间的负相关关系更强。研究结论表明,家族式的非制度管理可能成为家族企业高质量发展的瓶颈,积极引入非家族股东并保持权力制衡有助于职业经理人的引入,这对于企业最终实现高质量发展意义重大。