环境管制与绿色经济效率

针对环境管制与经济效率之间的复杂关系和相关问题,本文结合非期望产出SBM模型提出绿色经济效率非参数条件效率模型,探讨和验证宏观环境管制对绿色经济效率影响的作用效果。研究发现无条件的绿色经济效率都低于条件效率。环境管制对绿色经济效率的影响不仅具有“时滞”性而且具有“非线性”性,随着环境管制程度的加强,绿色经济效率呈先降后升趋势。环境管制在长期对提高绿色经济效率具有促进作用,但它的影响体现在对不同地区和时期具有不同效应,东部地区环境管制对绿色经济效率也具有先负后正的效应,而加强环境管制目前对提高中西部地区的绿色经济效率仍具有抑制作用。     

在韩中国留学生和韩国大学生休闲阻碍因素比较研究

近年来,大批中国学生前往韩国留学深造。休闲对外国留学生来说是在国外学习生活经历中的一个重要组成部分。除了日常的在校学习,对课外休闲活动的参与是提高业余生活质量的一个重要方法。近10年,世界上很多国家都开始关注休闲阻碍因素的研究。通过对600多名中韩大学生随机问卷调查,运用因子分析法得出5个休闲参与阻碍因子:心理因素;时间因素;到达性因素;同伴因素;设施与安全因素,揭示出中韩大学生在休闲参与阻碍因素上的不同之处。     

评审专家抽取中的时间距离约束分析

针对现有评审专家抽取中距离约束存在的不足,本文提出了一种新的时间距离约束。本文介绍了时间距离的含义及其提出的必要性,并给出了基于GIS技术的时间距离计算方法,具体包括相关假设、计算步骤、解决方案以及实现过程。时间距离约束的提出不仅可以保证所有被选专家都可按时到达评审地点,而且还能打破行政区域的限制,合理调配专家资源,具有重要的现实意义。     

农地承包权流转的原则与限制

农地承包权流转必须在一定的原则指导下才能实现规范、有序;同时农地承包权流转与社会公共利益紧密相关,因而必须受到某种程度的限制。农地承包权流转应当遵循“效率优先、兼顾公平”和“平等、自愿、有偿”的原则,应当受到诸如农地拥有数量、农地利用人资格等多方面的限制,同时也从理论、实践等角度对这些原则和限制的合理性及必要性进行了分析。     

现金股利与控股股东资金占用：替代还是制约

采用联立方程模型并通过两阶段最小二乘回归分析（2SLS）实证分析了上市公司现金股利与其控股股东资金占用的双向关系,研究发现二者既存在双向替代关系,又存在双向制约关系。替代关系表现为上市公司本期派现水平与控股股东本期资金占用程度间的显著负相关关系,制约关系表现为上期派现水平与本期资金占用程度以及上期资金占用程度与本期派现水平之间的显著负相关关系。公司股权制衡现象弱化了二者之间的替代关系,但对制约关系不起作用。     

土地流转的政策绩效和影响因素分析——基于东中西部三地的比较研究

中国农村土地流转遵循稳定优先,兼顾效率的价值逻辑,体现了总体稳定,渐进调整的基本特征。在中央政府的政策激励和地方政府的利益冲动的促进下,农村土地流转的政策绩效如何?哪些因素影响了其绩效?通过对土地流转政策变迁的梳理,选取浙江慈溪、安徽潜山、重庆作为案例样本,从土地流转水平、政策创新、政府行为以及农民意愿四个方面分析三地土地流转的政策绩效;进而分析土地流转绩效的影响因素和可能的政策选择。由此得出结论,在中国现有条件下,土地流转不能大规模推进,尚需借助一定的政策设计和制度安排,以促进其健康、适度、有效发展。     

Unpacking Burt’s constraint measure

Burt (1992) proposed two principal measures of structural holes, effective size and constraint. However, the formulas describing the measures are somewhat opaque and have led to a certain amount of confusion. Borgatti (1997) showed that, for binary data, the effective size formula could be written very simply as degree (ego network size) minus average degree of alters within the ego network. The present paper presents an analogous reformulation of the constraint measure. We also derive minima and maxima for constraint, showing that, for small ego networks, constraint can be larger than one, and for larger ego networks, constraint cannot get as large as one. We also show that for networks with more than seven alters, the maximum constraint does not occur in a maximally dense or closed network, but rather in a relatively sparse “shadow ego network”, which is a network that contains an alter (the shadow ego) that is connected to every other alter, and where no other alter-alter ties exist.     

非分配约束与非营利组织的治理:一个公共经济学视角下的观点

非营利组织治理研究大多从"非分配约束"出发,研究非营利组织的理事会的法律地位、权力结构安排以及激励兼容机制等。从公共经济学的视角出发,考虑非营利组织的公共部门特性以及其提供产品和服务的俱乐部产品特征,通过对"非分配约束"特性与非营利组织治理结构的重新考察,得出了一些有意义的结论。     

Who is dropped and why? Methodological and substantive accounts for network loss

High rates of egocentric network turnover are frequently observed but not well explained. About 1000 respondents to the UCNets survey named an average of 10 names in each of two waves a year apart. Consistent with prior studies, respondents in wave 2 failed to relist about half of the names they provided in wave 1. Asked why, respondents explained that they had forgotten the alter for about 40 percent of the missing names. Other common answers, such as no “occasion… to be in touch,” also suggest that the true rate of alters being dropped is probably under 20 percent. Multilevel logit models identified the predictors of alters being dropped (neither relisted nor forgotten) versus retained. Immediate kin were likeliest to be retained and roommates, coworkers, and acquaintances to be dropped. Alters who provided companionship, confiding, advice, and emergency help were especially likely to be retained, as were those to whom respondents felt close. Little about the respondents themselves affected drop rates: having moved recently, having a close friend die, or having had an important relationship break up. Results are consistent with the argument that a tie’s degree of constraint (notably being close family) and its balance of rewards determine the likelihood of it being dropped or demoted.     

Bundling of Vertically Differentiated Products in a Supply Chain*

We consider a supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. The manufacturer produces a basic and a premium product. If desired, a bundle of the two products might also be produced at a unit bundling cost. We allow either the manufacturer or the retailer to produce the bundle from the component products. All products, however, must be sold exclusively through the retailer. Using game theoretic models, we compare and contrast the equilibrium outcomes under retailer bundling and manufacturer bundling scenarios. We show that under manufacturer bundling, the manufacturer never offers the full product line composed of the basic product, the premium product, and the bundle, at equilibrium; while the same does not hold under retailer bundling. We show that total supply chain profit under retailer bundling weakly dominates that under manufacturer bundling and characterize the region in the parameter space where this domination is strict. We explore an extension where there is a capacity constraint in producing one or both of the component products and characterize the equilibrium outcomes. We show that unlike the infinite capacity case, offering the full product line is an equilibrium outcome under manufacturer bundling when the capacity of the premium good is limited.