论成品油定价机制中的有限规制：基于合谋的视角

利用单期静态博弈分析法、有限期动态博弈分析法和无限期动态博弈分析法对成品油定价机制中寡头厂商的合谋行为进行了分析。研究发现：两家寡头厂商在合谋条件下的收益均高于双方各自独立定产条件下的收益，因此，双方存在进行价格合谋的利益激励。基于此，我国成品油价格形成机制的改革可以考虑采用有限规制等手段。     

Cross‐Milieu Terrorist Collaboration: Using Game Theory to Assess the Risk of a Novel Threat

This article uses a game‐theoretic approach to analyze the risk of cross‐milieu terrorist collaboration—the possibility that, despite marked ideological differences, extremist groups from very different milieus might align to a degree where operational collaboration against Western societies becomes possible. Based upon theoretical insights drawn from a variety of literatures, a bargaining model is constructed that reflects the various benefits and costs for terrorists’ collaboration across ideological milieus. Analyzed in both sequential and simultaneous decision‐making contexts and through numerical simulations, the model confirms several theoretical arguments. The most important of these is that although likely to be quite rare, successful collaboration across terrorist milieus is indeed feasible in certain circumstances. The model also highlights several structural elements that might play a larger role than previously recognized in the collaboration decision, including that the prospect of nonmaterial gains (amplification of terror and reputational boost) plays at least as important a role in the decision to collaborate as potential increased capabilities does. Numerical simulation further suggests that prospects for successful collaboration over most scenarios (including operational) increase when a large, effective Islamist terrorist organization initiates collaboration with a smaller right‐wing group, as compared with the other scenarios considered. Although the small number of historical cases precludes robust statistical validation, the simulation results are supported by existing empirical evidence of collaboration between Islamists and right‐ or left‐wing extremists. The game‐theoretic approach, therefore, provides guidance regarding the circumstances under which such an unholy alliance of violent actors is likely to succeed.     

Inventory and transshipment decisions in the rationing game under capacity uncertainty

In this paper, we consider the inventory decisions of two retailers who are supplied by a single supplier with uncertain capacity. When capacity is allocated in proportion to the retailers׳ orders, the retailers compete for the capacity by inflating their orders (i.e., the rationing game). In addition, we allow the retailers to implement transshipment between them such that they cooperate by transshipping the surplus stock of one to another who is out of stock. Our analysis of Nash equilibrium orders shows that, while order inflation in the equilibrium orders persists in the rationing game with transshipment, it may not occur if the amount of capacity shortage is small and the transshipment prices are low. Thus, carefully chosen transshipment prices may alleviate order inflation behavior. We also characterize centralized orders that maximize the total profit of the retailers and compare them to equilibrium orders. In particular, we investigate coordinating transshipment prices that induce the retailers to choose centralized orders. Our numerical analysis shows that, even for two identical retailers, coordinating transshipment prices exist in a more limited range of parameter values in the rationing game than they do outside the rationing game due to capacity uncertainty and limitation.     

金融资产的动态非线性相关:一个新的模型

基于Kendall’sτ秩相关系数的优越性和定义,本文提出了新的具有明确经济意义的动态条件相关copula模型,将常用的Gaussian、Clayton和Gumbel函数统一根据该演化方程实现动态化,构造出三种Kendall’sτ动态条件相关copula模型,可用于刻画不同的相关模式。这些模型不仅参数少、容易估计,避免了现有动态条件相关copula模型构建方法各异导致的在实证中不利于比较的缺点,而且能够进行多步向前预测,有效地减少了进行样本外预测时的计算量,从而为刻画时变、非线性、非对称性和尾部相关等复杂的动态相关模式提供了新方法。     

Majority size and conformity behavior in charitable giving: Field evidence from a donation-based crowdfunding platform in Japan

A charitable donor typically imitates the majority contribution of other donors. This study examines the relationships between majority size and this so-called donor’s conformity behavior, by empirically investigating the impacts of multiple earlier donations on the donation of a subsequent donor to JapanGiving, a donation-based crowdfunding platform in Japan. This analysis is possible because the platform’s webpage displays the previous donation amounts in chronological order, thus allowing us to examine the modal amount of more recent donations. By using data on 9989 actual donations, our dynamic panel analysis suggests that when the number of most recent continuous modal donations increases, the likelihood that a subsequent donor matches the modal amount increases. This result supports the notion that a donor’s conformity behavior is more likely to occur when a greater proportion of other donors give a similar amount. Furthermore, the effects of continuous modal donations are strongly observed for low monetary ranges. We interpret that initiating further cooperation among a large number of less cooperative other donors would become harder, or individuals would obtain an excuse for less cooperation due to the others’ behaviors. Finally, we discuss how our findings connect economic studies of charity and social psychology studies of conformity and could help improve the effectiveness of fundraising by charities.     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

Estimation and Properties of a Time-Varying EGARCH(1,1) in Mean Model

Time-varying GARCH-M models are commonly employed in econometrics and financial economics. Yet the recursive nature of the conditional variance makes likelihood analysis of these models computationally infeasible. This article outlines the issues and suggests to employ a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm which allows the calculation of a classical estimator via the simulated EM algorithm or a simulated Bayesian solution in only O(T) computational operations, where T is the sample size. Furthermore, the theoretical dynamic properties of a time-varying-parameter EGARCH(1,1)-M are derived. We discuss them and apply the suggested Bayesian estimation to three major stock markets.     

Moral values and increasing stakes in a dictator game

Using data from a large representative US sample (N = 1519), we compare hypothetical moral fairness values from the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale with actual fairness behavior in an incentivized dictator game with either low or high stakes. We find that people with high moral fairness values fail to live up to their high fairness standards, when stake size increases. This violates principles from consistency theories according to which moral values are supposedly aligned with moral behavior, but is in line with temptation theories that question the absoluteness of morality values.     

Fixed T dynamic panel data estimators with multifactor errors

This article analyzes a growing group of fixed T dynamic panel data estimators with a multifactor error structure. We use a unified notational approach to describe these estimators and discuss their properties in terms of deviations from an underlying set of basic assumptions. Furthermore, we consider the extendability of these estimators to practical situations that may frequently arise, such as their ability to accommodate unbalanced panels and common observed factors. Using a large-scale simulation exercise, we consider scenarios that remain largely unexplored in the literature, albeit being of great empirical relevance. In particular, we examine (i) the effect of the presence of weakly exogenous covariates, (ii) the effect of changing the magnitude of the correlation between the factor loadings of the dependent variable and those of the covariates, (iii) the impact of the number of moment conditions on bias and size for GMM estimators, and finally (iv) the effect of sample size. We apply each of these estimators to a crime application using a panel data set of local government authorities in New South Wales, Australia; we find that the results bear substantially different policy implications relative to those potentially derived from standard dynamic panel GMM estimators. Thus, our study may serve as a useful guide to practitioners who wish to allow for multiplicative sources of unobserved heterogeneity in their model.     

形式与意义:儿童文学作品中的游戏精神

儿童文学的"游戏精神"主要是指在儿童作品文本中体现出的、通过人物游戏所传递的一种符合儿童心理需求和审美旨趣,并实现儿童内心愿望的精神。周作人认为儿童文学的游戏精神是"幻想精神""愉悦精神"和"自由精神"。儿童文学游戏精神具有快乐性、幻想性和自由性的三性特征"。游戏精神"在儿童文学中作品的主要呈现形式为:通过"顽童""小大人""、反派"等人物形象的塑造凸显游戏精神;通过故事情节蕴涵的笨拙与聪明、嬉笑与吵闹、虚拟与真实凸显游戏精神;通过语言夸张凸显荒诞美、语言颠倒凸显逆向思维、语言突转凸显惊奇,从而凸显游戏精神。游戏精神对于儿童文学作品编创的意义在于:游戏精神是儿童文学的基本属性和内涵所在,新媒介时代儿童文学的发展需要延续游戏精神。因此游戏精神是儿童文学的作品编创的重要依据和准则。