邓小平辩证发展观与和谐社会的构建

研究邓小平辩证发展观时,学术界往往较多关注其非均衡发展思想,而忽略对其"综合平衡"均衡发展思想的研究,针对这一现状,分析了邓小平均衡与非均衡辩证发展观及其对构建和谐社会的作用。分析认为:均衡发展不是社会各方面同步发展,非均衡发展并非是"单打一"的发展;均衡与非均衡发展应是在差异基础上的"和谐"共进,是均衡发展与非均衡发展的有机统一。当前重新认识和深刻领会邓小平辩证发展观对于和谐社会的构建无疑具有重要的现实意义。     

基于行程时间可靠性的随机交通网络均衡模型

考虑现实条件下交通网络的不确定性状态，提出了从确定型网络到不确定型网络状态下出行者路径选择行为的改变，及基于行程时间可靠性的路径选择模型。并将可靠行程时间的路径选择行为纳入到随机交通网络平衡分配模型中，证明了模型的等价性和唯一性。在一个小型测试网络上对模型分配结果进行了测试，测试结果与经验相吻合，表明模型具有较好的现实可行性。     

Comment on An and Schorfheide's Bayesian Analysis of DSGE Models

An and Schorfheide's article provides an excellent review of Bayesian estimation of DSGE models. Rather than recapitulating the points already made in this article, my comment focuses on three aspects. It proposes a convergence measure to take account of serial correlation of MCMC draws, explains why the DSGE-VAR framework for policy analysis can be improved by avoiding the ad hoc identification assumption, and discusses an alternative structural approach to model misspecification.     

Procurement with Reverse Auction and Flexible Noncompetitive Contracts

This article investigates a hybrid procurement mechanism that combines a reverse auction with flexible noncompetitive contracts. A buyer adopts such mechanism to procure multiple units of a product from a group of potential suppliers. Specifically, the buyer first offers contracts to some suppliers who, if accepting the contract, do not participate in the auction while committing to selling a unit to the buyer at the price of the subsequent auction. For the suppliers rejecting the offers, they can join the subsequent auction with the other suppliers to compete on the remaining units. When the buyer offers only one flexible noncompetitive contract, we find that the selected supplier may accept the offer regardless of whether he knows his exact cost information. Meanwhile, the buyer can benefit from offering such a contract, as opposed to solely conducting a regular reverse auction or offering a noncompetitive contract that does not allow suppliers declining offers to join the subsequent auction. Moreover, we find that the suppliers' information about their own costs has a significant impact on the buyer's decision. When the buyer makes multiple offers, we analyze the resulting game behavior of the selected suppliers and demonstrate that the buyer can benefit more than just offering one such contract. Therefore, the hybrid procurement mechanism can be mutually beneficial for both the buyer and the selected suppliers.     

Competition and Coordination in Two‐Tier Public Service Systems under Government Fiscal Policy

As a result of government budgetary limits and rapid market growth, many public service systems—such as health care—are characterized by extensive customer wait times that have become a serious problem. This problem might be solved by allowing private firms to enter these markets, which would provide customers with a choice between a free (governmental) public service provider (SP) and a fee‐charging (or “toll”) private SP. In such a two‐tier service system, the two SPs are differentiated by service quality and cost efficiency. This study focuses on the competition and coordination issues for two‐tier service systems with customers who are sensitive to both service quality and delay. The free system attempts to maximize its expected total customer utility with limited capacity, whereas the toll system attempts to maximize its profit. Neither goal is aligned with the social welfare goal of the public service. To achieve the social welfare goal, the government plays a crucial role in coordinating the two‐tier service system via the budget, the tradeoff of social members' goals, and tax‐subsidy policies. Using a mixed duopoly game, we establish Nash equilibrium strategies and identify the conditions for the existence of the two‐tier service system. We employ several interesting and counter‐intuitive managerial insights generated by the model to show that the public service can be delivered more efficiently via customer choice and SP competition. In addition, we show that a relatively low tax‐subsidy rate can almost perfectly coordinate the two SPs to achieve most of the maximum possible benefit of the two‐tier service system.     

投射偏差视角下的服务类品牌消费--以农村信息消费支付意愿为例

现将投射偏差模型框架引入服务类耐用品消费者均衡中,从理论上阐述投射偏差如何会导致消费者在服务类商品消费时无法达到效用最大化。研究采用实验和实地调研的方法,一共有251名人员参与了实验与调研,分析上网体验对于未来一年宽带的支付意愿影响。研究结果发现,人们在体验上网前后对于信息的认知状态有显著差异,没有上过网的人会基于当前的认知状态而低估未来一年宽带的效用,其支付意愿明显低于上过网的人,投射偏差在服务类耐用品的消费均衡中发挥了重要作用。     

农业合作社的经济均衡——基于新古典框架的分析

在完备市场和经济理性人假设下,采用新古典框架对合作社进行经济均衡分析,是对合作社的性质及其在农产品市场中所起作用研究的重要方面。在整理已有文献的基础上,将合作社视为追求单一目标的特殊企业组织形式,分别构建了传统购买、销售合作社及新型深加工合作社的经济均衡模型。研究发现,传统购买销售合作社为生产资料的卖方垄断和农产品买方垄断市场增加了竞争性因素,使农业生产效率提高,均衡产量增加。新型深加工“合作社—农户社员”系统存在一种自我调节机制,使系统在偏离均衡状态时自动向均衡方向调节。这一模型解释了“新一代合作社”中“股份—交易份额”同一的规定,如何使其保持在最大生产效率下经营。     

心理期望：政治认同生成的内隐机制

政治认同是公民对国家政治诸要素所产生的一种心理上的归属感。心理期望作为政治认同的内隐机制,从需要因素看,可分为自发性政治认同需要和引致性政治认同需要。而对需要的满足,则取决于主体的自我政治期望和社会政治期望的契合程度及运行路向。现实问题往往因对期望的认知错位而产生各异的政治认同距离进而给个体和政府等带来心理压力。如何把这种压力保持在一定的安全阈值范围内而使政府和个人在期望心理供求方面处于大体均衡,成为优化政治认同效果的现实选择。     

或有可转换债券的定价和公司资本结构

假设公司收益流服从算术布朗运动,考虑包含或有可转换债券(CCB) 的公司资本结构问题,计算公司证券均衡价格,分析公司破产概率、公司收益风险与公司资本结构之间的数量关系． 结果表明: CCB 不但显著降低破产概率,减小管理者“资产替代”动机,而且吸收公司大部分风险,大幅提升公司总价值; CCB 的收益率差价明显高于普通债券; 公司收益流与市场正(负) 相关程度越高,公司总价值越小(大) ．     

把握生命科学与生命伦理学的动态平衡

21世纪是生命科学的世纪。只有实现生命科学与生命伦理学之间的动态平衡关系,才能保证人类社会健康有序的可持续发展,这是历史的经验和现实的呼唤。现代生命科学与生命伦理学是一对处于共构状态下的矛盾,互相制约,共同发展,有机互动,从而实现平衡—不平衡—新的平衡这一动态平衡过程,促进人类文明的演进和发展。