Optimal Pricing Strategies for Capacity Leasing Based on Time and Volume Usage in Telecommunication Networks

In this study, we examined optimal pricing strategies for “pay‐per‐time,” “pay‐per‐volume,” and “pay‐per‐both‐time‐and‐volume” based leasing of data networks in a monopoly environment. Conventionally, network capacity distribution includes short‐/long‐term bandwidth and/or usage time leasing. When customers choose connection‐time–based pricing, their rational behavior is to fully utilize the bandwidth capacity within a fixed time period, which may cause the network to burst (or overload). Conversely, when customers choose volume‐based strategies their rational behavior is to send only the minimum bytes necessary (even for time‐fixed tasks for real time applications), causing the quality of the task to decrease, which in turn creates an opportunity cost for the provider. Choosing a pay‐per time and volume hybridized pricing scheme allows customers to take advantage of both pricing strategies while lessening the disadvantages of each, because consumers generally have both time‐ and size‐fixed tasks such as batch data transactions. One of the key contributions of this study is to show that pay‐per both time and volume pricing is a viable and often preferable alternative to the offerings based on only time or volume, and that judicious use of such a pricing policy is profitable to the network provider.     

《庄子·天下》与中国古代学术史

《庄子·天下》在中国古代学术史上的意义久被学者们所认识,但诸如:《庄子.天下》对道术体性的真正期望何在?其在论列旧法世传之史、邹鲁六经及百家之学时,其背后的学术内涵是什么?其对百家之学究竟是肯定还是否定?原因何在?所有这一切最终对中国古代学术文化有何等影响?这些问题至今似仍罕为学者所尽数参透,因而有必要再予诠衡论析,考订评量。但其中最为重要的是,中国古代政教制度实践对社会文化的辐射、影响之大,必须予以充分关注。     

东边日出西边雨——《激流三部曲》和《四世同堂》的比较分析

巴金的《激流三部曲》和老舍的《四世同堂》是诞生于20世纪中国的两部长篇巨著.两部小说都讲述了一个封建大家庭的兴衰荣辱,展现了在封建制度奴役下,在战争的摧残下,中国人的国民性格.但是,由于作者的写作目的不同,故事发生的背景不同,两部小说在主题提炼和人物形象塑造上呈现出不同的风格特点.     

Free or bundled: Channel selection decisions under different power structures

The smart phone industry has unique supply chain relationships. Companies at all levels of the supply chain compete and coordinate with each other for market share and profit. This paper examines the impact of power structures on the decision of pricing and channel selection between a free channel and a bundled channel. We investigate the smart phone supply chain that consists of a handset manufacturer and a telecom service operator. Based on game theory models, the manufacturer׳s optimal retail pricing policies in free and bundled channels and the telecom service operator׳s optimal subsidy policies in a bundled channel are derived under different power structures. It is demonstrated that the firm that has higher channel power will gain more profit, and the smart phone supply chain׳s profit in a Vertical Nash (VN) power structure is higher than that in Telecom Service Operator-Stackelberg (TS) and Manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) power structures. It is also shown that the smart phone supply chain will choose a bundled channel in TS and MS power structures under certain conditions and will select a free channel in a VN power structure.     

Coordinating a supply chain for deteriorating items with a revenue sharing and cooperative investment contract

In this study, a one-manufacturer–one-retailer supply chain model for deteriorating items with controllable deterioration rate and price-dependent demand is developed, in which both players cooperatively invest in preservation technology to reduce deterioration. Algorithms are designed to obtain the pricing and preservation technology investment strategies in both integrated and decentralized scenarios. It is shown that cooperative investment strategy benefits the manufacturer but damages the profits of the retailer and the whole supply chain. A revenue sharing and cooperative investment contract, which combines revenue sharing and cost sharing mechanisms, is thus designed to coordinate the supply chain. Numerical simulations and sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium strategies and coordinating results on key system parameters are given to verify the effectiveness of the contract, and meanwhile get some managerial insights. The results show that only when the revenue sharing rate lies roughly between 1/2 and 3/4 can the contract perfectly coordinate the supply chain in most cases, which has an important guiding significance for the supply chain coordination of deteriorating items when considering preservation technology investment.     

《榆树下的欲望》的女性主义解读

奥尼尔是美国现代戏剧的奠基人,其剧作往往贴近生活并且哲理深刻.他的早期剧作<榆树下的欲望>就体现了剧作家本人的女性观.通过对剧中三位女性人物的分析,探讨了她们的女性自我意识随着时间的推移由弱到强的变化过程,从而表明奥尼尔也是一位具有女性意识并且非常关心女性生存状况的剧作家.     

股权分置改革后IPO抑价与大股东的减持行为研究

股改后IPO公司大股东可能存在后市减持的动机。通过对股改前后在A股上市发行的555只新股进行实证研究发现,股改后第2～第10大股东持股比例越高的新股IPO抑价率越高,并且在上市后第13个月的股价相对市场指数下跌的幅度越大,而股改前则不存在这样的现象。研究结果表明,股改后新股大股东在12个月限售期满以后可能存在减持行为,而为了给后市减持提供更高的获利空间,大股东可能拉高新股的首日价格,从而造成了极高的IPO抑价率。     

基于IPO交易量对我国投资者处置效应的研究

从IPO交易量入手,利用市场公开信息,研究投资者心理参考价格以及卖赢持亏的行为倾向(即处置效应),并在此基础上检验了处置效应的时间特征。研究结果表明,我国投资者的行为具有处置效应,投资者对首发上市股票的心理参考价格定位在1.5倍发行价;样本期间内存在年度、月份处置效应,投资者的卖赢持亏程度表现出时间差异;政策环境对投资者的卖赢持亏倾向有影响,在利好的环境下,投资者的参考价格相应提高,表现出较强的处置效应。     

新股上市后盈利能力下滑及募集资金使用分析

首先从盈利与成长能力的角度考察中国A股公司首次公开发行(IPO)前及发行后的长期基本面特性,以及IPO市场基本面的动态变化.发现A股公司的长期盈利能力在IPO之后显著下降.在对A股IPO募集资金使用情况进行长期的追踪与分析后,发现IPO募集资金投入不足和投向变更可能是造成A股IPO长期盈利能力下滑的重要原因.     

新股询价配给规则与IPO价格形成的进化博弈分析

针对新股询价“价高者得”的配给规则,本文提出与之相对应的“价近者得”规则,运用进化博弈理论,对询价对象群体建立单群体模仿者动态模型,分析两种规则下询价对象的报价行为和新股发行价格的形成,并采用2009年6月到2010年10月我国中小企业板市场发行的新股数据,对两种规则下询价对象的进化稳定策略进行数值分析。结果表明,当询价对象预期抑价率均值足够大时,“价高者得”规则下询价对象有高报价的倾向,而“价近者得”规则下询价对象倾向于合理报价,改变我国现行“价高者得”的新股分配规则,采取“价近者得”的规则有助于提高IPO询价效率。