纳什均衡的内涵、问题和前景--读《纳什均衡论》

纳什均衡理论由于具有十分强的解决问题的能力,不仅成了现代理论经济学分析方法的基础,而且还对自然科学、社会科学的许多领域产生了影响.但纳什均衡理论不是完美无缺的,"象棋博弈"、"性别博弈"、"蜈蚣博弈"都对纳什均衡的有效性提出了质疑.这就要求纳什均衡理论有新的发展,这种发展既包括超越非合作博弈与合作博弈的传统分类,也包括对纳什均衡理论逻辑起点--经济人的超越和扬弃.     

Max-min DEA模型及效率讨价还价均衡解

建立一类新的DEA模型,即Max-min DEA模型.该模型通过最大化最小效率单元的效率,结合了自评与互评的思路,在一定程度上克服了仅仅采用自评思想的经典DEA模型的缺陷.文中Max-min均衡模型问题在于保护“弱小”单元的同时,有可能损害其它单元的效率.为克服该问题,文章通过Nash讨价还价模型求解Max-min均衡模型与CCR模型的讨价均衡解.最后用算例进行了演示计算.     

"假象"背后的均衡及信息的代价研究

通过库诺特模型可以说明,“假象”的存在将改变均衡结果:如果信息获取是无成本的,那么“假象”将使信息占优一方的均衡利润增加,其对手的均衡利润可能减少,也可能增加;如果获取对手的信息是有代价的,根据我们给出的信息投资的边界条件,当获取信息的代价大于这一边界条件时,获取对手信息是有必要的,反之,应该放弃对信息的投资。     

古典市场均衡理论的意义与当代经济学的发展

西方古典市场均衡理论由产生逐步走向成熟化 ,经过了漫长又艰辛的演变历程。它形成和发展的一般逻辑 ,特别是其精华──市场均衡不是人为的、外部的 ,而是一种“自然趋势” ;组织和维持市场均衡的力量来自市场本身及其自动机制 ;市场均衡力量源于个人自利最大化 ,或“看不见的手” ;市场均衡的条件即经济自由 ;市场均衡并非不要“政府之手”(政府干预 )等等 ,对于研究当今新时代条件下与市场均衡相关的一些重大理论问题 ,如社会经济运行效率与资源优化配置、经济均衡的关系问题 ,社会经济资源要素利用与分配的公平性、可持续性发展问题 ,市场机制与政府行为的协调问题 ,古典市场均衡模式与“新经济”趋势问题 ,是很有现实意义的     

带预算约束的广告主均衡报价研究——基于纳什均衡角度

从广告主角度出发，研究基于纳什均衡概念的带有预算约束的关键词拍卖问题。首先推导出纳什均衡下各个广告主报价的上界和下界。其次给出广告主报价向上偏离无利可图的充要条件，并进行了数值分析。此外，通过数值实例分析了广告主报价向下偏离时对其收益的影响。利用各个广告主报价的上下界和预算刻画了带有预算约束的纳什均衡。最后，利用广告主报价在纳什均衡下的上界给出报价向量是带预算约束的纳什均衡的充要条件。对于广告主制定预算策略具有参考作用。     

Procurement with Reverse Auction and Flexible Noncompetitive Contracts

This article investigates a hybrid procurement mechanism that combines a reverse auction with flexible noncompetitive contracts. A buyer adopts such mechanism to procure multiple units of a product from a group of potential suppliers. Specifically, the buyer first offers contracts to some suppliers who, if accepting the contract, do not participate in the auction while committing to selling a unit to the buyer at the price of the subsequent auction. For the suppliers rejecting the offers, they can join the subsequent auction with the other suppliers to compete on the remaining units. When the buyer offers only one flexible noncompetitive contract, we find that the selected supplier may accept the offer regardless of whether he knows his exact cost information. Meanwhile, the buyer can benefit from offering such a contract, as opposed to solely conducting a regular reverse auction or offering a noncompetitive contract that does not allow suppliers declining offers to join the subsequent auction. Moreover, we find that the suppliers' information about their own costs has a significant impact on the buyer's decision. When the buyer makes multiple offers, we analyze the resulting game behavior of the selected suppliers and demonstrate that the buyer can benefit more than just offering one such contract. Therefore, the hybrid procurement mechanism can be mutually beneficial for both the buyer and the selected suppliers.     

Competition and Coordination in Two‐Tier Public Service Systems under Government Fiscal Policy

As a result of government budgetary limits and rapid market growth, many public service systems—such as health care—are characterized by extensive customer wait times that have become a serious problem. This problem might be solved by allowing private firms to enter these markets, which would provide customers with a choice between a free (governmental) public service provider (SP) and a fee‐charging (or “toll”) private SP. In such a two‐tier service system, the two SPs are differentiated by service quality and cost efficiency. This study focuses on the competition and coordination issues for two‐tier service systems with customers who are sensitive to both service quality and delay. The free system attempts to maximize its expected total customer utility with limited capacity, whereas the toll system attempts to maximize its profit. Neither goal is aligned with the social welfare goal of the public service. To achieve the social welfare goal, the government plays a crucial role in coordinating the two‐tier service system via the budget, the tradeoff of social members' goals, and tax‐subsidy policies. Using a mixed duopoly game, we establish Nash equilibrium strategies and identify the conditions for the existence of the two‐tier service system. We employ several interesting and counter‐intuitive managerial insights generated by the model to show that the public service can be delivered more efficiently via customer choice and SP competition. In addition, we show that a relatively low tax‐subsidy rate can almost perfectly coordinate the two SPs to achieve most of the maximum possible benefit of the two‐tier service system.     

中国古代均平文化论纲

在中国古代社会,平均观念渗透在中国传统文化的各个思想领域,是各种政治思想、社会思想、伦理思想乃至经济思想的重要文化支点。均平文化的基本内涵,包括政治平均、社会平均、经济平均、均平之德等几个最基本的方面。均平作为一种文化,它的思想价值在于追求社会的和谐与均衡。这种文化,还被赋予了天地自然之德的自然属性,是人对自然德性的效法,因此有着天经地义的正当性。     

基于博弈论视角的电商价格战分析

电子商务正在经济活动中扮演着越来越重要的角色,基于博弈论视角进行分析,认为2012年8月15日京东商城与苏宁易购、国美商城之间价格战爆发的内部原因是由于企业间的竞争活动本身具有降价倾向;而外部原因则包括电子商务还处在产业生命周期中的成长阶段,消费者转移成本低,供应链的控制权掌握在渠道商手中,电子商务的价格搜寻成本低,以及市场先入者与市场后进者对市场份额的争夺等多方面因素。电商价格战对整个供应链的各个环节都具有一定的危害,无论是基于社会福利最大化角度,还是企业经济利益最大化的角度,电子商务的价格竞争均急需规范。     

Efficiency improvement from multiple perspectives: An application to Japanese banking industry

The current study focuses on efficiency improvement for banking systems from multiple perspectives, which have different definitions of input/output about various attributes of a banking system. In this research we utilize data envelopment analysis (DEA) and Nash bargaining game (NBG) theory to improve inefficient banks in order to: (1) Make the inefficient bank be the state of Pareto Optimality for multiple perspectives, which can avoid discontentment of some perspectives. (2) Improve a bank by changing its attributes and provide various improving schemes for decision makers. A numerical case study of Japanese banks is also given to show the results of equilibrium solution from multiple perspectives.